China is India largest neighbour and its rise is indeed a global opportunity as well as a challenge. Both India and China have issues of common concern in the world politics related to energy security, climate change, terrorism, uni-polarity and global financial instability.[1] After China-Indian conflict of October 1962, India became security sensitive towards any warming of relations between any of its neighbours on the one hand and China on the other. China’s near sea politics has seriously disturbed not only India, but Japan, Australia, the US, and the ASEAN countries. Traditionally, India has been the major trading partner with its neighbours, but China is entering India’s neighbouring markets more aggressively through aid, trade and investment. China’s has deepened its economic influence in all South Asian nations. The largest beneficiaries of Chinese economic aid are Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.  China’s increasing need of energy sources and access to the international markets makes the South Asia and Indian Ocean ports very attractive. China is expanding its power in South Asia because these countries provide new markets and alternative route to the Indian Ocean. Indian Ocean coastal states are the source of some 60 per cent of the world’s oil and a third of its gas reserve.  China’s role in the South Asia is growing at a rate that underlines much more than a normal expansion of capabilities. The battle between India and China for primacy in the South Asia and Indian Ocean is to be one of the big themes of the coming decades.

India and China, the world’s two fastest-growing economies, have a history of tense relations. They share contested Himalayan border. Water has become linked to land disputes. China claim Arunachal Pradesh (particularly Tawang) and also assert claim over the parts of Sikkim. China has a problem with India playing host to Dalai Lama and Tibetean refugees. Some Indian strategists and military leaders fear ‘maritime encirclement’ by China, via its relationship with South Asian countries. China assertive diplomacy primarily geared to establish its economic and security ties with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.   In some cases this firming up of ties has led to joint port construction or enlargement deals, example include Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka ,Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Sittwe port in Myanmar. China is growing strategic presence in the Giligit-Baltistan area of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. China has been strengthening of its military-related capabilities in Tibet Autonomous region which are in the form of further up gradation of its highway network, the construction of more airports, the construction of railways line from Lhasa towards the border with Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh with plans for the ultimate construction of a railway link-up with Nepal and military exercises involving various units of the People’s Liberation Army.

China has extended trade security ties with the military junta in Myanmar, China decided to supply to more nuclear reactor to Pakistan. In the past China has transferred weapons and missiles technology to Pakistan, possibility of a large number of PLA personnel are working in the Baltisan-Giligit area, secured contracts to develop the Gwadar in Arabian Sea, and obtained cooperation via Shanghai cooperation organization. China is supporting Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. To compound the problem, China is issuing stapled visa for the people from Jammu and Kashmir and of Arunachal Pradesh, Chinese effort to depict Indian Jammu and Kashmir as separate part, a move that India saw as a violation of its sovereignty. China denied a visa to one of the Indian Army Commanders posted at Kashmir. China has challenged India’s Jurisdiction over Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh including Twang tract. India growing concerns are over the damming of the Brahmaputra River by the China. India faces economic competition and a balancing trade deficit with China. China assertiveness in India’s neighbourhood in some ways is a defensive move as it finds itself vulnerable in Tibet, Xinjiang and the India Ocean.

China’s growing influence in India’s neighbouring countries:

Pakistan: China’s support for India’s foe Pakistan has been a cause of concern for India for a long time. Pakistan is developing a strategically important port at Gwadar with economic and technical aid and assistance from China since August 2006, Beijing and Islamabad are in talks to build a new nuclear reactor in Pakistan of the one gigawatt capacity, apparently without the approval of IAEA or the NSG. China has been a major military supplier to Pakistan and its new military alliance with Pakistan has been a new worrisome factor. China gives diplomatic support to Pakistan against Indian interests. China and Pakistan have traditionally valued one another as strategic hedge against India. For Pakistan, China is a guarantor of security against India.[2] China also considers Pakistan critical to energy security. Gwadar-along with a network of rail and roads through Pakistan assures the convenient transport of Middle-Eastern oil and gas to China via its western province of Xinjiang. Chinese Premier during his visit 19 to 20 December, 2010 to Pakistan Said, Pakistan and his country were “all weather strategic partners.” That means “the Chinese government and people of Chinese will stand by Pakistan to face all challenge together.”  

China and Pakistan signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2006, as well as numerous other agreements and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), including Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) to increase mutual trade and investment. Pakistan provides China with cheap raw materials and the use of Pakistani ports in return for access to Chinese markets through preferential treatment under the FTA. Pakistan could very well become a hub in the region, which may lead to considerable future transit revenues and help Beijing build the ‘trade and energy corridor’ through Pakistan.[3] Ultimately, from an Indian point of view, the possibility of China and Pakistan working in tandem to reduce India’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood should be a matter of great concern.

Sri Lanka: China ties with Sri Lanka gave it a foothold near the critical sea lanes and also entry into what India considers being its backyard. The geo-strategic location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean having importance in terms of maritime-trade and security of other states, caused concern to India. India is always worried about the harbor’s status; her occupation by any external power has serious repercussions for India security. Sri Lanka provides an ideal base in the India Ocean for naval attack on India and it can also be useful to India for defence in a naval warfare. The island nation also occupies an important place in the critical sea lines of communication.

Sri Lanka gave China the most favoured nation status and provided facility to China warships knowing fully that it is against Indian interests. In 1963 and 1971, much too Indian concern Sri Lanka entered into a maritime agreement with China. This left India worried for its coastal and Oceanic defence.[4] It was strategic concern that guided India’s policy of intervention in the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka from 1987 to pre-1990. Sri Lanka also recognised India’s concern, when it signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of 29th July 1987.[5]India has always opposed the presence of external powers in Sri Lanka.

India had adopted hands-off policy in the ethnic conflict since the withdrawals of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in March1990, especially after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). After this, LTTE had emerged as the biggest threat to both India and Sri Lanka.[6] LTTE had since been banned in India.[7] Military defeat of LTTE by the President Mahinda Rajapaksa government in May 2009 brought an end to this threat. Indian government non-intervention policy provided China with an opportunity to make headway into the Sri Lanka and there is an urgent need for India to take note of this growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka.

In the post-LTTE era, security concern of India and Sri Lanka took an entirely different form. India threat perceptions have grown as China has become more active in Sri Lanka. Economic and strategic interests are behind China interests in Sri Lanka. China and Sri Lanka signed a joint commune in 2005 to further bilateral relation and provide each other Most Favour Nation treatment. There is likely to be growing strategic rivalry between India and China. Since Mahinda Rajapaksa became president in November 2005, there was a new found understanding between Sri Lanka and China.[8] An important reason for the close ties between the Mahinda Rajapaksa government and China was Beijing’s robust endorsement and support of Colombo’s conduct in the war against the LTTE. China was “instrumental to some extent in the Sri Lankan government’s success in defeating the LTTE. Colombo was trying to purchase arms from abroad for years and only China supplied it with weaponry on a sustained basis”.[9]

In May 2007 China and Sri Lanka signed the “establishment of friendship city relationship” relating to the Hambantota district for development of infrastructure, designated as the Hambantota Development Zone (HDZ). There have been some concerns in India about China’s help and assistance in the construction of the Hambantota port on the Indian Ocean in Sri Lanka, particularly in the long term.[10] Indian strategists believe the port is a key link in a chain of such projects from Burma to Pakistan, the so called string of pearls, which seek to extend China’s maritime influence. The Hambantota will serve China in a number of strategic ways. Firstly, it will provides facilities of Chinese flagged merchant ships, container vessels , oil and gass tankers , and military vessels  including nuclear submarines operating in the Indian Ocean. Secondly, China would be able to establish electronic systems and networks for monitoring Indian Ocean military and civilian traffic, electronic transmissions from US base at Diego Garcia and the Indian nuclear facility that is likely to come up at Rambilli in the Bay of Bebgal. Thirdly, Hambantota offers a strategic location for China to set up its space monitoring systems, considered critical for its ballistic missiles, which can challenge US forces particularly the aircraft carriers who may threaten Chinese shipping in the Indian Ocean. Fourthly, the Chinese fleet of fishing vessels that are also deployed for intelligence gathering duties can be staged from Hambantota. [11]

There is a perception that Hambantota may be detrimental to India’s strategic and security interests. Though China and Sri Lanka claim that this is merely a commercial venture, it future utility as a strategic asset for China cannot be ruled out. Though at present there is no talk of a naval base, it could emerge ultimately to cater to the requirements of Chinese oil and gas tankers and anti-piracy patrols.[12]

Besides the Hambantota project, China involved in several infrastructure project on the island. It is constructing a second international airport at Hambantota, a $248 million expressway connecting the capital Colombo with the airport at Katunayake, $855 million coal power plant at Norochcholai, and performing arts theatre in Colombo. China manages a special economic zone at Mirigama for Chinese investors. Since 2006, China has provided Sri Lanka with $ 306 billion in financial assistance for various projects. [13] India sees this Chinese maneuvering as an intrusion into its historic sphere of Influence.

India is worried over the increasing Chinese influence and its implication for India’s security.[14]India’s Hambantota consulate is aimed at “keeping an eye” on Chinese activity there. Such concern explains India’s efforts to build close relations with Japan, Australia and Singapore. As a result, many leaders favour closer ties with the US.

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakasa has sought to allay Indian concerns about the growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka, saying India’s role in the Sri Lanka was a permanent feature. Unlike other players whose engagement was limited to commercial project they execute.

“The Chinese will Come to Sri Lanka, build some project and go, but the Indians will come here, they will build and they will stay. This is the difference in our relation with China and India.” [15]

Affirming India’s interests, Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated earlier also,

“All countries are friends of Sri Lanka but India is Sri Lanka relation (relative). Sri Lanka will not initiate any action with any other country against India as it would be self defeating act.” [16]

Bangladesh: Although China does not have an FTA with Bangladesh, the two countries, granted each other Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment in 1984. China provides duty-free access to a list of Bangladeshi products under the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement, and Bangladesh has offered oil exploration rights to China at Barakpuria. China has also gained naval access to the Bangladeshi Chittagong port, which will bring China closer to Myanmar oil fields and the seas around India.[17] The situation in northeastern India can become precarious if Bangladesh has a pro-Pakistan or pro-China government.[18]

A historic land-swap deal during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visit to Dhaka with friendly Sheikh Hasina Government has drastically changed the dynamics of ties between the two nations. The hostility of the past seems to have given way to an unprecedented upswing in the bilateral ties.[19]

Nepal: Nepal is in effect India’s security outpost. China has gained greater influence in Nepal with the emergence of Nepali Maoist as a political force. It is Possible China could move its troops into Nepal and threaten India through Uttar pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal. China has built the Qingzang railway line from the Tibetan capital of Lhasa to Kathmandu. China has also constructed a number of roads and airfields in Tibet and building dams on Brahmputra. China is investing in infrastructure at the China-Nepal border.

There have been unmistakable signs of China expanding its presence and influence in Nepal. The visit of powerful Chinese military delegation to Nepal in 23-26 March, 2011 under the leadership of PLA chief, General Chen Bingde. An MoU was signed during his visit offering Chinese assistance of $19.9mn to Nepal for medical equipment and construction machinery. In Nepal, defeciencies and failure of Indian diplomacy will be exploited by an assertive China to its advantage with the help of all those Nepali political forces that fell alienated from India.[20]

The election of Indian educated Baburam Bhattarai as the Prime Minister has proved India an opportunity to re-design the relationship and put an end to anti India campaign there. Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai four day visits in October, 2011 is significant for both countries. A peaceful and stable Nepal suits India’s interests. Nepal on the other hand needs India investors to invest in that country to give boost to its economy.   Baburam Bhattarai said Nepal expect more contribution from India in building Nepal’s economy. India needs to make best of this opportunity so that good relationship with Nepal can be estabilished. If India fails to take up that role in Nepal’s growth, China may take up that role.[21]

Myanmar:  Myanmar provides China’s landlocked inner provinces such as Yunnan with access to the Indian Ocean, thus bypassing the Malacca Strait. Malacca Strait is one of the busiest maritime chokepoints in the world, since virtually all seaborne trade to and from Asia and Europe/the Middle East must pass through it as other routes are longer. [22] Thus, having an alternative outlet is crucial for China. Myanmar is undergoing a naval infrastructure modernisation programme with Chinese assistance. China has started building oil and gas pipeline connecting it to the port of Kyaukpyu on the Bay of Bengal. China has proposed rail link, via Myanmar, to Chottagong port in Bangladesh.

Maldives: China has secured a naval base in the Maldives. But India has key influence in Maldives.  India has long maintained security with Maldives. India is establishing a network of listening stations and other military facility there, as a direct response to China’s development of Hambantota in Sri Lanka. The Indian armed forces favour a base for their surveillance aircraft on the Island of Gan, as well as basing for aircraft and ships in the capital Male and Hanimadhoo.

Chinese other movements include, the construction of a new naval base at Hanggyi Island in the Bassein river at the mouth of the Irrawady; construction of Sona deep sea port at Cox Bazar and development of existing facilities at Sittwe near the Bangladesh border and development of radar facilities in the Coco Island at a distance of only 30 nautical miles from the Andaman Chain of islands of India are all significant Chinese moves.[23]

India’s primary concern is to counter the threat posed by Chinese “encirclement” (the so called ‘string of pearls’). As a result, India’s two policy thrusts are the Indo-US strategic partnership and a ‘Look East’ policy. India is building close relations with Japan, Australia, and Singapore for offensive against China in South East Asia. India’s own charm offensive in the region has also been bearing fruit, whether it is through the establishment of electronic monitoring system in Madagascar in 2007, or in August 2009 in the Maldives. India officials have also become more active to the attempt of their Chinese counterparts to woo small but strategically placed nations such as the Seychelles or Mauritius.

Despite irritants in bilateral relations on political front, India and China need each other. China needs to access India’s market as much as India needs to draw Chinese capital to develop infrastructure projects. A warm relationship between the neighbours will help them to rise on the world stage, also ensure stability in South Asia. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao met in Bali on 18^th November, 2011, on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit and agreed that there was enough space and area for the two Asian giants to work together. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has time and again stated that the world has enough space to accommodate the aspirations of both India and China and that two countries should complement each other rather than looking at each other as competitors. Two way trades has been impressive growth and has a potential to grow, but widening deficit is a concern for India. Chinese premier promised to redress the trade imbalance between the two. Improve access for Indian exporters of pharma, IT and auto companies will help to narrow the gap. The future of both lies in its partnership not rivalry. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said on 16^th December 2010 during his visit to India,

“China and India are partners for cooperation not rivals in competition. There is enough space in the world for the development of both China and India and there are enough areas for China and India to cooperate” [24]

Following are some suggestions and observations of the study:

Suggestions:

• India as an emerging power has the responsibility to create confidence with its neighbouring countries so that they can walk with India and not pull India indifferent directions.
• India should engage China particularly in trade and avoid military conflict as long as possible.
• India should work towards engaging a strategic ally (possibly US) having sufficient military and economic muscle to caution China on any adventurism against India.
• Closer economic and military cooperation can bring South Asian nations to closer. India needs to energize trading blocs countries such as ASEAN, SAARC, SAPTA and IORARC by giving preferential treatment and help them in their economic development.
• Improving relationship with Pakistan and Bangladesh is very important for improving relationship with other neighbouring country.
• Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan need India’s assistance with development and solving internal problems. Since India borders all of these countries, it is an important security measure that these issues be resolved.

Concluding observations:

• In reality, China wants to encircle and contain India. India needs to remain more vigilant. India needs to consolidate its strength and influence in the neighbouring countries. India should broaden its relationship with south Asian countries.
• Tensions between India and China are unlikely to lesson, unless they somehow find an accommodation on their border dispute.
• Amicable ties between China and India are essential for stability in India’s neighbourhood .
• South Asian countries and littoral states of Indian Ocean can get significant geo-political and economic benefits.
•  A good trade relation exists and has the potential to grow even faster in the coming years, despite economic competitiveness and the sharing of contested border.

To conclude, China’s diplomacy is aimed at counterbalancing and checkmating India’s pre-eminent influence in its immediate neighbourhood. China has also been cashing on India’s lapses in neighbourhood and the more India bungles there, the more China gains. Indian policy makers must accept the hard reality that the assertion of influence by a rising China in Asia, including in India’s sensitive neighbourhood, is inevitable and Indian diplomacy has to equip itself strategically, politically and economically to face that reality. Instead of being alarmed at China’s growing influence in the neighbourhood. India needs to find new ways to win neighbours and increase influence in the neighbourhood. All neighbouring countries have close cultural, linguistic, historic ties to India. As a result, it should not be possible for China to encircle India.

Abstract

India has often faced a policy dilemma in responding to the Sri Lanka developments. Keeping in view India’s changing foreign policy perceptions and India’s earlier experience of intervention policy from 1987-pre1990 and particularly after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India has adopted a new policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. At the core of it is a reiteration of the Indian government commitment to protect Sri Lanka’s unity, sovereignty and Territorial integrity. While refusing to play any direct role in the ethnic conflict, India’s consistent position has been in favour of, “a politically negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka and consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights.” India’s pragmatic policy has contributed to remove the cultivated fear complex of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s commitment towards India’s security concern created a credible atmosphere and consequently brought a new era in relations between two countries. The leadership and the people in Sri Lanka have changed their mindset and thinking about India; for the first time, India is considered as an asset rather than a threat to the Sri Lanka’s security. Once the comfort level was established politically, the focus shifted to economic relations. In the post 1990 period consistent efforts have been made by India and Sri Lanka to upgrade bilateral economic relations. India and Sri Lanka have established a dense bilateral network of institutions and mechanisms so as to ensure sustained cooperation irrespective of domestic politics and changes in the external environment of both the countries. A significant development in 1998 is that a large legal frame work for economic relations is provided by ISFTA. In the post LTTE- era a frictional chapter in India’s Sri Lanka policy has come to an end.

Introduction

Sri Lankais a small island state in theIndian Oceanhaving strategic importance in terms of maritime trade and security interests of other states. Other states look towardsSri Lankafor expansion and facilitation of their maritime trade and security and thus attempt to exercise their influence on foreign policy making inSri Lanka.Indiais the closest neighbour ofSri Lanka, separated from it at its narrowest point by 22 miles of sea called the Palk-strait. The implication of such a close proximity is that developments in each country have affected the other. Its geo-strategic location in theIndian Oceancaused concern to the Indian security.Sri Lankaprovides an ideal base in theIndiaOceanfor naval attack onIndiaand it can also be useful toIndiafor defence in a naval warfare.India’s policy towardsSri Lankahas undergone several twists and turns during the post-independence period. From a policy of active involvement during 1987-1990, Indian government in the post 1990 phase took a hands-off policy after assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

Major factors which determineIndia’s policy towardsSri Lankaare the immense disparity in their size, the specific geo-strategic location ofSri Lankain theIndian Ocean, Indian Tamil problem, Sri Lankan Tamil conflict and Influence of Tamil Nadu politics. The emergence of coalition politics at the national level and increasing influence of regional political parties on foreign policy formulation in both the countries over past two decades have infused extra dimension in determining India’s policy towards Sri Lanka. The fear and minority complex of the Sinhalese got reflected in theSri Lanka’s foreign policy and relations withIndia. Misunderstanding and mistrust betweenIndiaandSri Lankaresulted in many ups and downs in determingIndiapolicy. Keeping in mind above said factors, Indian policy makers have always advocated harmonious relations withSri Lanka. India-Sri Lanka relations since independence stand out as a unique example of the manner in which two neighbouring states inSouth Asiahave succeeded in resolving their disputes and problems through political co-operation, discussion, negotiation, diplomatic efforts etc.

Objectives

The objective of this chapter is to analyseIndia’s policy towardsSri Lankain the post independence era. On the basis of nature of India-Sri Lanka relations and the issue dominating the bilateral agenda, the whole policy can be divided into four distinct phases. 1. Decades of Divergences (1947-1982) 2.India’s Policy of Intervention (1983-pre1990) 3.Policy of Non-Intervention and Partnership (post1990-2009) 4.  Post LTTE-era Policy (2009 to Present Day)

1. Decades of Divergences (1947-1982)

From1948 to 1952 the United National Party leaders saw Indiawith distrust and took all precautions to meet any eventuality of danger from India. They leaned heavily towards Britainfor Sri Lanka’s defence. Sri Lankasigned defence pact with Britainin 1947 and provided them naval and air bases at Trincomallee and Katunayake. [1] From the Indian view point, the strategic location of Sri Lanka, their attitude and western approach were not in India’s interest. The issue of Tamils of Indian origin caused strain between them. Although Senanayake and Kotelawala’s policies were West-oriented [2] yet because of Jawahar Lal Nehru’s personality and actions, the relations between the two countries remained cordial.

India-Sri Lankan relations got strained when Chinaattacked Indiain October 1962 and Sri Lankadid not criticise the attack as it failed to brand Chinaas an aggressor.[3]  However, Srimavo-Bhandaranaike made attempts to mediate in the dispute and tried to bringChina andIndia on the negotiation table. After the death of Jawaharlal Nehru on 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister of India. Though Shastri’s tenure was short yet he tried his best to solve the problems withSri Lanka.

The relations between Indiaand Sri Lankareceived a setback during the India-Pakistan war in December 1971, when Sri Lankapermitted flights from West Pakistan to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) through Colombo. Indian government stopped Pakistani over flights as it was believed that Pakistani troops were being transported in the guise of civilians. [4]  

In the General Election of March 1977, Indira Gandhi lost power and the first Non-Congress Government in Indiawas formed at the Centre by Morarji Desai. Morarji Desai visited Sri Lankain February 1979. He addressed a special session of the Parliament. He showed his willingness for cooperation in economic and technical field. During the Janata party rule, Morarji Desai openly criticized those people who were demanding a separate state for Tamils. [5]

After the fall of Morarji Government, Indira Gandhi came back to power in 1980. India-Sri Lanka relations during her second term took a different turn. The personal equation between Indira Gandhi and J.R. Jayawardene was not too good.  Jayawardene’s largely western approach created trouble for India as Sri Lanka refused to condemn the setting up of an American naval base in Diego Garcia. Jayawardne gave Trincomalee Tank Farm, to aSingaporebased company secretly linked withUSAin 1981 for the renovation and expansion of refueling facilities while the Indian tender for the same was rejected. In spite of this, both the countries showed their commitment for cooperation.

There are four important issues that have determinedIndia’s policy towardsSri Lankaimmediately after their independence till 1982.

(i) Statelessness issue of Tamils of Indian origin

Statelessness issue of Tamils of Indian origin caused strain in India-Sri Lanka relations. This constitutedSri Lanka’s central issue in relation toIndiatill the bigger issue of Sri Lankan Tamils’ demand for a separate state came up. During the period of British administration, the Tamil were British subjects and enjoyed equal political and civil rights with other people ofSri Lanka.

The Sri Lankan government under Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake of United National Party in the first Parliament enacted Citizenship Acts of 1948 and 1949. The Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 lay down that a person would be entitled to the status of a citizen of Ceyloneither by the right of descent or by virtue of registration. The conditions of citizenship were further restricted by the Indian and Pakistani Resident (Citizenship) Act of 1949. [6]  These Acts deprived the great majority of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka of their citizenship rights and franchise. These Citizenship Acts had an immediate impact on India and its domestic politics. [7] Indian Government emphasized on dialogue in spite of the provocative Acts of the Sri Lankan Government. Attempts were made to resolve the dispute through Jawahar Lal Nehru-Kotewala Pact 1954, Srimavo-Shastri Pact 1964, Srimavo Bandaranaike-Indira Gandhi Pact 1974, but the problem persisted until 9th November, 1988 when President J. R. Jayawardane Government passed a bill to grant citizenship to all the remaining stateless people of Indian origin. [8] Indian Tamil problem took nearly three decades to finally come to an end amicably.

(ii) Maritime Boundary dispute–Kachchathivu issue

At the time of independence Sri Lankahad unresolved maritime boundary dispute with India, involving disputed possession of Kachchathivu. [9] The problem was further aggravated when both the countries extended their limits of territorial waters. In order to resolve the Kachchativu dispute a maritime agreement was signed on 26^th June 1974 and a boundary line was demarcated. [10] This agreement places the disputed Kachchathivu Island within Sri Lanka’s bounds. The agreement marks the successful culmination of the efforts of the two countries to resolve the long standing problem between them through peaceful negotiations and in a spirit of complete equality, friendship and mutual accommodation. The most important gain of all was that India had won the confidence and understanding of the small Island neighbour by respecting its wishes. [11] A further maritime boundary agreement was signed betweenIndia andSri Lanka in 1976 and the dispute on maritime boundaries withSri Lanka came to an end.

In her Public Interest Litigation Writ Petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution, Ms Jayalalitha has appealed to the Supreme Court for an appropriate writ order or directive for declaring as unconstitutional the two agreements signed between India and Sri Lanka in 1974, and in 1976 under which the island of Kachchativu was ceded to Sri Lanka and the traditional fishing rights of Indian fishermen were given up. Jayalalitha has appealed for a directive to the Union of India to take appropriate steps for retrieving the island or alternately to take steps to obtain or regain the right of access to Kachchativu and right to engage in fishing around the island.[12] Because of the presence of a huge amount of dismersal fish around Kachchativu, the Indian fisherman knowingly or unknowingly cross the Indian maritime boundary only to get captured or shot by Sri Lankan Navy.  She has also appealed for a directive to the Union of India to protect the lives and livelihood of Indian fishermen who regularly fish around the island.

(iii) India’s Security concern

The geo-strategic location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean having importance in terms of maritime-trade and security of other states, caused security concern to India. Sri Lankastrategic location has promoted Chinato develop economic and strategic relations with Sri Lanka.[13] India is always worried about the harbor’s status; her occupation by any external power has serious repercussions for India security.[14] Sri Lanka provides an ideal base in the India Ocean for naval attack on India and it can also be useful to India for defence in a naval warfare. Sri Lanka is virtually located in the centre of Asia and the sea lanes between the Far East and the African and Arab worlds. [15]  This location gives the island a central position midway on the ancient maritime trade route between West and East Asia. Ships passing from Yangon and Kolkata going west to the Suez or the Cape or those sailing from Mumbai of the Gulf and eastward to Singapore still use Sri Lanka’s excellent harbours in Colombo and Trincomalee. [16] The island nation thus occupies an important place in the critical sea lines of communication. Trincomalee has the capacity to serve as a major naval base, and an extra regional naval force could well dominate the sea routes in the area and disrupt Indian shipping. That is whySri Lanka has always occupied an important place inIndia foreign policy calculations.

At the same time,Sri Lankafeel overawed and threatened byIndiabecause of the latter’s size and proximity. Threat perception in the past has ledSri Lankato enter into defence pact withUKin 1947.Sri Lankahad also used its geo-strategic location to neutraliseIndia’s position by cultivating extra regional powers and even expressing her desire to give base facilities to theUnited States of America.

(iv) Fishermen issue

Despite the existence of bilateral agreements of June 1974, March 1976, Joint Working Group and elaborate understanding fishermen issue still trigged worry in diplomatic relations between Indiaand Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan fishermen poaching in other countries waters are more widespread than Indian fishermen doing the same. But the Tamil Nadu fishermen even today invoke the historical rights and routinely stray in to International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) for fishing. This has led to apprehension by the Sri Lankan Navy and in some cases even to shooting. According to official data, more than 400 Tamil Nadu fishermen have been killed after 1983, including as many as 118 between1991 to 2010.[17] The fisherman issue has deeply affected the history, economy and culture of the coastal regions of both Tamil Nadu and northeast Sri Lanka. Due to ceding of Kachchtativu Island in the 1974s, the livelihood of Tamil Nadu fishermen has been badly affected. The fishermen of both the countries have not respected the maritime boundary at all. Despite the historical linkages between the fishermen of both Tamil Nadu and North-eastern Sri Lanka, they still see their comrades as martyrs and those on the other side of the international boundary line as aggressors.

Another factor that makes the Indian fishermen cross to Sri Lankan waters is availability of good quality fish and brown prawns beyond IMBL. On the other hands the Sri Lankan fishermen also cross over to Indian waters near LakshadweepIslandsfor Tuna fish. Other reasons are Lack of Global Positioning System (GPS) in mechanized boats and a chain of Automatic Identification System (AIS) stations along the TamilNaduCoast. [18] Projection of similar interest by India and Sri Lanka as regards the Indian Ocean is further reflected in definitive agreement reached between the two countries on the question of demarcation of their maritime boundaries. The necessity for demarcation of these boundaries had been emphasised by the extension, by both states, of their territorial water and contiguous areas, and by disputed possession of the island of Kachchativu in Palk Strait.[19]After protracted talks and negotiations an Agreement was signed, demarcating their maritime boundary in Palk Strait on 26th June 1974 and its effectiveness from 9th July 1974. Though Kachchathivu was not mentioned but it fell on the Sri Lanka side of the boundary agreed upon by the two countries.[20]

The main problem in the fishing rights in the PalkBayis that of the conflict between laws of the sea and the traditional fishing rights. Historically Indian fishermen and the Sri Lankan fishermen have been fishing in PalkBaywith occasional fights between the two groups; however with the ceding of Kachachativu to Sri Lankain 1974, fishing has become an issue of contention between Indiaand Sri Lanka. Until the civil war which broke out in Sri Lankain 1983 the Indian fishermen did not find it difficult to operate near the Kachchativu for fishing. In due course of time, however, the Sri Lanka Navy has become unfriendly to the Indian fishermen owing to their inability to distinguish between genuine fishing vessels and boats used for smuggling goods for the Sri Lankan Tamil militants. Consequently, indiscriminate firing and killing of Indian fishermen became common. Entering into others’ waters and carrying out fishing activity is illegal. However, under Article 146 of the UN Law of Sea, “Measure will be taken to ensure effective protection of human life.” Despite various outcries the humanitarian aspect of the problem was overlooked by both countries. In the post-LTTE era, relaxations of fishing restrictions alongSri LankaCoast have led Sri Lankan fishermen to venture into the sea. Indian fishermen, who enjoyed a monopoly of resource rich waters, have now got competitors in the form of their Sri Lankan counterparts.  During the ethnic conflict, the straining of Indian fishermen was overlooked. In the post conflict period, Sri Lanka Navy is patrolling the island’s maritime borders.

Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa, during his visit to Indiafrom 7th June 2010 to 11thJune 2010 and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to explore ways to strengthen the safety and security of fishermen and, in this context directed their official to revive the meeting of the bilateral Joint Working Group on fishing. [21]  It was also decided to enhance and promote contacts between the fishermen’s association on both sides. External Affairs Minister SM Krishna in response to Call Attention Motion in Raja Sabha said,

“The Government of India provides protective cover to fishermen as long as they do not stray in to the Sri Lankan water. We are bound by a bilateral treaty and we to act according to rules.” [22]

January 2011 incident in which two fishermen were killed allegedly  by the Sri Lankan Navy  in a span of 10 days following which India lodged  a strong protest with the island nation and sought strong action to end such incidents.[23]Jayalalithaa of the AIADMK of Tamil Nadu said, “The retrieval of Kachchathivu was the only solution to end the suffering of Tamil Nadu fishermen.”  Following the killing, the Foreign Secretary of India, Nirupama Rao visited Sri Lanka on 30-31 January, 2011. During the visit she called on President Mahinda Rajapakse and Minister External Affair G. L. Peiris. Rao expressed deep concern over the killing of two Indian fishermen allegedly by the Sri Lanka Navy and said it expected the island nation to put in place “effective measures” to avoid recurrence of such incidents. In a joint statement issued at the end of the visit both India and Sri Lanka agreed that use of force cannot be justified under any circumstances and both countries desired to find an amicable solution to the issue. [24] Joint measure to solve this problem such as joint naval patrolling, controlling of smuggling and piratical activities and strengthening of communication network are suggested. Still, differences persist on fishing rights of Indians and it has been decided by both the countries to address the issue amicably.

2. India’s policy of Involvement (1983- pre1990)

The events between 1983 and 1990 marked the most troubled and conflictual years in the India’s policy towards ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. India’s involvement had embittered its relationship with both the government and people of Sri Lanka. The Government of India had been, right from the beginning, interested in a negotiated political solution to this ethnic conflict, and it had been urging the Sri Lankan government to arrive at such a solution. Indiadid not want a separate state to emerge in Sri Lanka, as it could have fuelled a separatist Movement in Tamil Nadu. Indiaalso did not want the foreign personnel and equipment in and around Sri Lankawhich would have jeopardized India’s geo-security.

In July 1983, serious ethnic riots took place in Sri Lanka. [25] These riots began the flow of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees into India. [26]  Indira Gandhi appointed G. Parthasarthy as her special envoy to help Sri Lanka in solving the Sri Lankan Tamil Conflict. [27] But Jayawardene considered this act as interference and intervention in its internal affairs. Since the riots, the Sri Lankan Government adopted a line in Foreign Policy, which directly affected the security of India. The Revival of Defence treaty with UK, the Trinocomalee Tank Farm Deal, expansion of scope of the Voice of America, Sri Lanka Collaboration with a private British Security Organisation Keeny Meeny Services, having ex-Special Air Services and many such steps created a disharmonious relationship between India and Sri Lanka. [28]

The Tamil Nadu Assembly moved a resolution on 24^th October, 1983, expressing condolence for the innocent Tamils who were killed in Sri Lanka. Another thing which gave Tamil Nadu reason to show legitimate interest in the crisis in Sri Lanka was that it was Tamil Nadu had to bear the large number of Tamil refugees. Their number reached around 150,000 after the ethnic riots of 1983. [29]

After 1983 July riots, Jayawardene made frantic appeals to several countries including US, UK, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Israel for political and military help. Sri Lankaprorogated to these countries that there was a threat to its unity and integrity from Tamil terrorism which was supported and encouraged by the government and people of India. [30] Therefore, the Government of India could not remain a passive spectator to mass killing of the Tamils, as Tamils in India were watching Government of India’s lack of action with anxiety. The people and political parties in Tamil Nadu exerted pressure to force India to save the lives of “their brethren” in Sri Lanka. The Indian Government condemned the killing of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was forced to take some steps to placate the opinion of Tamil Nadu. Indira Gandhi stated that the Indian government was dealing with the Tamils question in Sri Lanka as a national issue. She further expressed that, “India could not be regarded as ‘Just another country’ as every development in Sri Lanka affected India also.” [31]

In response to all these developments Indira Gandhi stated in the Lok Sabha thatIndiadid not pose any threat toSri Lankaand it had no desire to interfere inSri Lanka’s internal matters. But she clearly warned Jayawardene Government that any external involvement in this region would complicate matters for both the countries.

After the assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in November, 1984, Rajiv Gandhi assumed power and became the Prime Minister of India. Rajiv Gandhi pledged to strengthen the ties withIndia’s “immediate neighbours in South Asia” and wanted to solve ethnic conflict ofSri Lanka“on the basis of mutual respect, sovereign equality and friendship.”

A meeting was held between Rajiv Gandhi and President J. R. Jayawardene on June 2-3, 1985 inNew Delhi. The two leaders discussed the ethnic issue and its impact on bilateral relations. Both the sides agreed that immediate steps should be taken to defuse the situation and create a proper climate acceptable to all concerned, within the framework of unity and integrity ofSri Lanka. They reaffirmed the traditional friendship betweenIndiaandSri Lankaand the two leaders decided to remain in close touch with each other.

The ethnic crisis ofSri Lankatook a new turn when the LTTE started carrying out its plan to take over the civil administration in the north which was under military control. The question of LTTE’s control over theJaffnaPeninsulaand the possibility of their declaring it as ‘Eelam’ created a bad situation in Sri Lankan Parliament in January 1987. In response to these activities of LTTE President Jayawardene imposed an economic and communication blockade on theJaffnaPeninsulain January 1987. This caused considerable hardship to the civilian population inJaffna. Faced with mounting pressure from the hard line Sinhalese and fundamentalists, Jayawardene launched ‘Operation Liberation’ in theJaffnaPeninsulain May 1987.  In Indian Parliament and in Tamil Nadu, the question of economic blockade and killing of Tamil civilians by Sri Lankan forces outraged public opinion and there was a huge pressure on Rajiv Gandhi, to do something immediately.

On 3^rd June, India sent relief supply to Jaffna in a flotilla of 19 fishing boats flying the Red Cross flag. The Government of Sri Lanka rejected the supplies and blocked the Indian flotilla’s entry into Sri Lankan territorial water. In a “drastic move” Indian government sent five Indian Air Force AN-32 transport aircrafts escorted by four Mirage 2000 fighter planes on 4 June, 1987 to Sri Lanka. They dropped twenty five tons of relief supplies in and around Jaffna. During this period, relations between the two countries reached almost breaking point with risk of military confrontation. In this way India’s policy had changed from mediation to arbitration and direct involvement. Later on, Sri Lankan Government comes to an Agreement on 29^th July, 1987. [32]

Unfortunately, as the accord was signed hurriedly and under compulsions, the LTTE did not agree to it.[33] Very few efforts were made to include the LTTE in the process. No doubt on 29^th July, 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka accord accommodated a number of demands of Sri Lankan Tamils without conceding them a separate home land and prevented the entry of foreign elements in Sri Lanka. As per the provisions of the agreement IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka to oversee the implementation of the accord. [34]  LTTE subsequently turned out that IPKF intended to cut the LTTE out, the outcome was breakout of hostilities between the LTTE and IPKF. India decided to forcibly disarm the LTTE. [35] This made India’s relations with Sri Lanka troublesome and by and large conflictual. Subsequently, president of Sri Lanka R. Premdasa arranged the IPKF withdrawal by securing ceasefire arrangement with the LTTE in March 1990. IPKF made sincere efforts to bring down the separatist movement but IPKF were withdrawn without fulfilling its mission on account of various pulls and pressures. 1250 Indian soldiers lost their lives to save the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. [36] The most tragic consequence of 1987 agreement was the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by LTTE. India’s involvement in Sri Lanka between 1983 to 1990 was unavoidable not only  due to the ramifications of Sri Lanka’s oppressive and discriminatory policies against its Tamil citizens but also in terms of India’s  national security concern due to the Sri Lankan government’s security connections with US, Pakistan and Israel.[37] Not only this, but it is also India’s sincere desire to safeguard the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.[38]  Not withstanding that, the fact remains that the India–Sri Lanka Agreement of 29th July 1987 still provides the most appropriate and viable basis for resolving the Tamil problem amicably.

3. India’s Policy of Non-Intervention and Partnership (Post 1990-2009)          

    (i) India’s policy of Non- Intervention

India-Sri Lanka policy in the post 1990 period has undergone a contextual change in together with changes inIndia’s foreign policy perceptions. After the end of the Cold War and the emergence of theUSas the sole super power,India’s foreign policy perceptions have also changed. In keeping with the changing global economic and trade scenario,India’s strategic priorities in Indian Ocean Region have also undergone a change during the last two decades.India’s national security perceptions have now been enlarged to include economic security, free trade and commerce, energy security, and social security of the population in addition to territorial integrity. India-Sri Lanka policy in this period is also now affected by the regional power dynamic, with external powers seeking to increase their own, and counter the influence of others.

Keeping in view all the developments, Indiahas changed its policy towards Sri Lankafrom intervention to non-intervention. Indianew Sri Lankapolicy vis a vis the ethnic conflict combines it old stands with the new realities. At the core of India Sri Lanka policy was a reiteration of the Indian government’s commitment to protect Sri Lanka’s unity, sovereignty and Territorial integrity. [39] While refusing to play any direct role in the conflict, India’s consistent policy has been in favour of, “a politically negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri-Lankan society within the framework of an undivided Sri-Lanka and consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights.” [40] Over and over again, India conveyed to the government of Sri Lanka that peace through war is not a good option and unsustainable in the long run. India adopted indifference over the ethnic conflict and declined to play any direct role in resolving ethnic conflict irrespective of the Sri Lankan request for help.[41]India’s non-intervention policy has resulted in the involvement of extra-regional powers in resolving the ethnic conflict. The ethnic war continued till the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 by the Sri Lankan forces with the tacit support ofIndia.

India’s pragmatic policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs ofSri LankaandSri Lanka’s commitment towardsIndia’s security concern created a credible atmosphere and consequently brought a new era in relations between two countries. India’s new policy has contributed to remove the cultivated fear complex ofSri Lanka. The leadership and the people inSri Lankahave changed their mindset and thinking aboutIndia; for the first time,Indiais considered as an asset rather than a threat to theSri Lanka’s security.

  (ii) India’s Policy of Economic Partnership

In the post 1990 phase consistent efforts have been made by Indiaand Sri Lankato upgrade bilateral economic relations. In this period, Indiaand Sri Lankahave established a dense bilateral network of institutions and mechanisms so as to ensure sustained cooperation irrespective of domestic politics and changes in the external environment of the two countries.[42]  An Agreement was signed between India and Sri Lanka in July 1991 to establish an Indo-Sri Lanka Joint Commission. A significant development in the post 1990 phase is that a large legal frame work is provided by ISFTA on 28^th December, 1998 with an overall objective to promote trade and economic relations between the two countries and to promote FDI. It entered into force from 1^st March, 2000. [43] Other legal frame works are: a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, a Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement, and agreements/ MoU on Air Services, Small Development Projects, and Co-Operations in small scale industries tourism, Information Technology, agricultural, Education, roads, highways, science and Technology.

The ISFTA which was signed at the highest political level marked an important milestone in India-Sri Lanka relations and trade relations in particular, as it concretized and paved the way for closer economic integration. [44] It is expected to bring about enhanced trade between the two countries as well as to expanded and diversified cooperation in a range of economic spheres, including investments. The agreement provides for duty preference access for the goods manufactured in two countries. Both the countries have listed products for immediate duty free entry into each other’s territories. India has agreed to phase out its tariffs on a large number of items within a period of three years. [45] Both the countries have drawn up negative lists in respect of which there are no duty concessions. Both the countries intend to reduce the items in the Negative List through periodic consultations.

The overall trade turnover has grown five times since the entry into force of the ISFTA. Indiais now the largest trade partner of Sri Lanka. Sri Lankahas also emerged as India’s largest trade partner in South Asia. Sri Lankais now the largest exporter to Sri Lanka. But, more important, Indiabecame the third largest export destination for Sri Lankan products (rising from 16th rank) as a result of ISFTA. [46]

In terms of investments, too, in the Post 1990 phase, Indiamaintained its position as one the leading investors in Sri Lanka. According to latest figures from the Board of Investment of Sri Lanka, Indiais among the top five overall investors in Sri Lanka. Investments from Indiapicked up rapidly after the signing of the ISFTA. [47] India  already have many leading Indian companies operating in Sri Lanka such as the TATAs (Taj Hotels, VSNL, Watawala tea planations), Ashok Leyland, Ultratech, Nicolas Piramal, CEAT, L & T , Taj Hotels, Lanka LOC. In addition there are four Indian Banks, the LIC, and education service providers like NIIT and MAFOI. Most of these investments happened in the aftermath of the ISFTA and were driven to a large degree by the opportunities generated by the ISFTA. [48]

The Post 1990 phase has also witnessed a rising trend in Sri Lankan investments into India. Main Sri Lankan investments in India include  confectionaries (Ceylon Biscuits- Munchee Brand) beverages, (Carsons Cumberbatch),Garments (Brandix’s, Textile City in Vizag and MAS holdings in Nellore), Hotels (John Keels, Hayleys, and Aitken Spence),furniture items (Damro),porcelain (Dankotuwa), Tyres (Ceat-kelani), shipbuilding (Colombo Dockyards),logistics (DRH Logistics and Freight  Links International). [49]

Although there is economic cooperation between Indiaand Sri Lankaand it is growing over the years and ISLFTA is a significant step forward but a lot more needs to be done in the near future. There is a scope for improvement. At present there are a large number of items in the negative lists as well as quantitative restrictions which can be done away with. Indiaand Sri Lankaare competitors in the international market for tea, rubber, spices, garments and textiles and agricultural products. India and Sri Lanka have also some trade related problems like; rules of origin problem, threat to similar domestic products, non competitive sectors also included in negative list, and unauthorized trade etc. The Governments of India and Sri Lankaalso felt that more action was required to unleash the full potential of our bilateral economic relations. Accordingly, in June 2003, the two governments decided to set up a Joint Study Group to explore possibilities of starting negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. [50]   Both countries after thirteen rounds of negotiations jointly announced in July 2008 that CEPA agreement was fully negotiated and ready for signature. [51] CEPA is expected to build on momentum generated by the ISLFTA. CEPA seeks to extend bilateral opening beyond trade in goods, to include services, investment and overall economic co-operation. It will address some of the issues that have come up in the implementation and operation of the ISLFTA as well. [52] It will impart renewed impetus and synergy to bilateral economic relations. CEPA aims at creating a more facilitating environment for Sri Lankan exports and seeks to remove some of the perceived impediments to exports fromSri Lanka.

4. Post LTTE-Period Policy (May 2009 to Present)

In the post-war period, a frictional chapter in India-Sri Lankan history has come to an end. It is time for Indiaand Sri Lankato start a new chapter with renewed vigour and vitality by rigorous co-operation in various fields.[53] It is likely that this period would not see the policy of involvement but rather of mutual trust and harmony. In this period both countries agreed that with the end of military operation in the island country, the time is opportune to focus attention on issues of relief, rehabilitation, resettlement and reconciliation, including a permanent political solution.[54]

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted on June 9, 2010 in his reply to the debate on the motion of thanks to the President’s address to the joint session of Parliament, that the Tamils’ problem was much larger than the LTTE and hoped the Sri Lanka government would show imagination and courage in meeting the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Tamil people.[55] Prime Minister told parliament that India has made it known that it has no intention of instructing Colombo on the political front but is ready to play an active part in the relief   and rehabilitation of the IDPs and has earmarked Rs. 500 crore for the purpose.

“We are willing to do more to restore normality and to help such people return to their rightful home and occupations.” [56]

In the post-LTTE era, Indiais worried over the increasing Chinese influence and its implication for India’s security.[57] The Chinese presence in Sri Lanka has increased so much that there is no major infrastructure project in which the Chinese have not invested. There is a perception that Hambantota may be detrimental to India’s strategic and security interests. Though China and Sri Lanka claim that this is merely a commercial venture, its future utility as a strategic asset for China cannot be ruled out. Though at present, there is no talk of a naval base, it could emerge ultimately to cater to the requirements of Chinese oil and gas tankers and anti-piracy patrols.[58]

Sri Lankan President, Mahinda Rajapakasa, has sought to allay Indian Concerns about the growing Chinese influence inSri Lanka, sayingIndia’s role in theSri Lankawas a permanent feature. Unlike other players whose engagement was limited to commercial project they execute.

“The Chinese will Come to Sri Lanka, build some project and go, but the Indians will come here, they will build and they will stay. This is the difference in our relation with China and India.” [59]

It has been aptly described by president of Sri Lanka Mahinda Rajapakse, “India as relation (relative) and other states as friend.” The maturity of relations between both the countries is evident fromSri Lanka’s strong support toIndia for permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

There is consensus within an outside Sri Lankathat with the LTTE out of the way, a golden opportunity has presented itself before the government to work towards a just, honourable and durable political settlement of the ethnic conflict. [60] The government has promised a political package to address the grievances of the Tamil community and resettle the displaced persons in the north.[61] President Mahinda Rajapakse also noted at victory rally in Colombo on June 3, “The war is over. Now is the time to win the hearts and minds of Tamils”. Speaking in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi, who is also the President of the DMK, pointed out that in the post-LTTE era, attaining the goal of Tamil Eelam was not a realistic goal. He advocated the pursuance of a “flexible policy”, where the Tamils should avoid critical comments about the Sinhalese “out of anger and hatred”, because it may have “adverse effect” on their well being. The need of the hour, Karunanidhi underlined, is for the Tamils to carry on their struggle “for equal rights, equal status for their language and devolution of power at the regional level”. This statement shows that transformation has taken place in the DMK perception on Sri Lanka. It may be recalled that in July 1983, on 27 August 1983, the DMK passed a resolution, which stated that a separate Tamil Eelam shall be the only remedy and permanent solution.[62]

In the post-LTTE era without devolution the internal situation in Sri Lankawould continued to be restive. This could have fall on the Tamil Nadu situation.[63] In the Post civil war period if the relationship between Tamils of the Tamil Nadu and Tamil of Sri Lanka’s channel into a positive and vibrant force, a previously constraining force on India-Sri Lanka relations could transform into a promising connection that draw the India and Sri Lanka close together.[64]Jayanthi Natarajan of the Congress also its spokesperson in the Raja Sabha during motion of thanks to President said, “We demand that President Mahinda Rajapakse ensure proper devolution of authority to Tamils and discrimination must end. Nothing short of this will satisfy us.” [65]

It is imperative that Indiaadopts a pro-active policy towards Sri Lanka, in order to not only save the Tamils but also for its own enlarged security reasons. Economy aid could be a big trump card in India’s foreign policy. In the post LTTE era, Indiawants government of Sri Lanka“to put forward a credible devolution package at the earliest”.India has deep interest in peace and stability inSri Lanka. Peace inSri Lanka can only contribute to further deepening and expansion of India-Sri Lankan ties to mutual advantage.

Conclusion

To sum up, the Government of India’s policy towardsSri Lankahad deep impact on India-Sri Lanka relationship.Indiahad in the past been actively engaged in the process of negotiations for citizenship and other rights of Tamil of Indian origin, maritime boundary dispute, security and fishermen issue. But its direct involvement in assisting Sri Lanka to work out a political solution to the ethnic conflict, at Sri Lanka’s request, began in the wake of July 1983 riots. From 1983 to 1987 the objective ofIndia’s involvement inSri Lankawas twofold.Indiawanted to helpSri Lankagovernment and the Tamils to evolve a workable solution to the ethnic conflict as it was wary of the emergence of a Tamil ‘Eelam’ nation out ofSri Lanka. At the same timeIndiaalso wanted to prevent possibility of the involvement of external powers in the ethnic conflict. The escalation of ethnic conflict inSri Lankaand possibility of involvement of external powers in the ethnic conflict and its perception inIndiacompelledIndiato adopt a policy of intervention in the internal affairs ofSri Lanka.Indiaproactive politico-military intervention proved ultimately failure. The   lessons thatIndiahas learnt from its intervention are very harsh and hard to forget. Many feel that Indian policy from was ill conceived, unrealistic and adventurous. However, it can be stated thatIndia’s intervention had certainly saved theSri Lankafrom territorial disintegration and also it had undoubtedly servedIndia’s geo-security interests by preventing the entry of outside powers inSri Lanka. In the post 1990 phase,IndiaandSri Lankahave established a dense bilateral network of institutions and mechanisms so as to ensure sustained cooperation irrespective of domestic politics and changes in the external environment of the two countries. The year 1998 saw the biggest boost in economic relations when both the countries signed ISLFTA. ISFTA has resulted in rapid expansion of trade volume, growth in investments, better connectivity, and a more intensive economic and development cooperation between both the countries. Following   the   success of ISFTA, both the governments decided to set up a JSG to explore possibilities of starting negotiations for a CEPA. CEPA is expected to build on momentum generated by the ISFTA. It will also impart renewed impetus and synergy to bilateral economic relations. This study concludes that economic relationship betweenIndiaandSri Lankaare at the highest level of cordiality. Study gives projections thatIndiaandSri Lankawill develop development partnership in the coming years. Economic relations can go a long way in building and cementing stable and peaceful political relations. This study further concludes thatIndia’s policy towardsSri Lankais heading towards model relationship which can be emulated by other smaller states inSouth Asia.

Notes and References

INDIA-SRI LANKA ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP IN 21^st CENTURY

Dr. Gurnam Chand*

Abstract

The sharply improving economic co-operation between India and Sri Lanka has its roots in the maturing political relationship. India’s clear, sincere and abiding commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and India’s pragmatic policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka’s commitment towards India’s security concern created a credible atmosphere and consequently brought a new era in relations between two countries. India’s new policy has contributed to remove the cultivated fear complex of Sri Lanka. Once the comfort level was established politically, the focus shifted to economic relations. In the post 1990 period consistent efforts have been made by India and Sri Lanka to upgrade bilateral economic relations. India and Sri Lanka have established a dense bilateral network of institutions and mechanisms so as to ensure sustained cooperation irrespective of domestic politics and changes in the external environment of the two countries. A significant development in 1998 is that a large legal frame work for economic relation is provided by ISFTA and the Institutional framework for the relationship is provided by India-Sri Lanka Joint Commission and frequent contacts at the political level. Following the success of ISLFTA, both countries started negotiations for Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. CEPA seeks to include services, investment and will impart renewed impetus and synergy to bilateral relations. At present, economic relationship between India and Sri Lanka are at the highest level of cordiality. India and Sri Lanka will develop development partnership in the coming years. Economic relations can go a long way in building and cementing stable and peaceful political relations.

Introduction

The India­­­­­­-Sri Lanka economic partnership has transformed and developed rapidly in all aspects in the past two decades. India foreign policy in the post 1990 phase has pushed economic partnership into the lead role in India-Sri Lanka bilateral partnership. India’s decision to offer Sri Lanka favourable terms in trade has yielded not only greater economic partnership but political and strategic benefits as well. From post 1990 period, Indian economy is most dynamic and attractive with which Sri Lanka continues to have strong relations by reasons of shared historical experience, common civilisation and cultural values sustained by geographically proximity and ethnic affinity. The political stability in Sri Lanka and commitment of the leadership provide the business communities of two countries to work on new ideas and explore the opportunities for trade, commerce and investment. Bilateral trade between two countries has increased tenfold and it is hoped it would touch $8 billion by 2015.

India-Sri Lanka economic partnership has a history dating back to the pre-colonial era. However during the colonial era, both economies were geared to producing goods for the colonial power. Even after independence, in the 1950s, the production structure of India and Sri Lanka did not undergo any significant changes. Thus there were no major transformations in the trade flow between India and Sri Lanka. The state of affairs changed gradually with liberalization of the Sri Lankan economy in1977and began to pick up in the post 1990 phase with the liberalization of the Indian economy. In the post 1990 period consistent efforts have been made by India and Sri Lanka to upgrade bilateral economic relations. Due to these efforts and India’s pragmatic policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka and India’s clear, sincere and abiding commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka sowed the seeds for eliminating all irritants in the ties between both the countries. Once the comfort level was established politically, the focus shifted to economic relations. Both countries are now among Asian nations that are on higher economic growth path. Sri Lanka has seen rapid economic growth especially since the end of the armed conflict. Sri Lanka’s geo-strategic location provides unique opportunities for both India and Sri Lanka to work together for greater linkages with the extra regional centers of economic activity for common benefit and advantage. The year 1998 saw the biggest boost in economic relations when both the countries signed a bilateral Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA).   

Bilateral Agreements         

In post 1990 phase India and Sri Lanka have established, a dense bilateral network of institutions and mechanisms so as to ensure sustained cooperation irrespective of domestic politics and changes in the external environment of the two countries. A significant development in the post 1990 phase is that a large legal frame work is provided by ISLFTA on December 28th, 1998, with an overall objective to promote trade and economic relations between the two countries and promote FDI. Since the ISLFTA took effect in March2000, expanded economic partnership has become the backbone of India-Sri Lanka relationship which has reached new levels of cooperation and trust.  Other legal frame works are: a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), a Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (BIPPA), and agreements/ MoU on Air Services, Small Development Projects, and Co-Operations in small scale industries tourism, Information Technology, agricultural, Education, road and highways and science and Technology.

Aside from the legal framework, it has an institutional framework in the form of the India-Sri Lanka joint commission, a dispute settlement mechanism and frequent contacts at the political level, including at the highest levels, President, Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers of both the countries are engaged in bilateral discussion covering the entire gamut of the bilateral relationship. Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa was in India twice in 2010. There is regular institutionalised dialogue at all levels of government including Foreign Secretary- led consultations, commerce secretary level talks between customs authorities, fisheries officials, the Navy/Coast Guards etc. In this new phase, both the nations realised that restrictions on trade between the two are detrimental to their economic growth and prosperity. They also realised that relaxation of the restrictions, abolition of tariffs and lifting restrictions on free movement of manufactured goods and services minimize the illegal trade between the two countries. The changed global scenario has also been reflected in their relations because now-a-days economic diplomacy has become prominent.   

Objectives

 The objective of this paper is to study:

• Consistent efforts made by India and Sri Lanka to upgrade bilateral economic partnership from Post 1990 to 2010.
• A large bilateral network of institutions provided by ISLFTA.
• Impact of ISLFTA on bilateral trade and investment.

Methodology

The study is based on the historical/documents analysis approach. This study relies on primary as well as secondary sources. Secondly, since the post 1990 phase of India-Sri Lanka economic relations is a recent event, we have had to heavily depend on periodical literature, newspaper clippings, research journals, books and unpublished material and help from the Internet has been sought.

 India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA)

The ISLFTA which was signed at the highest political level and its subsequent implementation in March 2000 marked an important milestone in India-Sri Lanka relations and in trade relations in particular, as it concretized and paved the way for closer economic integration.  It is expected to bring about enhanced trade between the two countries as well as to expanded and diversified cooperation in a range of economic spheres, including investments. The agreement provides for duty preference access for the goods manufactured in two countries. Both the countries have listed products for immediate duty free entry into each other’s territories. India has agreed to phase out its tariffs on a large number of items within period of three years. Sri Lanka will likewise do so in eight years. Both the countries have drawn up negative lists in respect of which no duty concessions will apply. These lists include items on which protection to local industry has been considered essential. Both the countries intend to reduce the items in the Negative List through periodic consultations. The agreement sets out the rules of origin criteria for eligibility for preferential access. Product having domestic value addition of 35% will qualify for preferential market access. Sri Lanka’s exports with a domestic value addition content of 25% will also qualify for entry into the Indian market if they have a minimum10% Indian content.

India has implemented zero duty on 4150 tariff lines for exports from Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has implemented Zero duty on 1208 tariff lines for Indian exports to Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has also undertaken to progressively liberalise its duties to reach zero-level in respect of additional 2724 tariff lines over a period of 8 years. It has already implemented 70% margin of preference on these tariff lines, which were to become zero duty in March 2008 but implementation is awaited. As of now, 1180 tariff lines remain in the Sri Lanka’s negative list that includes Agriculture/livestock items, rubber products, paper products, Iron and Steel, machinery, and electrical items. On the India side, there are 429 items in the negative list, which include garments, plastic products and rubber products etc. In addition to these concessions; India has also offered quotas to Sri Lanka on certain tariff lines:

(i)         15 million tonnes of Tea (5 tariff lines) with 50% margin of preference on which port entry restrictions that existed earlier have been removed in June 2007; India’s list on which  Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) has been granted  to tea and garments.

(ii)        Textiles, where there is a 25% tariff reduction for 528 Textile items.

(iii)       Garments where the 50% margin of preference on 8 million pieces over 233 tariff lines has been further liberalized through a MoU on October 5, 2007.  As a result, India has reduced duty to zero and removed restrictions on entry ports and sourcing of fabrics from India for 3 million pieces of apparel
products from Sri Lanka. India has also removed ports restrictions on the balance 5 million pieces of apparel products.

Another important feature of the FTA is the Rules of Origin (ROO) criteria to ensure minimum local content. Under the FTA this is reduced to a level of only 35% of FOB value as against 40% under SAPTA.

Impact of ISLFTA on bilateral Trade

(i)         The overall trade turnover has grown five times since the entry into force of the FTA and stands at USD 3.2 billion in 2007. India is now the largest trade partner of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has also emerged as India’s largest trade partner in South Asia, displacing Bangladesh from that position a few years ago.

(ii)        Sri Lankan exports to India have grown 10 times while Indian exports, mostly on the non-FTA route, have grown by 5 times.

(iii)       FTA has facilitated two way trades between India and Sri Lanka. India was the second largest exporter to Sri Lanka before the FTA and is now the largest exporter to Sri Lanka. But, more important, India became the third largest export destination for Sri Lankan products (rising from 16th rank) as a result of FTA. We can, therefore, say that FTA has enabled India to emerge as Sri Lanka’s most balanced trade partner with both exports and imports returning substantial figures. All other leading partners of Sri Lanka are either predominantly exporters or importers.

(iv)       FTA has enabled Sri Lanka to export new products where Sri Lanka did not          traditionally have capacities.

(v)        While the trade gap has expanded due to faster growth rate of Sri Lankan exports, the export-import ratio has come down from 10.5.1 in 2000 to 5: 3: 1 in 2007.

(vi)       A better way to look at benefits of the FTA is to compare the trade between           India and Sri Lanka utilizing FTA concessions, as this is trade generated by        FTA for either country, and conversely the non-FTA trade where trade is carried out             without any concessions: Sri Lanka exports of items covered by FTA in 2007 are             about USD 450-500 million and Indian exports are at USD 600-700 million, which is            fairly balanced.

(vii)      Non-FTA exports from Sri Lanka to India in 2007 are negligible at about US$ 50 million, around the same figure as it was when FTA came into force. Non-FTA exports from India to Sri Lanka in 2007 are substantial standing at about US$ 2 billion, up from about US# 500 million in 2000. This would imply that without the FTA, Sri Lankan exports to India would have remained stagnant while Indian exports, which are largely on the non-FTA route, would have grown four times from the 2000 level. In other words, FTA has benefited Sri Lanka by creating 90% of its current export potential.

(viii)     The import-export ratio which has come down from 10.5.1 to 5.3.1. In 2007           could have been 40:1 if the FTA was not there.

(ix)       Yet another way is to look at size of the economies. Indian economy is about 40 times larger than Sri Lanka. The export of India to Sri Lanka vis-as-vis exports of Sri Lanka to India is only 5 times larger. The ratio of exports and imports without FTA in place as stated above would have been 1:40. It could imply that Sri Lanka’s current export potential is much more than should have been given the ratio of size of economies and this is largely due to the FTA.

Bilateral Trade between India and Sri Lanka

The bilateral trade between India and Sri Lanka has registered a significant expansion and increase in the post 1990 phase. The bilateral trade crossed the US $ 3 billion mark in 2007 and has grown five times in the last seven years increasing from USD 658 million in 2000 to USD 3266 million in 2007. After a temporary dip in 2009 on account of the global recession, bilateral trade is again on the upswing and it is hoped it would touch $ 8 billion by 2015. India is the largest source of imports and third largest export destination for Sri Lanka (rising from 16th rank in 2000). India has emerged as the largest trade partner of Sri Lanka accounting for 16.8% or 1/6th of the trade turnover of Sri Lanka. In terms of overall trade turnover, India is followed by USA and UK, who are largely importers of traditional Sri Lankan products such as garments and tea from Sri Lanka. In fact, India is the most balanced trade partner of Sri Lanka among the top five such partners in the sense that both Sri Lankan exports and imports are rather substantial and trade turnover is not made up overwhelmingly by imports or exports as is the case of other such partners.

Sri Lankan exports to India are mainly non-traditional items such as vanaspati, copper and marble that have benefited from the FTA. An indicator of relative benefits of the FTA to the two countries is that more than 90% of Sri Lankan exports gain from FTA concessions as against only 45% of Indian exports to Sri Lanka receiving the same benefits. Sri Lankan exports have grown faster than Indian exports to Sri Lanka, growing tenfold as against a fivefold increase in Indian exports since the signing of the FTA.

TABLE: 1 IMPACT OF ISLFTA ON BILATERAL TRADE 

(All figures in US$ million) (FTA implemented w.e.f March 2000)

Source: i High Commission of India, Colombo, “Bilateral Trade between India and Sri Lanka,” http://www.hcicolombo.org-I mht

ii   High Commission of India, Colombo, “India-Sri Lanka FTA- Salient Features                                                                    http://www.hcicolombo.org-2 mht

Main Items of Export from Sri Lanka        

The main items exports from Sri Lanka were: Residues and waste food from industry (14.56%); Rubber and articles (12.13%); Coffee, tea, mate and spices (10.41%); Electrical Machinery and equipment and parts (19.06%); Machinery and Mechanical Appliances (8.62%); Ships, boats and floating structures (5.64%); Pulp of wood (4.00%); Copper and articles (3.40%); Glass and glassware (3.33%) and Precious or Semi-precious stones etc., (2.54%).

TABLE:  2 TOP TEN ARTICLES EXPORTED TO INDIA FROM SRI LANKA-2009

Source: Sri Lanka Customs,http:www.hcicolombo.org, accessed on April 24, 2011

The main item in which increase in exports from India has taken place in 2007 is petroleum oils. It alone accounts for 43% of exports in 2007 up from about 20% in 2006. In absolute terms there has been an increase of imports under this category to the tune of about US$ 850 million over the figure of US$ 375 million in 2006. If we take these factors into account, the rise in Indian exports in 2007 would appear to be driven mainly by export of one category i.e., petroleum oils. If we take this category out, the overall increase in exports would appear to be following the trend of earlier years. Another main item of increase has been vehicles of various types, where India is a market leader in new vehicle segment. In 2006, it constituted about US$ 225 million (12.5%) and in 2007, it increased to US$ 301 million (11%).

Main Items of Export from India

The main items of export from India were: Mineral Fuels, mineral oils and products (20.12%); Vehicles other than railway tramway (10.79%); Cotton (8.30%); Pharmaceutical products (5.62%); Iron and steel (3.97%); Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers (3.82%); Machinery and mechanical appliances; & parts (3.78%); Coffee, tea, mate and spices (3.53%); Knitted or crocheted fabrics (3.22%); Paper and paperboard (2.69%).

TABLE:  3 TOP TEN ARTICLES EXPORTED TO SRI LANKA FROM INDIA-2009

Source: Sri Lanka Customs,http:www.hcicolombo.org, accessed on April 24, 2011

Sri Lankan exports have expanded tenfold since the entry into force of FTA against a fivefold increase in Indian exports to Sri Lanka. The trade gap, even though it has expanded in absolute terms, has narrowed in proportional terms. 90% of Sri Lankan exports to India are items covered under the FTA while only 45% of the items exported by India are covered by FTA. Similar benefits in terms of two-way investments and growth in services sector cooperation has been witnessed. However, there are areas of underperformance as well. Sri Lankan exports have a limited spread, with dominance of non ferrous metals and vanaspati, which account for more than 50% of the exports. Top ten Sri Lankan exports account for 90% of exports. Most of the 4150 tariff lines with zero duty remain unutilized. Sri Lankan exports also have a limited geographical spread in India with concentration on South India. As a result, the full extent of the Indian

TABLE: 4 PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SRI LANKA TRADE WITH INDIA

 Source:  High Commission of India, Colombo, “Bilateral Trade between India and Sri Lanka,”

http://www.hcicolombo.org-I mht, accessed on April 20, 2011.

market remains untapped. Besides, quotas under FTA have not been fully utilized due to various reasons.

Investments

In terms of investments, too, from Post 1990, India maintained its position as one of the leading investors in Sri Lanka. According to latest figures of Board of Investment (BOI) of Sri Lanka, India is among the top three or four overall investors in Sri Lanka. Investments from India picked up rapidly after the signing of the FTA. India  already have many leading Indian companies operating in Sri Lanka such as the TATAs (Taj Hotels, VSNL, Watawala tea planations), Ashok Leyland, Ultratech, Nicolas Piramal, CEAT, L & T , Taj Hotels, Lanka LOC. In addition there are four Indian Banks, the LIC, and education service providers like NIIT and MAFOI. Most of these investments happended in the in the aftermath of the ISFTA and were driven to a large degree by the opportunities generated by the ISFTA.

TABLE: 5  INVESTMENTS

Source: Sri Lanka Board of Investment, http://www.hcicolombo.org, accessed on April 20, 2011

Investment projects in commercial operation set up under Section 17 (Board of Investment law under which certain incentives are available) were 59 in number with a total investment of Sri Lankan Rs. 7 billion (US$ 74 million converted mean exchanged rate 1 US$ = SLR 95) employing 5,847 people. Chief among them is investment of about US$ 40 million by Lanka LOC in petroleum products. VSNL has also invested about US$ 1.5 million for operating an external gateway for international communications under this law. Other granites and tiles, non ferrous metals, and power plants.

In addition, there are 96 projects which are in commercial operation under normal laws of the country. The total investment involved is SLR 4,060 million (US$43 million converted at 1 US$) = SLR 95) of these, 64 projects were started after the signing of the FTA. These include investment by Ambuja Cements, Ultratech Cements, ICFAI and MAFOI in education, and LIC. Investments that predate signing of the FTA include investments by Taj Hotels, Lanka Ashok Leyland, and investment by TATAs in Watawala tea plantations, CEAT in rubber products and tyres, and Nicoals Priamal in glasses.

Besides, Sri Lanka also has four Indian banks (SBI, IOB, Indian Bank and ICICI), and Jet Airways, Jetlite, Air India Express and Indian Airlines in the civil aviation sector. Some of the success stories of Indian investment in manufacturing sector have been CEAT and Nicholas Primal, who have taken over sick units, turned them around, expanded and are now earning profits. Another notable investment was by Lanka Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), which entered the Sri Lankan market in August 2002 and revolutionized the retail petroleum sector. They have plans for further expansion and investments.

Upcoming investment projects for which Sri Lankan Board of Investment approvals have been obtained involve an investment of approximately US$ 364 million. As a continuation of this trend, in January 2009, Bharti Airtel launched its services as the fifth mobile operator in Sri Lanka, which is about US$ 150 million and projects in real estate and infrastructure development sector which is about US$ 58 million and US$ 122 million respectively. Another Indian company, Britannia, started its operations in Sri Lanka during the year to bring its famous confectionary brand to Sri Lanka. Lanka LOC expanded its operations by setting up a Lube Plant, and another venture Piramal Glass started its new plant in Horana to manufacture glass in Sri Lanka. Tie-ups with Indian companies were also announced in real estate sector and for setting up IT Parks in Sri Lanka. The notable names include L&T which is in luxury apartment construction and NEB Ltd, a Bangalore based company that is into apartment construction and is working on a project for Metro construction in Colombo.

Further there are other major projects in pipeline which if they were to fructify would involve large investments. These include IT Parks, SEZs, power projects, airports, etc. Besides, according to BOI, some other major projects in pipeline include investments of US$ 125 million by South Asian Petrochemicals in PET plant, and of US$ 100, million by Aditya Birla Group in Carbon Black.

The Post 1990 phase has also witnessed an increasing trend of Sri Lankan investments into India. Main Sri Lankan investments in India include  confectionaries (Ceylon Biscuits- Munchee Brand) beverages, (Carsons Cumberbatch),Garments (Brandix’s, Textile City in Vizag and MAS holdings in Nellore), Hotels (John Keels, Hayleys, and Aitken Spence),furniture items (Damro),porcelain (Dankotuwa), Tyres (Ceat-kelani), shipbuilding (Colombo Dockyards),logistics (DRH Logistics and Freight  Links International).

Trade expansion has also given a push to the service industry like shipping, logistic, banks; insurance etc.70% calls at Colombo port are from India. Largest tourist arrival in Sri Lanka is from India Sri Lanka is the largest foreign airline in India with 100 flights a week to 11 destinations. Other players include Mihin Lanka, Air India Express,Indian Airlines,Sahara,Jet Airways.

Development Cooperation with Sri Lanka

(i) Infrastructure Development

India is active in a number of areas of development activity in Sri Lanka. The last four years have witnessed extension and utilization of credit lines amounting to US $ 281 million. These credit lines have been utilized for wheat, buses, petroleum products, commodities and consultancy services. India is participating in infrastructure development in Sri Lanka. A line of credit of US$ 100 million has been extended for the refurbishment of the southern railway corridor from Colombo to Matara. The project involves track laying on the Kalutara-Matara sector by IRCON and provision of training and rolling stock by RITES. The total cost of the project is likely to be around US$ 167 million and is likely to be implemented in two phases.

In the power sector, as mentioned earlier, NTPC Ltd. is in discussion with Government of Sri Lanka to set up a 500 MW coal based thermal power plant in Trincomalee as a joint venture with Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB). An Mou was signed between NTPC, CEB and GoSL on December 29, 2006 at Colombo. The project would involve investments of US$ 500 million and would be implemented by a JV company to be formed with a stake of 50% each by NTPC and CEB.

Another power related project relates to setting up an interconnection of the electricity grid between India and Sri Lanka to enable Sri Lanka to source electricity from India. The two sides have set up a Steering Committee at Power Secretary level and a Task Force to carry out negotiations on the modalities of implementation.

Lanka Indian Oil Corporation has invested in Sri Lanka and now operates 170 petrol pumps in Sri Lanka and has successfully raised money through an IPO to fund expansion of its activities, including the setting up of a lubes plant in Trincomalee with an investment of US and 5 million.

(ii) Capacity Building in Sri Lanka

India provides about 150 training slots for middle and higher level professionals under the ITEC, Colombo Plan and BIMSTEC schemes. These course have proved immensely popular and have been utilized by Sri Lankan professionals in wide variety of areas such as entrepreneurship development, biotechnology, water resources, financial management etc. To assist in capacity building in agriculture, there are training programmes, scholarships, research projects and exchange of visits of farmers. 16 M.sc. and 21 Ph.D. slots at Indian Agricultural Research Institutions have been made available to Sri Lankan students. Specific education projects include upgradation of the educational infrastructure of the schools in the Central province including teachers’ training, and setting up of e-libraries and computer laboratories. In addition, scholarships are awarded annually to 100 Sri Lankan students each year under the Mahatma Gandhi Scholarship Scheme instituted in 2008. Another set of 75 scholarships is awarded by the High Commission of India to Sri Lankan nationals for pursuing under-graduate and post-graduate courses in various reputed institutes and universities in India.

(iii) Development Cooperation

A number of development projects are also implemented under ‘Aid to Sri Lanka’ funds. In order to support the Government of Sri Lanka’s e-Sri Lanka initiative, the Government of India has established 20 Nenasalas is under consideration. As part of “English as a Life Skill” project of the Government of Sri Lanka, a proposal to set up a Centre for English Language Training in Colombo to train English teachers is also under consideration which aims to develop Sri Lanka’s BPO sector. Already 41 scholarships to English Teachers in Sri Lanka have been granted to train them in modern English teaching methods at the English and Foreign Language University in Hyderabad.

India and Sri Lanka have also signed a MoU in April 2008 for creation of vocational training centre in Puttalam which is under implementation. During the Joint Commission meeting in 2005, EAM announced a scheme for Small Development Projects. A MoU on Cooperation in small development Projects has been signed. India has started work on several such projects at a cost of Rs. 40 million each and the numbers are likely to increase with the period of time. Some of the projects being implemented include providing fishing equipments to the fishermen in the North and East of Sri Lanka, Solar Photovoltaic Aided Computer Education in Uva Province of Sri Lanka, creation of an Ayurveda faculty in the Eastern University of Sri Lanka, supply of 4 Air Quality Monitoring Stations to G overnment of Sri Lanka and renovation of a Railway Station in Colombo.

In the health sector, India has assisted with supply of equipment and renovation of OT at Dickoya, and work is on for implementation of a project for construction of a 150-bed hospital at Dickoya and for upgradation of the hospital at Trincomalee. A proposal for supplies of equipment to the medical faculty in Eastern University is also under consideration. This is in addition to donation of medicines to the hospital in Point Pedro, supply of 4 state of the art ambulances, a cataract eye surgery programme for 1500 people and donation of equipment to hospitals at Hambantota and Point Pedro.

In continuation of this process, during 2008, India and Sri Lanka entered into necessary arrangements to provide a line of credit of US$ 100 million for the upgradation of Southern Railway corridor in Sri Lanka between Colombo and Matara. This project, once implemented, will reduce the time taken in travelling on this sector and improve the overall quality of travel experience on this sector.

India is also assisting in development of the core sectors like power and energy Talks between NTPC and CEB have progressed on setting up a joint venture to set a coal based thermal power plant in Sampur in Eastern Sri Lanka. The plant would have a capacity to produce 300 MW and would involve and investment of US$ 500 million. India and Sri Lanka have also finalised a MoU on conducting a feasibility study for establishing inter connection of electricity grids between the two countries. The MoU is likely to be signed shortly.

As part of bilateral assistance program India implemented a number of projects. Under the Small Development Project scheme, fishing boats and equipment at a cost of Sri Lanka Rs. 110 million were granted to IDPs in Eastern Sri Lanka. A similar programme is currently under consideration for 2011. Another program to set up a faculty of AYUSH  medicine in Eastern University of Sri Lanka is under implementation. A project to supply equipment for establishment of 20 Nenasalas (e-learning centres) in Eastern Province is also under implementation. India had, earlier in 2007, set up 20 nenasalas all across Sri Lanka. In order to improve connectivity of Battichola and Trincomalee with Colombo. India is currently implementing a project to supply 5 Rail Buses to the Eastern Province. India is also examining the possibility of rehabilitation of some schools in the Eastern Province through supply of equipment and study materials.

Given the dominance of the Service sector in the economy of Sri Lanka, it is very important that the human resource potential of Sri Lanka is developed to enable its emergence as a knowledge economy. In keeping with this, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement on cooperation in Science and Technology in New Delhi in October 2008 providing for seminars, workshops and exchange of visits by scientists and researchers. A MoU in the road and highways sector to facilitate exchange of information; promotion of linkages between enterprises and consulting and engineering companies; and short secondment and training of RDA officers in India was also signed in May 2008 between the Sri Lankan RDA and the Indian NHAI.

Further, to assist with capacity building, India continued to provide about 150 training slots for middle and higher level professionals under the ITEC, Colombo Plan and BIMSTEC schemes. Courses covered include entrepreneurship development, biotechnology, water resources, public administration, advanced sciences, financial management etc. In the field of agriculture, there are training programmes, scholarship, research projects and exchange of visits.

In June 2002, the Indian Oil Corporation and the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation signed a MoU under which India is allowed to engage in retail oil trade in the Sri Lanka as well as to manage and operate, on a long lease, the Trincomalee oil tanks. Both from commercial and strategic standpoints, it is a significant development in India-Sri Lanka relations.

India’s extension of credit facilities is another major component of its economic relations with Sri Lanka. In the past two decades India credit line is periodically offered to cover the purchase of capital goods, consumer services and food items. It has also meant for the purpose of economic stabilisation and development of transport network. Recently, India has offered to set up an information and technology (ICT) park in Sri Lanka.

Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)         

Following   the   success of ISLFTA, the governments of India and Sri Lanka felt that more action was required to unleash the full potential of our bilateral economic relations. Accordingly, in June 2002, the two governments decided to set up a Joint Study Group (JSC) to explore possibilities of starting negotiations for a CEPA.  Both countries after thirteen rounds of negotiations jointly announced in July 2008 that CEPA agreement was fully negotiated and ready for signature. CEPA is expected to build on momentum generated by the FTA. CEPA seeks to extend bilateral opening beyond trade in goods, to include services, investment and overall economic co-operation.

It will address some of the issues that have come up in the implementation and operation of the ISFTA as well. It will impart renewed impetus and synergy to bilateral economic relations. CEPA aims at creating a more facilitating environment for Sri Lankan exports and seeks to remove some of the perceived impediments to exports from Sri Lanka.

1.         CEPA provides for identification and removal of all non-tariff barriers.

2.         CEPA provides for close cooperation between the Customs Authorities of both countries to deal with delays and difficulties associated with Custom administration.

3.         To deal with delays and inconvenience suffered by exporters due to testing and certification process for certain products in the other country, CEPA provides for a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) as well as measures to deal with technical barriers to trade and adoption of common Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary standards.

4.         The ISFTA rules of origin criteria for some products are being relaxed to the benefit of Sri Lanka.

5.         In order to ensure that problems in bilateral trade receive priority attention and are resolved promptly, a Standing Committee at the level of Commerce Secretaries has been set up. It will meet every six months to address all outstanding issues and concerns and resolved them promptly. Annual meetings at the level of Commerce Ministers are also envisaged. Therefore, all concerns can be addressed at a very high level and on a regular basis.

CEPA also envisages economic cooperation in a wide range of areas. Some of the important areas are Energy, Manufacturing; Services; Transport and infrastructure; Science and technology and Human resource development. Among the 80 services sectors to be opened by India are areas where Sri Lanka has proven expertise and acknowledged advantages. These include: architectural and engineering services, tourism and travel related services, computer and IT and related services, transport, and maritime services. CEPA would play a pivotal role in attaining long-term bilateral goals.

Conclusion

There is little doubt that relationship between India and Sri Lanka has undergone a period of significant recuperation since 1990. In the post 1990 period consistent efforts have been made by India and Sri Lanka to upgrade bilateral economic relations. India and Sri Lanka have established a dense bilateral network of institutions and mechanisms so as to ensure sustained cooperation irrespective of domestic politics and changes in the external environment of the two countries. The year 1998 saw the biggest boost in economic relations when both the countries signed ISLFTA. ISFTA has resulted in rapid expansion of trade volume, growth in investments, better connectivity, and a more intensive economic and development cooperation between both the countries. ISLFTA has promoted mutually beneficial bilateral trade and strengthened intra regional economic cooperation. Following   the   success of ISFTA, the governments of India and Sri Lanka felt that more action was required to unleash the full potential of bilateral economic relations. Accordingly, both the governments decided to set up a JSC to explore possibilities of starting negotiations for a CEPA. CEPA is expected to build on momentum generated by the ISFTA. CEPA seeks to extend two economies beyond trade in goods, to include services, investment and overall economic co-operation. It will address some of the issues that have come up in the implementation and operation of the ISLFTA as well. It will also impart renewed impetus and synergy to bilateral economic relations. Economic relationship between India and Sri Lanka are at the highest level of cordiality. India and Sri Lanka will develop development partnership in the coming years. Economic relations can go a long way in building and cementing stable and peaceful political and strategic relations. India-Sri Lanka relationship is heading towards model relationship which can be emulated by other smaller states in South Asia.

References:

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Gurnam Chand

Associate Professor and Head Department of Political Science

M.R. Govt. College, Fazilka-152123

94171-83900 (M) 01638-263936 (R)

E-mail-kambojgurnam@yahoo.com

Abstract

Ethnic affinity between the Tamil of Tamil Nadu and the Tamils in Sri Lanka was an important factor which determines the attitude of Tamil Nadu parties towards Sri Lankan tamilian conflict. A special emotional attachment was always there between the resident Tamils of Tamil Nadu and the Tamil of Northern-Eastern province and Indian Tamil of central hills. And this was the reason why any incident against Tamils in Sri Lanka provoked a sharp reaction in Tamil Nadu. Supporting Sri Lankan Tamils had become an important factor in Tamil Nadu internal politics. Whenever there was a problem or crisis in Sri Lanka affecting the welfare of the Tamils, the political parties of Tamil Nadu despite of their internal differences and mutual hatred raised their voice in support of them. At the same time, some of the political parties of Tamil Nadu tried to project their own image as the custodians of the affected Tamils in Sri Lanka. The other factor that have played a decisive role is the distance or otherwise of a particular party from the position of power at Tamil Nadu and in the centre.

India is Sri Lanka’s closet neighbour, separated from it at its narrowest point by 22 miles of sea called the Palk-strait. The implication of such a close proximity is that developments in each country have affected the other. The common culture, tradition and shared ethnicity of Tamil living in Tamil Nadu and in northern and eastern province of Sri Lanka have always remains a significant factor in determining the attitude of Tamil Nadu ethnic political parties towards tamilian conflict in Sri Lanka. Successive governments in India could not ignore the views and sentiments of Tamil Nadu because of its being a politically sensitive and articulate state.

A special emotional attachment was always between the residents of Tamils of Tamil Nadu and Tamil of Northern-Eastern province and Indian Tamil of central hills. And this is the reason why any incident against Tamils in Sri Lanka provoked a sharp reaction in Tamil Nadu.[1] Whenever the Sri Lankan Tamils or Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been military cornered, the Tamil Politicians of India, prompted by the Sri Lankan Tamils, have raised the issue of the security of Tamil people and pressured India government to prevail over Colombo.[2] When the Sri Lankan Tamil leaders demanded a separate state, they started to internationalize their cause and this attempt sought the support of political parties in Tamil Nadu.  Supporting Sri Lankan Tamils had become an important factor in Tamil Nadu internal politics in order to woo voters. [3]

Sri Lankan tamilian conflict is the result largely of continued discrimination against the Tamils by the successive Sri Lankan governments both before and after independence. There are many aspects to the Sri Lankan Tamil conflict. First both the Sinhalese and Tamils claims to be the original settlers in Ceylon. [4]  Which of these two groups came first is a dispute between the two. Both the communities have been putting forward rival claims in establishing their racial and cultural superiority and administrative hegemony over each other.[5] Secondly, this conflict was accentuated by the British policy which was designed to consolidate imperial power and authority through every means necessary and possible.[6] Thirdly, there were the discriminatory Citizenship Acts of 1948 and 1949. These Acts were designed to deny citizenship and voting rights to the Indian Tamils.[7] Fourth aspect is the problem of religious harmony. Religion played (and still plays) a very important role in reinforcing the ethnic consciousness of the two groups. Fifth aspect is the question of official language. Sri Lanka Freedom Party led by Bhandaranaike passed an official language Act 1956, declaring Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka. This led to eventual polarization of politics on ethnic lines.[8] The Sinhalese have a suspicious attitude towards the Tamils. They think that the Tamils still have links with the 65 million Tamils just across the Palk-Strait in Tamil Nadu and Kerala.[9] As a result, the majority Sinhalese community has feeling of minority complex.

It is beyond doubt that the political parties of Tamil Nadu specifically use Sri Lanka ethnic crisis for mobilizing support to exert pressure on the centre government to make them evolve a suitable policy in support of the cause of the Tamils. In the process of mobilising the people to help the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the ethnic parties gained support for their ethnic activities in Indian polity. Moreover the other political parties, national and regional, are also extending their support to the cause of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Generally the support extended by the political parties to the cause of Tamils, has not been consistent all times. It has varied from time to time depending upon the nature of the crisis and intensity of the conflict.

The Congress party ruled the Tamil Nadu from 1952-1967. During this period the Indian Tamils problem passed through various stages and in every stage the political parties as well as the government of Tamil Nadu expressed their concern towards the welfare of the Indian Tamils to the centre government. When Citizenship Act of 1948 was passed by the Sri Lankan government, the feeling of Tamil Nadu over the Act was conveyed to the centre through a motion passed by the representatives of various political parties in the State Assembly.[10] At the same time, the Tamil Nadu state government indirectly reflected its desire to participate or at least assist the centre in its dealings with the Indian Tamils problem.

During the language riot in Sri Lanka, the Working Committee of the DMK in Tamil Nadu condemned the indifference of the government of India in this issue and its failure “to protect the Indian Tamil minorities in Ceylon. It called upon the government to shed its inaction and to take necessary interest and action in this matter.[11] The D.M.K. which was emerging as the vociferous opposition in Tamil Nadu in the late 1950′s projected itself as the custodian of the entire Tamil race.[12] During this period the congress party regarded the Indian Tamil Problem as a foreign policy matter under the purview of the centre and conveyed its concern to the centre because of opposition pressure. The role of Tamil Nadu was peripheral in influencing India-Sri Lanka relations.

In the 1967 General Elections, the D.M.K. defeated the ruling Congress party and formed the government in Tamil Nadu. The victory of the D.M.K. party created apprehensions in Sri Lanka since it projected its image as the champion of the Tamils cause all over the world. From its inception, the D.M.K. party and later its breakaway group ‘Nam Tamizhar’ (we Tamils) strongly advocated secession from the Union government. The separate ‘Dravidanad’ demand of the D.M.K. and the demand of Nam Tamizhar organisation to create a ‘greater Tamil Nadu’ comprising not only the Tamil speaking part of South India, but also the Tamil speaking parts of Sri Lanka caused greater alarm and concern in Sri Lanka. [13]

The emergence of D.M.K. in South India adversely affected relations between India and Sri Lanka. M. Karunanidhi became the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu in 1969 after the demise of C.N. Annadurai. The D.M.K. which evinced keen interest in the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka-as an opposition party-continued to show its interest on the issue after it became the ruling party. [14]

The State’s participation in the issues involving the Tamils of Sri Lanka was intensified whenever the Tamils were affected in the island. [15]  The various internal developments in Sri Lanka had its spill over on Tamil Naidu’s attitude towards the Tamils problem and which in turn automatically had its effected in the bilateral relations.

During the era of the one party dominance the interests of Tamil Nadu used to be ignored by the centre government.[16] In the era of coalition government, which began in 1979 in the centre, both centre government and state government stared influencing the attitude of each other. State governments began to make inputs into the making of foreign policy.[17] The Janata Party government in the centre did not allow the issue to strain the relations between Indian and Sri Lanka. Possibly its adherence to non-interference in the affairs of its neighbours

The pressure given by Tamil Nadu varied in accordance with the domestic situations in Sri Lanka and India. It should be noted here that whenever there was a problem or crisis in Sri Lanka affecting the welfare of the Tamils, the political parties of Tamil Nadu generally raised their voice in support of them. At the same time, some of the political parties of Tamil Nadu tried to project their own image as the custodians of the affected Tamils in Sri Lanka. While voicing their concern in the Legislative Assembly along with other parties, the leaders of the various political parties, particularly of the D.M.K. and the A.I.A.D.M.K. tried their best to attract the attention of the public towards their individual efforts.

July 1983 riots had their inevitable fallout in Tamil Nadu. Karunanidhi and Anbazhagan resigned their seats in the Legislative Assembly to protest against New Delhi’s lukewarm response to the sufferings to the Sri Lankan Tamils. On August 27, 1983, the DMK passed a resolution, which stated that a “separated Tamil Eelam shall be the only remedy and paramount solution”.[18] The response of the DMK/AIADMK was motivated mainly by their desire to score debating points and stage one upmanship on the opponent. During 1983-1987, the debate centered round as to who was the greater champion of the Sri Lankan Tamil interests.[19]

Before the signing of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 29th July 1987, both congress (I) and AIADMK had identical attitudes towards the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka. But as the situations deteriorated in the face of Jayewardene governments operation to fight and blockade in Jaffna, the AIADMK started drifting away from the congress (I).

Once the Accord was signed, both the Congress (I) and the AIADMK supported this action. Both of them perceived that it would strengthen their parties and simultaneously sideline the DMK, led by Karunanidhi, which was posing as the sole champion of the Sri Lankan Tamils. But when there was confrontation between the IPKF and the LTTE, the AIADMK was on the horns of a dilemma. While it was trying to defeat Karunanidhi’s designs to emerge as the saviour of the Sri Lanka Tamils, it did not want to irritate the centre by opposing the IPKF action. But ultimately this development led to drifting away of the AIADMK from the Congress (I). However, at the national level, the AIADMK did not join the walkout on the Sri Lanka issue in Lok Sabha on 10 November 1987. But it did not lag behind the other opposition parties in condemning the government on the Sri Lankan Issue.

DMK evaluated the Accord as a betrayal of the Sri Lankan Tamils. When, the IPKF launched operations against the LTTE in order to disarm it, the DMK, assumed the role of the defender of the LTTE. It has taken a stand against the government of Indian and the IPKF. The DMK strongly supported the LTTE demand for a separate state. It appears that the DMK wanted to sentimentalise the Sri Lanka issue.

The DMK, in the long years when it was in opposition, used to be severely critical to the politics and programs of the central government; more relevant from the regional perspective, the Party used to accuse the AIADMK government of sacrificing the interests of the Tamil brethren across the Palk Strait.       

After the IPKF withdrawal and assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE on 21 May 1991, alienated the popular support for Sri Lankan Tamils and LTTE militants in India. Indian government declared LTTE to be an unlawful organization and took serve action against its supporters.[20]  The sympathy and support that the Sri Lankans- militants, refugees and ordinary civilians enjoyed evaporated immediately.[21] The two Dravidian parties began to delink themselves from the LTTE. The cumulative result was, except for the fringe elements of ardent LTTE supporters, the politicians in Tamil Nadu did not get actively involved in the political developments in Sri Lanka.            

The signing of the ceasefire agreement in the Sri Lanka on 22 February, 2002, led to the de-escalation of the conflict, which brought a welcome relief to the people in Tamil Nadu.[22]  However, renewed violence after the breakdown of the peace process in late 2003 changed the situation in north and east Sri Lanka and also in Tamil Nadu. The sympathy for the Tamil cause continued to rise and peaked in 2006. Popular outrage in Tamil Nadu to the Sri Lankan government’s air attack at Sencholai orphanage, in Vallipunam in Mullaithivu district, on 14 August, 2006, and a subsequent attack on the school for internally displaced people at Vaharal in Batticaloa on 8 November, 2006, led to the resurgence of the Sri Lankan Tamil issue as an important factor in Tamil Nadu politics. [23]

Almost all the political parties came together in support of the Sri Lankan Tamils. Describing the Sri Lankan Air Force raid on an orphanage as ‘barbaric, uncivilised and inhuman’, the Tamil Nadu State Assembly observed two minutes’ silence for the victims, and strongly condemned the raid through a unanimous resolution on 17 August, 2006. When Colombo ciriticised the action of the Tamil Nadu Assembly, Chief Minister Karunanidhi defended the right of the Tamils in Tamil Nadu to stand by their brethren in Sri Lanka and said, “If Tamils condemning the killing of their Tamil brethren was dubbed a mistake, then they would continue to commit it”. Karunanidhi also remarked that there was a need for ‘rethinking’ India’s policy towards Sri Lanka. [24] In fact, the assembly resolution was important because it was probably for the first time, since the killing of Rajiv Gandhi, that the Tamil Nadu State Assembly criticised the action of the Sri Lankan government unanimously. Even political parties like Janata Party, headed by Subramanian Swamy, known for their strong anti-LTTE position, were subtle in their response in view of the growing sympathy for Tamils in Sri Lanka.

Similarly, the Tamil Nadu branches of the CPI, CPI (M) and the Congress, which are quite vociferous against the LTTE and pro-LTTE groups, condemned the attack on children in the strongest terms.[25] Even anti-LTTE leaders like Jayalalitha showed surprising restraint towards pro-Eelam groups like MDMK. All this suggests that there was a definite change in the approach of these political parties towards the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. Given the tremendous upsurge in sympathy towards Sri Lankan Tamils, political parties in Tamil Nadu might have considered it safe to join the popular wave. Pro-Eelam groups like MDMK, PMK, Dalit Panthers of India, Dravida Kazagham and TNM became more active in highlighting the atrocities of the Sri Lankan government and the sufferings of Tamils through regular protests and demonstrations in the state.

As the conflict got intensified and the war against the Tigers degenerated into war against Tamil civilians, the political parties in Tamil Nadu began to step up their agitation. The Sri Lankan issue became enmeshed in the electoral politics. Even Jayalalaitha, the leader of the AIADMK, who used to scrupulously avoid any mention of Sri Lanka in her statements, began to speak about the atrocities against the Sri Lankan Tamils. Obviously she did not want her party to get alienated from the public opinion. The competitive politics got further sharpened during elections. The shrewd politician that Karunanidhi is, he resolved to express concern for the sufferings of the Sri Lankan Tamils, while at the same time extending solid support to the central government’s policies on Sri Lanka. [26] The end result was the DMK completely toeing the central line on Sri Lanka issue.

The response of the government of India, backed solidly by the Tamil Nadu government, was only to express “concern” at the plight of the Tamil civilians. The maximum that Karunanidhi could accomplish, after his famous hunger strike, was the assurance from President Mahinda rajapakse that there will no military offensive for three days.  LTTE was crushed in May 2009 by Sri Lankan military.

Speaking in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi pointed out that in the post-LTTE period, attaining the goal of Tamil Eelam was not a realistic goal. He advocated the pursuance of a “flexible policy”, where the Tamils should avoid critical comments about the Sinhalese “out of anger and hatred”, because it may have “adverse effect” on their well being. The need of the hour, Karunanidhi underlined, is for the Tamils to carry on their struggle “for equal rights, equal status for their language and devolution of power at the regional level”. [27] This statement shows that transformation has taken place in the DMK perception on Sri Lanka. It may be recalled that in July 1983, on 27 August, 1983, the DMK passed a resolution, which stated that a separate Tamil Eelam shall be the only remedy and permanent solution.

In the post LTTE-era without devolution of power, the internal situation in Sri Lanka would continue to be restive. This could have a fall out on the Tamil Nadu political parties.[28] Tamil Nadu Assembly on 7 June, 2011 adopted a unanimous resolution demanding imposition of economic sanctions on Sri Lanka by India for alleged war crimes and  to “rein in” Colombo on the Tamils issue and pressing for speedy rehabilitation of displaced Tamils.[29] The resolution was moved by Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa of the AIADMK. Against the backdrop of this resolution, National Security Adviser Shivshanker Menon, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar visited Sri Lanka on 10 June, 2011 and pressed the Mahinda Rajapaksa Government to come to a “quick political arrangement” with the minority Tamils to put an end to ethnic conflict.[30]

Conclusion

Despite their internal differences and mutual hatred for each other, the Dravidan parties especially AIADMK and DMK had taken a nearly common stand on the Sri Lankan Tamilian issue. These Parties keep making subtle shifts in their stand according to the changing condition in Sri Lanka and approached centre government for permanent solution to the ethnic conflict, which in turn influences India’s policy towards Sri Lanka. The attitude of the AIADMK and DMK was determined and still being determined by the imperatives of the democratic politics here. The other factor that have played a decisive role is the distance or otherwise of a particular party from the position of power at Tamil Nadu and in the centre. In the post-LTTE period, without devolution and speedy rehabilitation of Internally Displaced Persons the internal situation in Sri Lanka would continued to be restive. This could have fall on the attitude of Tamil Nadu ethnic political parties and politicians. Recent example includes the Tamil Nadu Assembly unanimous resolution demanding imposition of economic sanctions on Sri Lanka.

ABSTRACT

Sri Lanka is strategically harmonizing its relationship with its neighbor and with the region. In the post LTTE-era, relationship between India and Sri Lanka are at the highest level of cordiality, due to India’s liberal accommodative policy and Sri Lanka appropriate response. It gives projections Sri Lanka will not harm India’s security interests. Sri Lanka will accommodate and develop economic and security co-operation with India in the coming years.

Introduction

In the present world, global power configuration is changing in favour of Asia, particularly China and India. The US and the West in general are losing the pre-eminent position. Smaller regional countries are also emerging with strong identities. In this new setting, India finds its rivals making inroads into Sri Lanka. China ties with Sri Lanka gave it a foothold near the critical sea lanes and also entry into what India considers being its backyard.

China is India largest neighbour and its rise is indeed a global opportunity as well as a challenge. China’s increasing forays into the Indian Ocean, as well as the growing economic and political relations intended to dilute India’s dominance in South Asia. Some Indian strategists and military leaders fear ‘maritime encirclement’ by China, via its relationship with South Asian countries. China assertive diplomacy primarily geared to establish its economic and security ties with Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.   In some cases this firming up of ties has led to joint port construction or enlargement deals, example include Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka ,Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Sittwe port in Myanmar. The ‘all weather friendship’ between China and Pakistan has been a cause of concern for India for a long time. Pakistan is also developing a strategically important port at Gwadar with economic and technical aid and assistance from China since August 2006.[i] China is growing strategic presence in the Giligit-Baltistan area of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).[ii] The presence of Chinese soldiers in POK became a talking in India and US media. China has been strengthening of its military-related capabilities in Tibet Autonomous region which are in the form of further up gradation of its highway network, the construction of more airports, the construction of railways line from Lhasa towards the border with Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh with plans for the ultimate construction of a railway link-up with Nepal and military exercises involving various units of the People’s Liberation Army.

Geo-Strategic Importance of Sri Lanka

The geo-strategic location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean having importance in terms of maritime-trade and security of other states, caused concern to India. Sri Lanka strategic location has promoted China to develop economic and strategic relations with Sri Lanka. India is always worried about the harbor’s status; her occupation by any external power has serious repercussions for India security.[iii] Sri Lanka provides an ideal base in the India Ocean for naval attack on India and it can also be useful to India for defence in a naval warfare.[iv]

Sri Lanka is the closest neighbour of India’s, separated from it at its narrowest point by 22 miles of sea called the Palk-strait.[v] The implication of such a close proximity is that developments in each country have affected the other. Sri Lanka is virtually located in the centre of Asia and the sea lanes between the Far East and the African and Arab worlds.[vi] This location gives the island a central position midway on the ancient maritime trade route between West and East Asia. Ships passing from Yangon and Kolkata going west to the Suez or the Cape or those sailing from Mumbai of the Gulf and eastward to Singapore still use Sri Lanka’s excellent harbours in Colombo and Trincomalee.[vii] The island nation thus occupies an important place in the critical sea lines of communication. Trincomalee has the capacity to serve as a major naval base, and an extra regional naval force could well dominate the sea routes in the area and disrupt Indian shipping. That is why Sri Lanka has always occupied an important place in India foreign policy calculations.

At the same time, Sri Lanka feel overawed and threatened by India because of the latter’s size and proximity. Threat perception in the past has led Sri Lanka to enter into defence pact with UK in 1947.[viii] Sri Lanka had also used its geo-strategic location to neutralise India’s position by cultivating extra regional powers and even expressing her desire to give base facilities to the United States of America.

Historical Overview            

The British realised the strategic importance of Sri Lanka and the concept of strategic unity of India and Sri Lanka emerged, whereby the possession of Sri Lanka came to be regarded as a prerequisite of the defence and security of India.[ix] After the Britishers, Indian policy makers were also very sensitive towards Sri Lanka. K.M. Panikkar, a well known Indian writer and scholar advocated the strategic unity of India, Burma and Sri Lanka for India’s defence.[x]

Jawahar Lal Nehru in 1945 had pointed out the ethnic, linguistic and cultural unity of India and Sri Lanka and supported the formation of a close union of autonomous units of the Indian Federation. Sri Lanka geo-strategic importance had been stated by Ravi Kaul, a former Commander of the Indian Navy. He stated,

“Sri Lanka is as important strategically to India as Eire is to the United Kingdom or Taiwan to China. As long as Sri Lanka is friendly or even neutral, India has nothing to worry, but if there be any danger of the island falling under the domination of a power hostile to India; India cannot tolerate such a situation endangering her territorial integrity.” [xi]

Ravi Kaul also opined that,

“Fears were not about a threat from Sri Lanka, but that if anybody with inimical interests towards India gained a foothold in the island nation, India’s security interest could be adversely affected.” [xii]

After China-Indian conflict of October 1962, India became security sensitive towards any warming of relations between any of its neighbours on the one hand and China on the other.[xiii] Sri Lanka gave China the most favoured nation status and provided facility to China warships knowing fully that it is against Indian interests. In 1963 and 1971, much too Indian concern Sri Lanka entered into a maritime agreement with China. This left India worried for its coastal and Oceanic defence.[xiv]

With the rise of the Tamil militancy and escalation of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, the Sri Lanka government was seeking help from external powers for a ‘military solution’ to the ethnic crisis. President J.R. Jaywardene government, in Sri Lanka, sought military and political support from Israel, USA, UK and Pakistan.[xv] This was also inimical to India’s security interests in the region.[xvi]

To win the US support, Sri Lanka government extended refueling and recreation facilities to visiting US naval ships. Jaywardene also tried to seek Britain’s direct involvement in the ethnic conflict by giving a fresh lease of life to the 1947 defence agreement. Having their anti-India postures in foreign policy, China and Pakistan had given military support to Sri Lanka.  What upset India was Sri Lanka government’s decision to grant a contract for leasing of oil storage tanks in Trincomalee to a Singapore-based US company and its agreement with the US in December 1983 to set up a powerful Voice of America (VOA) [xvii] station in the East.

India took firm and categorical stand against Sri Lanka’s move to build up strategic relationship with external powers. It was this strategic concern that guided India’s policy of intervention in Sri Lanka from 1987 to pre-1990. Sri Lanka also recognised India’s concern, when it signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of 29th July 1987.[xviii]

India has always opposed the presence of external powers in Sri Lanka and also tried to persuade Sri Lankan government to solve ethnic problem politically and through negotiation. Effort was made to politically solve the issue by Indian and Sri Lankan government and on 29th July 1987, Indo-Sri Lankan agreement was signed to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka. It was only after the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement; India was able to stop extra-regional powers from entering Sri Lanka.[xix]

Through an exchange of Letters, attached to the agreement, between the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lanka President J. R.Jayawardene,  agreed to ‘reach an early understanding’ with the Indian government that the presence of ‘foreign military and intelligence personnel’ would not prejudice India security. The Sri Lanka government also undertook to review its agreement with ‘foreign broadcasting organisations’ to ensure India that they were to be used solely as ‘public broadcasting facilities and not for military or intelligence purpose’. On the question of Trincomalee port, Sri Lanka undertook not to let any third country use it ‘in a manner prejudicial to India’s interest’ and accepted that the restoration of the oil-tank farm on this port would be undertaken as a joint venture ‘between India and Sri Lanka’. These concessions on the Sri Lanka’s part were considered as unexpected and extensive. But in reality Sri Lanka accommodation on these issues was part of the ongoing discussions between India and Sri Lanka on the overall ethnic conflict and relations between the two countries since 1983 at least.[xx]

Growing Chinese Influence in the Post-LTTE Era

India had adopted hands-off policy in the ethnic conflict since the withdrawals of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in March1990, especially after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). After this, LTTE had emerged as the biggest threat to both India and Sri Lanka.[xxi] LTTE had since been banned in India.[xxii] LTTE of the post 1990 period was qualitatively different being much more powerful in terms of its access to funds and technology and superior arms and ammunitions. The LTTE had developed extensive contacts with terrorists groups all over the world.[xxiii] LTTE’s any attempt to establish and Independent ‘Tamil Eelam’ in Sri Lanka, was biggest threat to India’s security and sovereigenty. [xxiv]  Military defeat of LTTE by the President Mahinda Rajapaksa government in May 2009 brought an end to this threat. Indian government non-intervention policy provided China with an opportunity to make headway into the Sri Lanka and there is an urgent need for India to take note of this growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka.

In the post-LTTE era, security concern of India and Sri Lanka took an entirely different form. India threat perceptions have grown as China has become more active in Sri Lanka. China’s politico-economic initiatives and unrestrained supply of military equipment to Sri Lanka has made India nervous.[xxv] India is worried over the increasing Chinese influence and its implication for India’s security.[xxvi] Economic and strategic interests are behind China interests in Sri Lanka. China and Sri Lanka signed a joint commune in 2005 to further bilateral relation and provide each other Most Favour Nation treatment. There is likely to be growing strategic rivalry between India and China. Since Mahinda Rajapaksa became president in November 2005, there was a new found understanding between Sri Lanka and China.[xxvii]

An important reason for the close ties between the Mahinda Rajapaksa government and China was Beijing’s robust endorsement and support of Colombo’s conduct in the war against the LTTE. China was “instrumental to some extent in the Sri Lankan government’s success in defeating the LTTE. Colombo was trying to purchase arms from abroad for years and only China supplied it with weaponry on a sustained basis”.[xxviii] China Jian-7 fighter jets, anti-aircrafts guns and JY-11 3D air surveillance radars played a key role in the Sri Lankan military success.[xxix] Under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Chinese presence and influence in Sri Lanka have increased. During the regime of Mahinda Rajapaksa, China and Sri Lanka have forged a comprehensive strategic relationship. China’s strategic interests and aid diplomacy have led to close cooperation between China and Sri Lanka.[xxx] China came to rescue of Sri Lanka after the US stopped direct aid to Sri Lanka because of its dismal human rights record.[xxxi]

During Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s visit to China from 26^th February to 4^th March 2007, the joint communique had indirectly referred to the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka and noted that “The two sides resolved to fight tires sly against the three evil forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism, and would step up consultation and coordination on regional and international level to counter-terrorism action.” In April 2007, China and Sri Lanka reached a $37.6 million deal for supply of artillery guns, armored personnel carriesrs (ACPs) and infantry weapons. China also agreed to supply other system to counter LTTE ambushes. Beijing also agreed to sell six F-7 jet fighters, considered critical to destroying the LTTE’s fledgling air force and also demolish other military infrastructure such as command posts, underground bunkers, ammunition storages, boatbuilding yards and above all the airstrips. China also supplied the Sri Lankan Army the HJ-8 anti-tank missiles that were used against the LTTE hardened structures and pill boxes.[xxxii]

In May 2007 China and Sri Lanka signed the “establishment of friendship city relationship” relating to the Hambantota district for development of infrastructure, designated as the Hambantota Development Zone (HDZ). There have been some concerns in India about China’s help and assistance in the construction of the Hambantota port on the Indian Ocean in Sri Lanka, particularly in the long term.[xxxiii] The Hambantota will serve China in a number of strategic ways. Firstly, it will provides facilities of Chinese flagged merchant ships, container vessels , oil and gas tankers , and military vessels  including nuclear submarines operating in the Indian Ocean. Secondly, China would be able to establish electronic systems and networks for monitoring Indian Ocean military and civilian traffic, electronic transmissions from US base at Diego Garcia and the Indian nuclear facility that is likely to come up at Rambilli in the Bay of Bebgal. Thirdly, Hambantota offers a strategic location for China to set up its space monitoring systems, considered critical for its ballistic missiles, which can challenge US forces particularly the aircraft carriers who may threaten Chinese shipping in the Indian Ocean. Fourthly, the Chinese fleet of fishing vessels that are also deployed for intelligence gathering duties can be staged from Hambantota. [xxxiv] However, it is worth mentioning that Hambantota port has not been an issue in the relationship between India and Sri Lanka.

There is a perception that Hambantota may be detrimental to India’s strategic and security interests. Though China and Sri Lanka claim that this is merely a commercial venture, it future utility as a strategic asset for China cannot be ruled out. Though at present there is no talk of a naval base, it could emerge ultimately to cater to the requirements of Chinese oil and gas tankers and anti-piracy patrols.[xxxv]

The Chinese presence in Sri Lanka has increased so much that there is no major infrastructure project in which the Chinese have not invested. Besides the Hambantota project, China involved in several others on the island. It is constructing a second international airport at Hambantota, a $248 million expressway connecting the capital Colombo with the airport at Katunayake, $855 million coal power plant at Norochcholai, and performing arts theatre in Colombo. China manages a special economic zone at Mirigama for Chinese investors. Since 2006, China has provided Sri Lanka with $ 306 billion in financial assistance for various projects. [xxxvi] India sees this Chinese maneuvering as an intrusion into its historic sphere of Influence. Strategically, it is in India’s interests to keep its rival out of its main sphere of influence.

India’s primary concern is to counter the threat posed by China activities in the Indian Ocean region and in Sri Lanka. India’s own charm offensive in the region has also been bearing fruit, whether it is through the establishment of electronic monitoring system in Madagascar in 2007, or in August 2009 in The Maldives. India officials have also become more active to the attempt of their Chinese counterparts to woo small but strategically placed nations such as the Seychelles or Mauritius. India’s Hambantota consulate is aimed at “keeping an eye” on Chinese activity there. Such concern explains India’s efforts to build close relations with Japan, Australia and Singapore. As a result, many leaders favour closer ties with the US.

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakasa has sought to allay Indian concerns about the growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka, saying India’s role in the Sri Lanka was a permanent feature. Unlike other players whose engagement was limited to commercial project they execute.

“The Chinese will Come to Sri Lanka, build some project and go, but the Indians will come here, they will build and they will stay. This is the difference in our relation with China and India.” [xxxvii]

Sri Lankan President told the K. Venkataramanan of The Times of India in an interview at his ‘Temple Tree’ residence in Colombo on 28^th June, 2010.

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa while pointing out that China was only one of the countries which were involved in post-war development, Mahinda Rajapaksa further said that the China factor was a bogey raised to upset the Indian public and undermine his regime’s deepening ties with India.[xxxviii]

Affirming India’s interests, Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated earlier also during an interview to The Hindu, chief editor N. Ram at ‘Temple Tree’ in Colombo on 30^th June, 2009,

“Sri Lanka will not initiate any action with any other country against India as it would be self defeating act. Sri Lanka does not see India’s prosperity and power detrimental to them. In fact, Sri Lanka stands to benefit from India’s prosperity.”[xxxix]

Colombo envoy Prasad Kariyawasam told IANS in an interview amidst concern about China growing influence in Sri Lanka said,

“China is an old friend, but India is an older friend. Our political and economic friendship with China will not be at the expense of India. Sri Lanka will not be a party to any mechanism or effort to harm India’s strategic interests. Harming India interests will be like harming our interests.”[xl]

Sri Lanka envoy stressed that Sri Lanka’s ties with India were set to acquire more economic and strategic weight in the days to come.

India Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna during his visit to Sri Lanka in November 2010 stated that,

“The relationship between India and Sri Lanka need not be at the cost of other countries, our ultimate objective is to see a prosperous, Stable Sri Lanka.” 

During three days visit in December 2010 by Indian Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar, the issues of discussion were the establishment of a bilateral defence dialogue and joint naval exercise, strengthening of coast guard services, extension of military training and assistance for military infrastructure construction. All this affirmed that India will work with Sri Lanka to cater for Sri Lanka defence.[xli] On the other hand, some strategist believes that India’s defence assistance is an attempt to balance growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka.

To conclude, the growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka and India’s neighbouring countries has made it clear that China is following a planned strategy to encircle India. Indian government is worried over the increasing Chinese influence and its implications for India’s security.  At the same time, Sri Lanka has a right to develop close relations with China. In the post-LTTE era, it seems that Sri Lanka will handle it relationship with other countries without destabilising India. Sri Lanka has taken care not to allow its alliance with China to offend India. Sri Lanka has repeatedly clarified that it will keep India’s security concern in mind and will not compromise India’s security interests. In the post war-period, Sri Lanka is strategically harmonizing its relationship with its neighbor and with the region. In the post LTTE-era, relationship between India and Sri Lanka are at the highest level of cordiality, due to India’s liberal accommodative policy and Sri Lanka appropriate response. It gives projections Sri Lanka will not harm India’s security interests. Sri Lanka will accommodate and develop economic and security co-operation with India in the coming years.

It seems that both India and Sri Lanka sought to overcome this particular impediment by signing the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (29 July 1987). The accord, therefore, appears to be a symbol of the desire of the two countries to contain mutual conflicts and promote good neighbourly relations. In view of the regional problems mentioned earlier, it is extremely important to find out how the accord has been assessed in the domestic politics in the two countries. In this paper, however, we will confine ourselves to studying its assessment only in India.²

At the official level, the accord was assessed as a “unique” “historic peace accord” and international agreement. K.C. Pant, the then minister of defence, stated in the Lok Sabha that the “pact aimed at ending the island’s ethnic conflict.”³ While describing the objective of the accord, Dinesh Singh, the then minister for food, supply and commerce, said:

“Our objective in this agreement was to help preserve the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. We did not wish to see a kind of civil war building up in Sri Lanka which might destroy unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. It is our objective to see that the violence and the ensuing genocide come to an end. We wanted peace to be restored in which the different parties in Sri Lanka could decide their future by themselves, not by Indian dominance. It was our objective to enable the Tamil ethnic minority in Sri Lanka to live in peace, preserving their cultural and linguistic identity.” ⁴

B.R. Bhagat, the then external affairs minister, expected the accord to “bring to an end a tragic chapter of Sri Lanka’s recent history and mark the beginning of a new chapter in India-Sri Lanka relations.” ⁶

The agreement, according to the Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, provided “a framework for a durable solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem and Sri Lanka’s unity, integrity and stability.”⁶ Rajiv Gandhi admitted that the accord came about with some difficulties. However, it was an expression of friendship and not of domination.⁷ He hailed the accord as “first of its kind signed by India in the 20th century.” ⁸

The government of India justified the presence of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka by saying that this was according to the provisions of the accord. The forces were there on the invi­tation of the Sri Lanka government. As B.R. Bhagat said in the Lok Sabha, “IPKF are present in Sri Lanka because India has been under the agreement the guarantor for the implementation of the agreement.”⁹ Similarly, the Minister of State for External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, stated: “IPKF are there to protect the unity, territorial integrity and independence of Sri Lanka, to safeguard the interests of the Tamils and to protect the security environment in the region.”¹⁰

Coming to the non-official level, before the signing of the accord both the Congress (I) and the All India Anna Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) had identical attitudes towards the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. But as the situation deteriorated in the face’ of the Jaywardene government’s operation to fight to finish and the blockade in Jaffna, the AIADMK started drifting away from the Congress (I).¹¹

However, once the accord was signed, both the Congress (I) and the AIADMK. supported this action. Both of them perceived that it would strengthen their parties and simultaneously sideline the Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) which was posing as the sole champion of the Sri Lankan Tamils.¹² But when there was confrontation between the IPKF and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the AIADMK was on the horns of a dilemma. While it was trying to defeat Karunanidhi’s designs to emerge as the saviour of the Sri Lanka Tamils, it did not want to irritate the centre by opposing the IPKF action.¹³ But ultimately this development led to drifting away of the AIADMK from the Congress (I).

The hardline group in the AIADMK, taking advantage of the absence of the chief minister, M.G. Ramachandran (MGR), who was in sick bed in a hospital in the US, started issuing statements deploring the alleged killings of Tamils by the IPKF, Former agriculture minister and a deputy general secretary of the AIADMK, K. Kalimutha, came out with a scathing attack on the Indian government on 12 October 1987. Addressing a function at Kanohipulam, he said that it was rather cruel on the part of the Indian army to do a dirty job for Lankan president Jaywardene who was notorious for his hatred for Tamils.¹⁴ Kalimutha also said that his party and its leaders had welcomed the accord in good faith and had hoped that it would bring peace and harmony. But the subsequent developments in Sri Lanka belied these hopes. What was now sought to be achieved was not peace and harmony but only the silence of the graveyard.¹⁵

However, at the national level the AIADMK did not join the walkout on the Sri Lanka issue in Lok Sabha on 10 November 1987. But it did not lag behind the other opposition parties in condemning the government on the Sri Lankan issue. The AIADMK leader Aladi Aruna charged the government with using army to commit atrocities on the Tamil people of the Indian origin. He said that his party, an ally of the Congress (I), favoured the implementation of the accord but not at the gun-point. It was colonial pattern to force the accord at gun-point, he added.¹⁶

Speaking in the Rajya Sabha, Aladi Aruna went a step further and described the IPKF action against LTTE as “another Blue Star operation against our brother”. He further added that the IPKP has almost turned out (o be a peace killing, force and a subordinate of Sri Lankan government.¹⁷

The Congress (I) was perhaps expecting that Indo-Sri Lanka accord would strengthen the ties between the Congress and the AIADMK and would bring good results in the ensuing assembly elections. But after the death of MGR, both the Congress (I) and (he AIADMK contested elections separately and lost. Thus, although the main reason for the defeat of the Congress (I) and the AIADMK seems to have been the death of M.G. Ramachandran and the resultant factionalism, the accord did not have the desired positive impact on, the fortunes of the two parties,

But at the same time, this defeat does not mean that the Congress (I) has lost public support in Tamil Nadu. In fact, the Congress (I) got more votes (20-2%) in comparison to the 1984 elections, when the percentage was 16’5%.¹⁸ So, as the regional parties were dominating the Tamil Nadu politics and the Congress (I) base was very poor, things seem to have improved for the Congress (I). But still this was not according to the expectation of the party.

The assessment of the accord by the Dravida Munetra Kazhagam was entirely different from that of the Congress (I) and the AfADMK. From the very beginning, the DMK opposed the accord tooth and nail. DMK evaluated the accord as a betrayal of the Sri Lankan Tamils.¹⁸ Karunanidhi, the party president, said that the accord should be between the conflicting parties and India’s role should be only that of a mediator. In his view, the results of the implementation of accord were disastrous, because in its implementation the government of India has acted in accordance with the wishes of the Sri Lankan government.²⁰

When, the IPKF launched operations against the LTTE in order to disarm it, the DMK threw its weight on the side of the LTTE. The DMK strongly supported the LTTE demand for a separate state, but Karunanidhi felt that there could be an interim arrangement for establishing a government of Tamils through the merger of the northern and eastern provinces.²¹ In his view, Jayawardene was putting down the Tamil resistance movement with the help of the IPKF. He said that the Sri Lanka problem would not be solved unless the Tamils were treated basically on humanitarian considerations.²² In the Rajya Sabha, the DMK member, Maran, spearheaded the assault on the government describing the “butchering” of people by IPKF as shocking and shame­ful. Accusing the government of trying to kill the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, he alleged that even civilians were being killed. He urged the prime minister to order an immediate ceasefire.²⁸

It appears that the DMK wanted to sentimentalise the Sri Lanka issue and sought to make political capital out of the changed equations in Tamil Nadu. We may mention that before the accord the DMK had a critical attitude towards the LTTE.²⁴ As we have seen, after the accord it changed its strategy from being critic to defender of the LTTE. The rallies it organised to criticise the accord were intended to arouse anti-centre feelings. When the elections came, the DMK remained firm on its stand and was able to win with the thumping majority after a gap of 13 years.

The Dravid Kazhagam (DK), the parental body of the Dravidian parties, did not lag behind the DMK in condemning the accord and IPKF action. It vociferously took up the LTTE’s cause. The Dravid Kazagham and its ally, the Tamil Nadu Kamraj Congress, spoke against the central government for retaliating against the LTTE. The two parties held the IPKF responsible for the tragic developments. Veeramani, the general secretary of the Dravida Kazhagam, said that the IPKF which was deployed in Sri Lanka to safeguard the lives of Tamils was acting against the Tamil interests. He alleged that the IPKF had accepted Jayawardene as its commander.²⁵

The above discussion shows that despite their internal differences and mutual hatred for each other, the three Dravidian parties took a nearly common stand on the Sri Lanka accord. As is clear, this stand was taken due to purely political aims which at least the DMK seems to have been able to successfully serve.

So far as the Congress (I) is concerned, the accord and the IPKF operations seem to have brought no political benefits to it. But the party has tried to explain this by pointing out that India had really no other option open to it, that the operation was in the country’s para­mount national interest, and that otherwise foreign powers would have intervened and India’s security would have been in danger.²⁶

The Communist Party of India (CPI) had always stressed on the political solution of the Sri Lanka problem and had opposed LTTE demand for a separate state. When the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was signed in July 1987, the CPI welcomed it. The central secretariat of the CPI issued the following statement on 30 July 1987:

“The Central Secretariat of the Communist Party of India welcomes the agreement arrived at between the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and President Jayawardene as a positive step towards the solution of the long standing ethnic problem that has not only caused immense harm to Sri Lanka, but also strained relations between our two countries.” ²⁷

The party lauded the proposed merger of the northern and eastern provinces and the stipulation that there would be talks between the governments of India and Sri Lanka for the withdrawal of the Israeli and Pakistani military and other advisors from Sri Lanka.²⁶

The CPI supported the presence in Sri Lanka as this was according to the provisions of the accord and was necessary to protect the security of the country and of the region.²⁹ About the IPKF confrontation with the LTTE, the CPI stand was that this situation was created by the LTTE, as it had stalled the surrender of its arms and bad sought to liquidate other militant groups.³⁰

But when the battle of the IPKF with the LTTE resulted in heavy loss of life and material, the party took the stand that it was totally avoidable. When the implementation of the accord led to difficulties, the CPI member of parliament, Inderjit Gupta, said in the Lok Sabha ob; 10 November 1987 :

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord is one thing and the difficulties which have arisen in the implementation and which of course can be argued that some of those difficulties should have been foreseen with greater sagacity and maturity is another thing.³¹

He further said that the accord had run into difficulties because there was a basic flaw in the accord. This was that the Indian govern­ment had taken the LTTE chief Pirabhakaran’s agreement for granted.³²

The national council of the CPI urged upon the government of India that conditions should be created by all possible means to facilitate the withdrawal of the IPKF, but only after it had finished its job. The sooner it completed the job, for which it was sent, the better it would be for the long term interests of India.⁸³ The CPI stated that this would help to normalise and restore the friendly relations between peoples of the two countries.³⁴

Later on, when the president and all the political parties including the left parties and public opinion in Sri Lanka demanded the IPKF pull out,³⁵ the central executive committee of the CPI issued the following statement,

The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India, while expressing its concern for the safety and welfare of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka, insists that it is the Premdasa (the President of Sri Lanka, government which should squarely shoulder the responsibility for protecting people of all communities and for maintaining law and order. Both Sri Lanka president and the Indian prime minister should desist from stipulating preconditions. They should avoid any mutual confrontation and should negotiate an agreement which would

enable the IPKF to withdraw from the Island with dignity and due respect.³⁶

Like the CPI, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) also wanted a negotiated solution to the Sri Lanka ethnic problem. When the Indian government sent planes to airdrop relief supplies to Jaffna, CPI (M) did not join the other opposition parties, in supporting such a step. It continued to urge the Indian government to pursue efforts for a nego­tiated solution to settle the ethnic problem within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. ³⁷

Thus, when the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was signed as a negotiated solution to the Sri Lanka ethnic problem, the CPI (M) welcomed it. Its central committee in its August 1987 meeting stated:

The Agreement that was recently signed between the govern­ments of India and Sri Lanka, if properly accepted by all and implemented, should settle the Tamil issue and restore the friendly relations between the people of two countries.³⁸

About the IPKF presence in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, the politbureau of the CPI (M) clearly stated that it was of key importance for the implementation of the accord, for restoring peace in the region, and for defeating the game of the imperialists and strengthening relations between two countries.³⁹ The CPI (M) made it clear that it would not like the IPKF to stay in Sri Lanka for a day if its purpose was to suppress the Tamil people in Sri Lanka.⁴⁰         :

When the IPKF launched its operation against the LITE, the politbureau of the CPI (M) in a statement on 3 October 1987 blamed the LTTE for creating the situation which led to the IPKF operation in Sri Lanka.⁴¹ While the other opposition parties were demanding with­drawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka, Suresh Kurup, member of parlia­ment of the CPI (M) in Lok Sabha warned against the IPKF withdrawal at that moment because that would mean leaving innocent Tamil civilians at the mercy of the Sri Lanka militants.⁴²

Later on when the operation of the IPKF got prolonged, Suresh Kurup and Sukomal Sen, both CPI (M) members of parliament, urged the government for early withdrawal of the IPKF.⁴³                 |

When president of Sri Lanka, R. Premdasa unilaterally demanded the IPKF withdrawal, CPI (M) issued the following statement:

The Politbureau of the CPI (M) is perturbed at the unilateral declaration of the Sri Lankan Government asking for the withdrawal of the IPKF. The unilateral declaration by the Sri Lankan Government without regard to the Accord places the Government of India in a difficult situation. While the Government of India should express its concern over these developments, if the Sri Lankan Government persists then India has no option.⁴⁴                                            |

When the Sri Lankan political parties including the left parties and  public opinion seemed to share president Premdasa’s views regarding  the withdrawal of IPKF, the Politbureau of the CPI (M) issued another statement:

The Politbureau of the CPI (M) is deeply concerned at the growing tensions between the Indian Government and the Sri Lankan Government over the question of the withdrawal of the IPKF. The stand of the Sri Lankan president in refusing to discuss the time-table of the withdrawal is leading to a confrontation position which does not augur well for either country. Public opinion in India is genuinely concerned about the safety and security of the Tamil minority which will be affected by the withdrawal. But the Indian Government by insisting on conditions for the withdrawal is only serving to heighten the confrontation. In Sri Lanka wide sections of the people and political parties would see IPKF withdrawn. The left parties in Sri Lanka which have supported the Accord also feel that the time has come for the IPKF to be withdrawn, while they continue to urge upon the Sri Lankan Government to fulfill its commitment as per the Accord. In this situation, the Indian Government has no other option.⁴⁵

The Janata Party found fault with the accord itself. It felt that it should have been a tri-parties agreement, i.e., among Sri Lanka Government, Tamils and India, rather than bilateral. The assent of the LTTE was most essential for the success of the accord. Expressing the Janata Party view, Unikrishnan, M.P., stated in the Lok Sabha that this accord between two parties was a discord.⁴⁶ When the IPKF launched the operation to disarm the LTTE, as it was not laying down arms according to the clauses of the accord, the Janata Party was of the opinion that war could not have been the purpose of the peace accord.⁴⁷

While criticising Indian government’s policy in Sri Lanka, M.S. Gurupadswamy, leader of the Janata Party, stated in the Lok Sabha that it was “the biggest misadventure for the government of India in the diplomatic and political front as it had brought shame to the country.⁴⁸

The BJP objected to India signing the agreement with the Sri Lanka government. The agreement should have been signed between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil militants.⁴⁹ The party believed that it had endangered the national interest and given rise to anti-India sentiments among Tamils in Sri Lanka. Thus it felt that the accord was fraught with immense danger.⁵⁰

Expressing similar views, Jaswant Singh, the BJP Member of parlia­ment, said: “Our troops are engaged in finding a military answer to the spoiled political problem.” He maintained that the situation as it was developing in Sri Lanka posed much greater threat to India than the Punjab problem ever did. ⁵¹ Jaswant Singh said in the Rajya Sabha that the Indian armed forces were involved in an undeclared war on foreign soil for a purpose which was not clear.⁵²

While advising the members to refrain from making adverse comments on the Indian army, L K. Advani, the JBP president, said in the Lok Sabha that they were only doing what the government had asked them to do. He maintained that the government’s Sri Lanka policy had landed it in a mess. ⁵³

Later on, when the Sri Lankan president demanded unilaterally the withdrawal of the IPKF, the BJP leader and former foreign minister, A. B. Vajpayee said:

The Indian domestic opinion is increasingly turning against continued military involvement in Sri Lanka. Rajiv Gandhi has no option but to stomach the humiliation and recall Indian troops. ⁵⁴

The points raised by the Janata party and the BJP are valid up to a point. No doubt the accord would have fared better if it had been signed by the Sri Lanka Government and the LTTE, but there was no such possibility. The Sri Lanka army was committing genocide on the Tamils and the Jayawardene Government seemed determined to pursue a military solution of the ethnic problem. The LTTE was not ready to give up its demand for a separate state, the Tamil Eelam. If this situation had continued, Sri Lankan unity and integrity and India’s security would have been endangered. This complicated the situation and compelled India to sign an accord with the Sri Lanka government. If this had not been done, the results would have been much more disastrous. Thus the assessment of the accord by the Janata Party and the BJP is not realistic. It fails to perceive the danger to India’s territorial integrity.

The Janata Dal leader and a former union minister Vishwanaih Pratap Singh, also found fault with the accord. He demanded a comprehensive enquiry into the circumstances which led to the signing of the accord by the Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, especially without the written consent of the LTTE chief, Vellupillai Pirabhakaran, to all the terms of the agreement.⁵⁵

He was also unhappy over the fact that the government of India was not playing safe in Sri Lanka. In his view, the killing of army men would have been avoided if the government of India had waited for some more time. V.P. Singh told newsmen that the Indian government would be in a fix if the issue of holding a referendum in Jammu and Kashmir was raised because it had signed an agreement which provided for a referendum on the Sri Lanka issue.⁵⁶ V.P. Singh advocated the withdrawal of the IPKF in a phased manner.⁵⁷

While addressing a press conference in Bombay, V.P. Singh demanded that the centre should “immediately withdraw the Indian Peace Keeping Force from Sri Lanka” and save the country and its armed forces “from further humiliation,” ⁵⁸ He further said: “Neither the so called accord nor international law and conventions could be invoked to justify the prime minister’s obduracy to respond to the Sri Lankan President’s call that India should withdraw its troops.” ⁵⁹

V.P. Singh’s argument on the issue of referendum is off the point. A referendum in Sri Lanka for the unity and integrity of the country is one thing and the issue of referendum in Kashmir is quite another. As for the hurried conclusion of the agreement, any delay would have merely added to’ the complexity of the situation. The situation in Sri Lanka had really come to the worst and the only option for India was to act without loss of time to prevent the hostile powers coming in there to India’s permanent disadvantage. Nor did the situation admit of playing safe. India had to go in, safe or otherwise, to protect the integrity of Sri Lanka and also its security environment. So far as the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka is concerned the government of India did commence the process of a phased withdrawal.

The Telugu Desam, a regional party of Andhra Pradesh, has also criticised the accord. Telugu Desam was critical of the government for misleading the country by giving the impression that the agreement had the support of the LTTE. The Telugu Desam’s parliamentary leader, P. Upendra, told a press reporter:

When the Accord was signed, we had expressed doubt about the wisdom of India becoming a direct party to the Accord as against its repeated stand of using goodwill to settle the ethnic problem.⁶⁰

He also said that the direct involvement by taking responsibility of maintaining law and order could have serious repercussion and India might not be able to come out of the situation with honour and perhaps the Indo-Sri Lanka accord would go the same way as the other accords signed by Rajiv Gandhi such as in Punjab and Assam.⁶¹

When the president and political parties of Sri Lanka demanded IPKF withdrawal, P. Upendra said: “What is the point of the IPKF staying on when the Tamils do not want it, the Sinhalese do not want it and not even Premdasa (the President of Sri Lanka) wants it?” ⁶²

Telugu Desam ignores the fact that the LTTE had initially expressed its support to the accord and had also started laying down arms. It was only later that it turned hostile. As for India being a party to the accord, it has already been said that there was no other alternative. So far as the assessment of the accord is concerned, it may be premature to indulge in such an exercise,

Shiromani Akali Dal of Punjab had wished a peaceful solution to the Sri Lanka problem, and when the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was signed, it welcomed it. Balwant Singh Ramoowalia, M.P. (Akali Dal), said in the Lok Sabha:                                   ‘

This agreement will certainly strengthen the hands of nationalist forces who want unity, integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka to be honoured by all. The continuous disturbances in Sri Lanka could result in the accumulation of weapons by the imperialist forces. So with this agreement, we are now in a position to safeguard this interest also. By this accord terrorism has come to an end. ⁶³

He lauded the government of India and especially the prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, for the “bold step” taken to solve the problem of Sri Lanka. He demanded similar steps to implement the Punjab accord.

II

Since the aim of this paper was not to analyse but only to outline the assessment of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord in India at the political level, we will make only the following brief remarks as conclusion.

The attitude of the Indian political parties towards the accord was determined primarily by the imperatives of the democratic politics here. The other factor that has played a decisive role in the articulation of the stand is the distance or otherwise of a particular party from the position of power. In addition to the Congress (I), this has been true of the opposition as a whole at the national level, and of the DMK. in the context of Tamil Nadu. As we have seen, the opposition parties keep making subtle shifts in their stand according to the changing situation in Sri Lanka and its corresponding reaction in Tamil Nadu. Even the communist parties cannot be said to have behaved differently, although their position has always been more consistent and better argued than those of (he other opposition parties. We may mention, as an example, the CPI (M) which had all along supported the entry and presence of the IPKF in Sri Lanka, but has now adopted a some what non-committal stance over this issue.

NOTES

1.  The conflict is the result largely of the continued discrimination against the Tamils by the successive Sri Lankan governments, both        before and after independence. This discrimination was indulged in for vested political interests. See for details, Gurnam Chand Indo-Sri      Lanka Accord: Its Political Impact and Assessment in India (M. Phil. dissertation, Panjab University, Chandigarh, 1989), Chapter I.

2.   For a brief summary of the important, provisions of the accord, see Appendix I.

3.    India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8, Vol. 29, No. 54 (30 July 1987), col. 340.

4.    Ibid.. Vol. 30 No. 61 (11 August 1987), col. 49.

5.    Ibid., Vol. 29 No. 54 (30 July 1987), col. 479.

6.    Ibid., col.345,

7.    “Colombo Accord : Before and After”, Democratic} World, Vol. 26, No. 32, p. 5.            ^\

8.    India, Lok Sabha Debates, n. 3, col. 340.

9.    Ibid; Vol. 23, No. 2 (3 November 198 7), col. 482.

10.   Ibid., Vol. 32, No. 4 (H November 1987), col. 268.

11.   DilipBobb, S. H. Venkatraman and Anita Pratap, “Journey to Jaffna,” India Today, Vol. 12, No. 12,        (16-30      June 1987), p. 34.

12.   The Hindu (Madras), 5 August 1987.

13.   K. Bala Subramanian, “Peace in Sri Lanka Brings Satisfaction in Tamil Nadu”, Commerce, Vol. 185, No.       3379, (22 August 1987), p. 23.

14.   S. Dorairaj, “MGR Absent: DMK Wants Mileage in Lanka Deaths”, Link Vol. 20, No, 12 (25 October 1987), p.       11.

15.    Ibid.

16.   Times of India (11 November 1587).

17.    India, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol.143, No. 15 (17 November 1987), col. 279.

18.   Prabhu Chawla and Amarnath K. Menon, “Smashing Return”, India Today Vol. 14, No. 3 (1-15 February         1982), p. 27.

19.   Special Correspondent, “ Triumph in Colombo”,Sunday, Vol. 14, No. 38 (9-15 August 19.7), p. 23.

20.    The Hindu (14 October 1987).                        -

21.    India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8, Vol. 30, No. 66 (18 August 1987), col. 489.

22.    Times of India (14 October 1987).

23.   India, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. 143, No. IS (17 November), col. 301.

24.  At that time the DMK had branded the LTTE as fascist. The latter had not only slaughtered the activists of       TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation), a rival group known to be closer to the DMK, but it had even       refused to collect its share of funds offered to it by the DMK, thus pouring salt at the injury. At the same time,      the LTTE had accepted the funds that came from the AIADMK. See, B. Krishankumar, “An Unpopular      Cause”, The Week (Cochin, 25-31 October 1987), p. 23.

25.    The Hindu. (New Delhi), 19 October 1987.

26.    India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8, Vol. 32, No. 4 (11 November 1987), col. 263.

27.   “The Central Secretariat of the CPI welcomes Sri Lanka Agreement”, New Age, Vol. 35, No. 32, (9 August       1987), p. 11.

28.    Ibid.

29.   Sadhan Mukherjee, “Sri Lanka Tamil Accord Ends Bloody Conflict”, New Age, Vol. 3,  No. 33 (10 September       1987), p. 15.

30.    New Age, Vol. 35, No. 42 (18 October 1987), p. 13.

31.   India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8, Vol. 32, No. 3 (10 November1987), col. 449.

32. Ibid., col. 449-50.

33  Statement of the National Council of (he CPl, New Age (New Delhi), Vol. 37, No. 14 (2 April 1989), p. 11.

34  Ibid.

35.  President  Premdasa’s first unilateral announcement asking for the withdrawal of the IPKF was made on 1 June 1989. This was immediately followed by a similar call by the pro-Sinhala political parties and the Bhuddhist clergy. Later on, the United Socialist Alliance (USA), which included the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, too came out in support of the Premdasa call. The USA insisted that since the overwhelming majority of Sri Lankan population and political parties now wanted the IPKF to leave the Sri Lankao soil, it was incumbent on the Indian Government to withdraw the Indian forces. For details, see Mainstream, Vol.37, No. 38 17 JJne 1989, pp. 27-29 ; The Hindu (New Delhi), 6 June 1989 ; and New Age (New Delhi), Vol. 27, No. 29, (16 July 1989).

36. Central Executive Resolutions, New Age (New Delhi), Vol. 37. No. 28, (9 July 1989).

37. Prakash Karat, “Developments in Sri Lanka : Standpoint of the CPI (M)”, The Marxist (New Delhi), Vol. 6, No. 2 (April-June 1988), p. 42.

38.The Central Committee Statement, “On Indo-Sri Lanka Accord”, People’s Democracy (Nev Delhi), Vol. 11, No. 31 (27 August 1987), p. 1.

39. Politbureau Statement, “On the Development in Sri Lanka”, People’s Democracy (New Delhi), Vol. 12, No. 12, (20 March 1988), p. 8.

40. Harkishan Singh Surjeet, “Four Days in Sri Lanka”, People’s Democracy,Ibid.

41. Times of India (4 October 1987).

42. India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8, Vol. 32, No. 3 (10 November 1987), col. 446.

43.Quoted in People’s Democracy (New Delhi), Vol. 13, No. 19 (7 May 1989), p. 10.

44. Politbureau Statement, “On the Question of Withdrawal of IPKF” People’s Democracy (New Delhi), Vol. 13, No. 24 (11 June 1989), p. 2.

45.Politbureau Statement, “Restraint Needed on IPKF ifsuc” People’s Democracy (New Delhi), Vol. 13, No. 31 (30 July 198&), p. 2.

46. India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8, Vol 30, No. 66 (18 August 1987), col. 480.

47. Times of India (21 October 1987).

48. India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8, Vol. 32, No. 3 (10 November 1987),col. 405-6.

49. Organiser (New Delhi), Vol. 19, No. 30 (5 August 1987), p. 3.

50. Special Representative, “Sri Lanka : The Bell Tolling”, Organiser, (NewDelhi), Vol. 60, No. 50 (18 June 1989), p. 1.

51.    Times of India (25 November 1987).

52.    India, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. 143, No. 15 (17 November 1987), col. 312.

53.   India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series8,Vol.32 ,No.4l (11November l987), col. 279.

54.    R. Balashanker, “A Campaign Issue”, The Week (Cochin), V ol. 7, No. 26, (18 June 1989), p. 37.

55.    Times of India (21 February 1988).

56.    Rajendra Sareen, “Real Issues in Sri Lanka”, The Tribune (9 November 1987).

57.    Times of India (20 February 1988).

58.   Ibid., 25 June 1989.

59.    Ibid.                                                                          

60.   The Hindu (Madras), 6,November 1987.

61.    Ibid.

62.    R. Balashankar, The Week, 54, p. 37.

63.    India. Lok Sabha Debates, Series 8, Vol. 30., No. 66 (18 August 1987), cols. 434-35.

APPENDIX—I

The accord recognised the multilingual and multiethnic character of Sri Lankan society, and that the northern and eastern provinces are the areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking people. It pledged to nurture the cultural and linguistic identity of each ethnic group within the framework of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. The accord provided for the joining of the northern and eastern provinces in one administrative unit. A referendum was to be held within a year to enable the people of the eastern province to decide whether they wanted to be a part of a single administrative unit with the northernprovince or not. Provincial councils were to be set up and elections to be held by the end of December 1987.

The accord provided for cessation of hostilities within 48 hours of the signing of the accord, the withdrawal of Sri Lanka government troops to the barracks, and the surrender of arms by the militant Tamil groups within ’12 hours. The agreement also provided for the Indian armed forces being involved if required by the Sri Lankan government .to oversee the implementation of these measures. Finally the agreement stated that Tamil shall be recognised as an official language along with Sinhalese and English.

An annexture to the agreement were the letters exchanged between the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and the then Sri Lankan President, J.R. Jayawardene. It was agreed, among other things, that Trincomalee or any other part in Sri Lanka will not be made available to any country for military use in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests. The other assurances related to the Voice of America installation in Sri Lanka, whereby the Sri Lankan government assured that such foreign broadcasting facilities will not be used for any military or intelligence purposes. Both the leaders also agreed that the employment of foreign personnel in Sri Lanka will not be allowed to the prejudice of Indo-Sri Lanka relations. (For a full text of the accord and the letters, see Gurnam Chand, op. cit.. Appendix—III).

India-Sri Lanka relations in the post-1990 period have undergone a contextual change together with changes in India’s foreign policy perceptions. After the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower, India’s foreign policy perceptions too have changed. In keeping with the changing global economic and trade scenario, India’s strategic priorities in the Indian Ocean region have also undergone a change during the last two decades. India’s national security perceptions have now been enlarged to include economic security, free trade and commerce, energy security, and social security of the population in addition to territorial integrity. The United States’ relations with India have become an important component of New Delhi’s strategic linkages to globally safeguard its interests

India-Sri Lanka relations are now also affected by the regional power dynamics, with external powers seeking to increase their own influence and counter those of others. India is the most important foreign supporter of Sri Lanka, and remains its largest trading partner. China is currently one of Sri Lanka’s major military suppliers, but also has a potential for economic investments and infrastructure projects. The Sri Lanka Government under President Mahinda Rajapakse is exploiting the geo-political struggle unfolding in the Indian Ocean between China and India, with the United States having its own agenda for retaining its influence. While Pakistan is playing for stakes in Sri Lanka with Chinese knowledge to queer the pitch for India, the Russians too are keeping a hawk eye on any activity in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s engagements in Sri Lanka are also strategically sensitive to India. Strategically, it is in India’s interest to keep its rivals out of its sphere of influence. India needs to invest more in Sri Lanka to keep China within its zone of influence. India sought (tried) to eliminate these threats through various bilateral agreements with Sri Lanka.

India-Sri Lanka relations are based on a deep and abiding friendship based on shared historical experience and common civilisation and cultural values sustained by geographical proximity and ethnic affinity. There have been shifts and changes in the pattern of the relationship marked by mutual differences, irritants, cooperation and friendship. But, both the countries have developed adequate strength to withstand the stresses and strains; this is a notable feature of their bilateral relationship. India-Sri Lanka relations are multifaceted and interconnected; invariably, therefore, they have implications for domestic politics and economy in the two countries. Nearly every bilateral issue between them is intertwined with some domestic issues and therefore become a matter of domestic political debate. There is interdependence but, at the same time, the smaller partner also complains of asymmetry in the relationship.

In the post-1990 phase, the sharply improving economic cooperation between India and Sri Lanka has its roots in the maturing political relationship. India’s clear, sincere and abiding commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and its support for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict put hatred behind and sowed the seeds for eliminating all irritants in the political relations between the two countries. Keeping in view New Delhi’s changing foreign policy perceptions and India’s earlier experience of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 29, 1987 and subsequent mission of the IPKF from 1987 to 1990, and particularly after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE, India has resisted the option of mediation or intervention in the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka. The events that unfolded between 1987 and 1990 imparted a new dimension to bilateral ties

and these were the most troubled and by and large conflictual years in India-Sri Lanka relationship. India’s intervention in the island state had embittered both the government and people of Sri Lanka.

Realising the constraints and cost of its direct intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990, India adopted a new policy of non-intervention with active interest in the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka, the focus being on economic cooperation. India’s new Sri Lanka policy vis-à-vis the ethnic conflict combines its old stand with the new realities. At the core of India’s foreign policy is a reiteration of the Indian Government’s commitment to protect Sri Lanka’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. India’s pragmatic policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka’s commitment towards India’s security concerns created a credible atmosphere and consequently brought a new era in the relations between the two countries. India’s new policy has contributed to removing the cultivated fear complex of Sri Lanka. The leadership and the people in Sri Lanka have changed their mindset and thinking about India; for the first time, India is considered as an asset rather than a threat to Sri Lanka’s security. In the post-1990 phase, India and Sri Lanka have established a dense bilateral network of institutions and mechanisms so as to ensure sustained cooperation irrespective of domestic politics and changes in the external environment of the two countries.

A significant development in this period was that a large legal framework was provided by the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA), which was signed at the highest political level on December 28, 1998 with the overall objective of enhancing trade and economic relations between the two countries and promoting FDI. It was entered into force from March 1, 2000. Apart from the legal framework, during this period, the institutional framework for the relationship was provided by frequent contacts at the political level, including at the highest levels; the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers of both the countries are engaged in threadbare discussions covering the entire scope of the bilateral relationship. In this new phase, both the nations realise that restrictions on trade between the two nations are detrimental to their economic growth and prosperity. Following the success of FTA, both the governments are ready to sign the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA).

In the post-LTTE era, Sri Lanka has become closer to China, Pakistan and Israel because of their political and military support to Colombo during the war. China has partly filled the vacuum created by India’s reluctance to actively participate in Sri Lanka’s war effort. While the Indian Government declined to provide military equipment,

citing political compulsions and concern over the use of force against the LTTE, China filled in the gap with liberal supply of a wide variety of armaments. The timely help rendered during the war has enabled China to gain a lot of strategic space and credibility in Sri Lanka. The Chinese are constructing a commercial port in Hambantota in the South and thus their presence in Sri Lanka is likely to be firmed up. In the coming years, the Chinese influence in Sri Lanka can be expected to not only increase but become more assertive.

The USA has also been an active player in Sri Lanka both in promoting the peace process 2002 and later in supporting Sri Lanka’s war effort. However, on issues relating to Sri Lanka, the USA had been maintaining close contact with India. It is evident that the USA values India for its unique geographic and strategic advantage in Sri Lanka; this relationship is likely to be strengthened to balance the growing Chinese profile in the South Asian region.

Hence it is important that India looks at these developments with great caution and ensures a proper foreign policy towards Sri Lanka. India will have to safeguard its interests particularly in the Indian Ocean region. The sea lanes of the Indian Ocean have become vital for India’s expanding global trade. They carry fossil fuels so vital for India’s ever increasing energy needs. India needs to invest more in Sri Lanka to keep China within its zone of influence. India’s timely help during the Tsunami has proved to the world that India is capable of handling challenges facing the region.

India-Sri Lanka relations are now broadbased with the economic agenda being a priority followed by strategic considerations. India’s strategic interest in Sri Lanka has been enlarged to protect and project India’s strategic and economic interests by building strong bonds with Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was the first country with which India signed a Free Trade Agreement; the trade between the two countries is expected to grow to $ 4 billion by the end of this year. There is greater appreciation between the two countries of each other’s problems and perceptions.

Inevitably the changes in India’s strategic perception were reflected in its present approach to Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE, particularly after the failure of the peace process 2002. Its role had been limited as an advisor and counsellor not only to Sri Lanka but to the four co-chairs—the European Union, Japan, Norway and the USA which promoted the peace process. India scrupulously kept out of Sri Lanka’s war with the LTTE despite strong internal political pressures from the ruling Congress’ coalition

partners in Tamil Nadu. India’s agenda for Sri Lanka had mainly focused on strategic security cooperation and the building of trade linkages.

Permanent peace in Sri Lanka requires institutional restructuring aimed at creating ethnic equality; a power sharing arrangement to satisfy the ‘aspirations of all the Sri Lankan communities, especially those of Sri Lankan Tamils and Sri Lankan Muslims’ is considered the most desirable democratic option. This pro-minority position underlines the need for devolution of powers to counter the majority community’s entrenched position on ethnic democratic centralism.

Changing Role of both Governments

A key reason for India-Sri Lanka relations to improve dramatically since the mid-1990s was the change of governments in both the countries As power moved from the hands of the UNP to the SLFP after 17 years in Sri Lanka, following the General Election in India the Congress party led by Rajiv Gandhi was replaced in New Delhi by the National Front Government headed by Vishwanath Pratap Singh.

In the General Election of 1991, the Congress party came back to power and P. V. Narasimha Rao became the Prime Minister of India. After assuming power Rao declared his Sri Lankan policy. He said that India would not desire to take any active part in resolving the problems of Sri Lanka. These problems would have to be solved by the Sri Lankans themselves, regardless of whether they were Sinhalese or Tamils. At the bilateral level, India showed more interest in developing the framework for a working relationship with Sri Lanka, rather than identifying itself with the Sri Lankan Tamil cause.

An Agreement was signed between India and Sri Lanka in July 1991 to establish an Indo-Sri Lanka Joint Commission. Its sub-commissions included those on trade, investment and finance, science and technology. President Premasdasa visited India in October 1992 and discussed the bilateral relations of the two countries.

After being elected, President Chandrika Kumaratunga paid a significant visit to India in March 1995 and laid the basis for close relations with India. Later on I.K. Gujral became the Prime Minister in late 1997. He clearly understood the importance of maintaining friendly relations with the neighbours. He introduced the ‘Gujral Doctrine’.

After the midterm elections in 1998, the Bharatiya Janata Party along with its alliance (National Democratic Alliance) came in to power at the Centre. As soon as Atal Behari

Vajpayee became the Prime Minister of India, the Sri Lanka representative was among the first to reach India. India reassured Sri Lanka that it respected the sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka and it had no intention to intervene in its internal affairs.

Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Sri Lanka to attend the 10th SAARC Summit. He said that India would be willing to conclude bilateral Free Trade Agreements with the member countries. By the end of December 1998, President Kumaratunga’s visit to India resulted in the conclusion of the historic Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement. The warm relations between the two countries continued ever since, and Colombo was determined to forge closer ties with New Delhi. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s concept of ties between the two countries extended to the extent of wanting both countries to partner each other in building a bridge across the Palk Strait. In February 2002, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and the LTTE chief, Velupillai Prabhakaran, signed a Ceasefire Agreement and an MoU to take the peace process forward; India welcomed this Agreement.

In the November 2005 national elections Mahinda Rajapakse, the anti-LTTE hardliner of the SLFP, was elected President with the support of two staunch anti-LTTE political parties, the JVP and JHU, which demanded a military solution to the ethnic conflict. Like previous governments, the administration of President Mahinda Rajapakse devoted the highest priority to India-Sri Lanka relationship and the President visited India on four occasions since assuming the high office in November 2005.

In January 2006, the Sri Lankan Government launched a military campaign to root out the LTTE. When the Sri Lankan armed forces began to resort to savage bombing of the Tamil areas in the northern part of Sri Lanka, the political parties in Tamil Nadu started expressing deep concern. In August 2006 when news about the air attack on Sencholai orphanage and also a school meant for the internally displaced children reached Tamil Nadu there was righteous indignation. Almost all political parties came together and the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed a unanimous resolution. The resolution characterised the air attack as “barbaric, uncivilised and inhuman”. The resolution also requested New Delhi to step up pressure on Colombo for immediate ceasefire and try to arrive at a negotiated settlement.

After a 30-month long military campaign, the Sri Lankan armed forces ultimately militarily defeated the LTTE and freed the nation from the three decades of terror in May 2009. As many as 80,000 people were officially listed as killed during the three decades of ethnic conflict. The end of military conflict with the LTTE brought Sri Lanka to a major

turning-point in its history and with the death of LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran, the militant campaign for an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka seems to have come to an end.

Post-LTTE Era Relationship

In the post-LTTE era, a frictional chapter in India-Sri Lankan history has come to an end. It is time for India and Sri Lanka to start a new chapter with renewed vigour and vitality by rigorous cooperation in various fields. It is likely that this period would not see the policy of intervention but rather of mutual trust and harmony. In this period both countries have agreed that with the end of the military operations in Sri Lanka, the time is opportune to focus attention on issues of relief, rehabilitation, resettlement and reconciliation, as well as a permanent political solution of the ethnic conflict.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted in his reply to the debate on the motion of thanks to the President’s address to the joint session of Parliament that the Tamils’ problem was much larger than the LTTE and hoped the Sri Lanka Government would show imagination and courage in meeting the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Tamil people. The Prime Minister told Parliament that India has made it known that it has no intention of instructing Colombo on the political front but is ready to play an active part in the relief and rehabilitation of the IDPs and has earmarked Rs 500 crores for the purpose. The Prime Minister stated in Parliament:

We are willing to do more to restore normality and to help such people return to their rightful home and occupations.

India’s bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka could be strengthened even further with the end to the military conflict.

There is consensus within and outside Sri Lanka that with the LTTE out of the way, a golden opportunity has presented itself before the government to work towards a just, honourable and durable political settlement of the ethnic conflict. In the post-LTTE era without devolution the internal situation in Sri Lanka would continued to be restive. This could have an unforeseen effect on the Tamil Nadu situation. In the post-civil war period if the relationship between the Tamils of Tamil Nadu and the Tamils of Sri Lanka is turned into a positive and vibrant force, a previously constraining factor in India-Sri Lanka relations could transform into a promising connection drawing India and Sri Lanka closer to each other.

It is imperative that India adopts a pro-active policy towards Sri Lanka in order to not only save the Tamils but also for its own enlarged security reasons. Economic aid could be a big trump card in India’s foreign policy. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has congratulated the President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapakse, on his re-election as the President on January 26, 2010. The Prime Minister reiterated:

We have time tested ties of friendship and co-operation. I look forward to working closely with you to further strengthen our close and multidimensional bilateral relations in the coming years.

The author Dr.Gurnam Chand an Associate Professor and the Head, Department of Political Science, M.R. Government College, Fazilka.

Abstract

China’s increasing forays into the Indian Ocean, as well as the growing economic and political relations intended to dilute India’s dominance in South Asia. Some Indian strategists and military leaders fear ‘maritime encirclement’ by China, via its relationship with South Asian countries. Instead of being alarmed at China’s growing influence in the region. India’s primary concern is to counter the threat posed by Chinese “encirclement”.  India’s two policy thrusts -the Indo-US strategic partnership and a ‘Look East’ policies are paying well. India is building close relationship with Japan, Australia, and Singapore for offensive against China in South East Asia. India’s own charm offensive in the region has also been bearing fruit. India as an emerging power has the responsibility to create confidence with its neighbouring countries so that they can walk with India and not pull India in different directions. All regional countries have close cultural, linguistic, historic ties to India. As a result, it should not be possible for China to encircle India. Leaders from both sides will have to find a way to remove new strains and to overcome these concerns. A contest ridden relationship cannot help India and China, which should engage in a transparent dialogue to ensure peace and stability in the South Asia region. India should engage China particularly in trade and avoid military conflict as long as possible.

In the present world, the US and the West in general are losing their pre-eminent position. This has enabled an increasing powerful China and emerging India, to expand their influence on the international affairs in the 21^st Century. Smaller regional countries are also emerging with strong identities. Due to the confluence of common strategic and economic interests shared by India and China, a new rivalry is emerging in the Indian Ocean. Dominating the Indian Ocean has emerged as a central point of contention in the rivalry between India and China. Both are seeking to expand their naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean in their bid to become major world powers. Robert D. Kaplan, a security expert of US argues that,

“The Indian Ocean will take centre stage in the 21^st Century as India and China compete in a “great-power rivalry” over the waters. Both India and China aspire to increase their zones of influence in the Indian Ocean, above all in order to guarantee their peoples with oil and gas supplies and to intensify commercial ties with countries in Asia and the Middle East.” [1]

Indian Ocean is an area which has got more security challenges at present than any other part of the world. There are large numbers of historically existing interred and intra State conflicts in this region and therefore there is a problem of working together towards a common aim in the Indian Ocean region. One of the biggest challenges before the India is to get the confidence of the neighbouring countries and ensure political stability in the neighbourhood and in the Indian Ocean so that they do not fall into the hands of forces inimical towards India, particularly China. India has to ensure a peaceful, secure and stable neighbourhood, so as to safeguard peace, security and development within the Indian Ocean region and it is with this perspective that India is developing a mutually beneficial relationship with neighbouring and Indian Ocean countries.

After China-Indian conflict of October 1962, India became security sensitive towards any warming of relations between any of its neighbours on the one hand and China on the other.[2] Traditionally, India has been the major trading partner with its neighbours, but China is entering India’s neighbouring markets more aggressively through trade and investment. China’s increasing need of energy sources and access to the international markets makes the South Asia and Indian Ocean ports very attractive. China is expanding its power in South Asia because these countries provide new markets and alternative route to the Indian Ocean. Nearly half of the seaborne trade passes through the Indian Ocean, and its coastal states are the source of some 60 per cent of the world’s oil and a third of its gas reserves.[3]  To satiate its appetite for energy, China has embarked on projects in several countries situated along the sea routes stretching from the Malacca straits to the Cape of Good Hope. The Malacca Strait has choke-point on China’s supply routes. China’s interest in developing alternative ports and pipelines would seem to be motivated by a desire to reduce the criticality of the Malacca Strait. China’s role in the Indian Ocean is growing at a rate that underlines much more than a normal expansion of capabilities.

Figure 1

Source: Harsh V. Pant, China’s Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry, http://japanfocus.org

The rivalry between India and China for primacy in the Indian Ocean is to be one of the big themes of the coming decades.  India’s Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna had informed Parliament on 31 August 2010 that,

“The Government of India has come too realised that China has been showing more than a normal interest in the Indian Ocean affairs.”

He told Parliament that, “We are closely monitoring the Chinese intentions.” [4] From an Indian point of view it needs to be underlined that China is neither a part of South Asia and nor a littoral state, but through ‘string of pearls’ strategy China is cultivating India’s neighbour as friendly states, both to protect its economic and security interests and to balance “rising India.” [5]

India and China share contested Himalayan border. China’s refused to acknowledge the McMohan Line[6] in Arunachal Pradesh as the border between two nations. India China border dispute remains unresolved-India say that China illegal occupies 43,180 sq km of territory in Jammu and Kashmir, including the 5,180 sq km Beijing illegally ceded to Pakistan in 1963. China contests that India occupies some 90,000 sq km of Chinese territory, most of it in Arunachal Pradesh, which India say is part of India. Water has become linked to land disputes. China claim Arunachal Pradesh (particularly Tawang) and also assert claim over the parts of Sikkim. China has a problem with India playing host to Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees. China has close military ties with Pakistan, with which India has fought three wars.

China’s increasing forays into the Indian Ocean, as well as the growing economic and political relations intended to dilute India’s dominance in Indian Ocean. Some Indian strategists and military leaders fear ‘maritime encirclement’ by China, via its relationship with South Asian countries. China assertive diplomacy primarily geared to establish its economic and security ties with Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan and Bangladesh.   In some cases this firming up of ties has led to joint port construction or enlargement deals, example include Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Sittwe port in Myanmar electronic intelligence gathering facilities on the Island in the Bay of Bengal, funding construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, a military agreement with Cambodia and building of forces in the South China Sea.[7] China is growing strategic presence in the Giligit-Baltistan area of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.[8] China has been strengthening of its military-related capabilities in Tibet Autonomous region which are in the form of further up gradation of its highway network, the construction of more airports, the construction of railways line from Lhasa towards the border with Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh with plans for the ultimate construction of a railway link-up with Nepal and military exercises involving various units of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). A US study report points to the possibility that China may deploy its nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean.[9]

Figure 2, Source: http://www.msnbc.com.

Successive governments in India have tried to cast aside irritants and tried to make good relations with China. However, the prospects for collaboration and cooperation between India and China have been overshadowed by recent Chinese actions which have been disturbing India. China has extended trade security ties with the military junta in Myanmar, China decided to supply to more nuclear reactor to Pakistan. In the past China has transferred weapons and missiles technology to Pakistan, possibility of a large number of PLA personnel are working in the Baltisan-Giligit area, secured contracts to develop the Gwadar in Arabian Sea, and obtained cooperation via Shanghai cooperation organization. China is supporting Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. To compound the problem, China is issuing stapled visa for the people from Jammu and Kashmir and of Arunachal Pradesh, Chinese effort to depict Indian Jammu and Kashmir as separate part,[10] a move that India saw as a violation of its sovereignty. China denied a visa to one of the Indian Army Commanders posted at Kashmir. China has challenged India’s Jurisdiction over Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh including Twang tract. China is intruding in various places along the borders in the guise of herd-grazers. India growing concerns are over the damming of the Brahmaputra River by the China. India faces economic competition and a balancing trade deficit with China.

China and India are both seeking to gain a strategic advantage over each other. Both countries are seeking to expand their naval capabilities with a focus on Indian Ocean in their bid to become major world power.  China-India rivalry leads to tension in the Indian Ocean and in the South Asia region. Countries that are attracting Chinese interests include Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar and Maldives.

Pakistan: China’s support for India’s foe Pakistan has been a cause of concern for India for a long time. Pakistan is developing a strategically important port at Gwadar with economic and technical aid and assistance from China since August 2006, [11]  Beijing and Islamabad are in talks to build a new nuclear reactor in Pakistan of the one gigawatt capacity, apparently without the approval of International Atomic Energy Agency or the Nuclear Supplier Group.[12] China has been a major military supplier to Pakistan and its new military alliance with Pakistan has been a new worrisome factor. China gives diplomatic support to Pakistan against Indian interests. China and Pakistan have traditionally valued one another as strategic hedge against India. For Pakistan, China is a guarantor of security against India.[13] China also considers Pakistan critical to energy security. Gwadar-along with a network of rail and roads through Pakistan assures the convenient transport of Middle-Eastern oil and gas to China via its western province of Xinjiang. Chinese Premier during his visit 19 to 20 December, 2010 to Pakistan Said, Pakistan and his country were “all weather strategic partners.” That means “the Chinese government and people of Chinese will stand by Pakistan to face all challenge together.”  

China and Pakistan signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2006, as well as numerous other agreements and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), including Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) to increase mutual trade and investment. Pakistan provides China with cheap raw materials and the use of Pakistani ports in return for access to Chinese markets through preferential treatment under the FTA. Pakistan could very well become a hub in the region, which may lead to considerable future transit revenues and help Beijing build the ‘trade and energy corridor’ through Pakistan.[14] Ultimately, from an Indian point of view, the possibility of China and Pakistan working in tandem to reduce India’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood should be a matter of great concern.

Sri Lanka: China ties with Sri Lanka gave it a foothold near the critical sea lanes and also entry into what India considers being its backyard. The geo-strategic location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean having importance in terms of maritime-trade and security of other states, caused concern to India. India is always worried about the harbor’s status; her occupation by any external power has serious repercussions for India security.[15] Sri Lanka provides an ideal base in the India Ocean for naval attack on India and it can also be useful to India for defence in a naval warfare. The island nation also occupies an important place in the critical sea lines of communication.

Sri Lanka gave China the most favoured nation status and provided facility to China warships knowing fully that it is against Indian interests. In 1963 and 1971, much too Indian concern Sri Lanka entered into a maritime agreement with China. This left India worried for its coastal and Oceanic defence.[16] It was strategic concern that guided India’s policy of intervention in the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka from 1987 to pre-1990. Sri Lanka also recognised India’s geo-strategic concern, when it signed an accord on 29th July 1987.[17]

India had adopted hands-off policy in the ethnic conflict since the withdrawals of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in March1990, especially after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Indian Government non-intervention policy provided China with an opportunity to make headway into the Sri Lanka and there is an urgent need for India to take note of this growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka.

In the post-LTTE era, security concern of India and Sri Lanka took an entirely different form. India threat perceptions have grown as China has become more active in Sri Lanka. Economic and strategic interests are behind China interests in Sri Lanka. An important reason for the close ties between the Mahinda Rajapaksa Government and China was Beijing’s robust endorsement and support of Colombo’s conduct in the war against the LTTE. China was “instrumental to some extent in the Sri Lankan government’s success in defeating the LTTE. Colombo was trying to purchase arms from abroad for years and only China supplied it with weaponry on a sustained basis”.[18]

There have been some concerns in India about China’s help and assistance in the construction of the Hambantota port on the Indian Ocean in Sri Lanka, particularly in the long term.[19] Indian strategists believe the port is a key link in a chain of such projects from Burma to Pakistan, the so called string of pearls, which seek to extend China’s maritime influence. The Hambantota will serve China in a number of strategic ways. Firstly, it will provides facilities of Chinese flagged merchant ships, container vessels , oil and gass tankers , and military vessels  including nuclear submarines operating in the Indian Ocean. Secondly, China would be able to establish electronic systems and networks for monitoring Indian Ocean military and civilian traffic, electronic transmissions from US base at Diego Garcia and the Indian nuclear facility that is likely to come up at Rambilli in the Bay of Bebgal. Thirdly, Hambantota offers a strategic location for China to set up its space monitoring systems, considered critical for its ballistic missiles, which can challenge US forces particularly the aircraft carriers who may threaten Chinese shipping in the Indian Ocean. Fourthly, the Chinese fleet of fishing vessels that are also deployed for intelligence gathering duties can be staged from Hambantota. [20]

Figure 3, Image of Hambantota Port of Sri Lanka

There is a perception that Hambantota may be detrimental to India’s strategic and security interests. Though China and Sri Lanka claim that this is merely a commercial venture, it future utility as a strategic asset for China cannot be ruled out. Though at present there is no talk of a naval base, it could emerge ultimately to cater to the requirements of Chinese oil and gas tankers and anti-piracy patrols.[21]

Besides the Hambantota project, China is constructing a second international airport at Hambantota, a $248 million expressway connecting the capital Colombo with the airport at Katunayake, $855 million coal power plant at Norochcholai, and performing arts theatre in Colombo. China manages a special economic zone at Mirigama for Chinese investors. Since 2006, China has provided Sri Lanka with $ 306 billion in financial assistance for various projects. [22] India sees this Chinese maneuvering as an intrusion into its historic sphere of Influence.

India is worried over the increasing Chinese influence and its implication for India’s security. The Indian Navy will definitely find itself under pressure because of Chinese presence through men and material at various ports and harbours of Sri Lanka. India’s Hambantota consulate is aimed at “keeping an eye” on Chinese activity there. Such concern explains India’s efforts to build close relations with Japan, Australia and Singapore. As a result, many leaders favour closer ties with the US.

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakasa has sought to allay Indian concerns about the growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka, saying India’s role in the Sri Lanka was a permanent feature. Unlike other players whose engagement was limited to commercial project they execute.

“The Chinese will Come to Sri Lanka, build some project and go, but the Indians will come here, they will build and they will stay. This is the difference in our relation with China and India.” [23]

Affirming India’s interests, Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated earlier also, “All countries are friends of Sri Lanka but India is Sri Lanka relation (relative). Sri Lanka will not initiate any action with any other country against India as it would be self defeating act.” [24]

Bangladesh: China and Bangladesh do not share a border, but Bangladesh and Mayanmar do, and China is keen to establish a logistical corridor in corporating the three states. China does not have an FTA with Bangladesh, the two countries, granted each other Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment in 1984. China provides duty-free access to a list of Bangladeshi products under the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement, and Bangladesh has offered oil exploration rights to China at Barakpuria. China has also gained naval access to the Bangladeshi Chittagong port, which will bring China closer to Myanmar oil fields and the seas around India.[25] China is a major arms supplier to Bangladesh. Although, Bangladesh’s ruling Awami League Party is keen to boost ties with India. The situation in northeastern India can become precarious if Bangladesh has a pro-Pakistan or pro-China government.[26]

Nepal: Nepal is in effect India’s security outpost. China has gained greater influence in Nepal with the emergence of Nepali Maoist as a political force.[27]  China has inspired Maoists. It is Possible China could move its troops into Nepal and threaten India through UP, Bihar and West Bengal. China has built the Qingzang railway line from the Tibetan capital of Lhasa to Kathmandu.

Myanmar:  Myanmar provides China’s landlocked inner provinces such as Yunnan with access to the Indian Ocean, thus bypassing the Malacca Strait. Malacca Strait is one of the busiest maritime chokepoints in the world, since virtually all seaborne trade to and from Asia and Europe/the Middle East must pass through it as other routes are longer. [28] Thus, having an alternative outlet is crucial for China. Myanmar is undergoing a naval infrastructure modernisation programme with Chinese assistance. China has started building oil and gas pipeline connecting it to the port of Kyaukpyu on the Bay of Bengal. China has proposed rail link, via Myanmar, to Chottagong port in Bangladesh.

Maldives: China has secured a naval base in the Maldives. But India has key influence in Maldives.  India has long maintained security ties with Maldives. India is establishing a network of listening stations and other military facility there, as a direct response to China’s development of Hambantota in Sri Lanka. The Indian armed forces favour a base for their surveillance aircraft on the Island of Gan, as well as basing for aircraft and ships in the capital Male and Hanimadhoo.

Chinese other movements include, the construction of a new naval base at Hanggyi Island in the Bassein river at the mouth of the Irrawady; construction of Sona deep sea port at Cox Bazar and development of existing facilities at Sittwe near the Bangladesh border and development of radar facilities in the Coco Island at a distance of only 30 nautical miles from the Andaman Chain of Islands of India are all significant Chinese moves which give China a significant strategic advantage over India.

India’s main advantage is that it is an Indian Ocean littoral state and a shorter supply route to the Persian Gulf. India’s primary concern is to counter the threat posed by Chinese “encirclement”. As a result, India’s two policy thrusts are the Indo-US strategic partnership and a ‘Look East’ policy. India with its Look East policy substantially enhanced its presence in region. India is building close relations with Japan, Australia, and Singapore for offensive against China in South East Asia. India’s own charm offensive in the region has also been bearing fruit, whether it is through the establishment of electronic monitoring system in Madagascar in 2007, or in August 2009 in the Maldives. India officials have also become more active to the attempt of their Chinese counterparts to woo small but strategically placed nations such as the Seychelles or Mauritius. India has greater influence in Seychelles than China. India trained the Seychelles People’s Defence Force and police and donated a navy craft and helicopters.[29] India also owns a listening station there. Mauritius has been under Indian cultural influence. India is the biggest source of Mauritian imports, and much of India’s inbound foreign investment is channeled through Mauritius. India has first overseas listening station in Madagascar.  Economic engagement between India and Indonesia is growing rapidly, and gained further momentum with the signing of the India-ASEAN free trade agreement in 2010.[30] In an apparent bid to counter China’s growing presence in the Bay of Bengal, especially its new forays in Bangladesh and Myanmar, the Indian government has okayed two new naval bases on Eastern sea board-Paradip in Orissa and Tuticorin in Tamil Nadu.[31]

Economic Partnership

Despite rivalry in the Indian Ocean, both Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao have been strong votaries of increasing bilateral trade. The Sino-Indian trade which stood at $18.71billion in 2005 has already crossed $ 49.84 billion in October 2010 and likely to be $ 100 billion by 2015. Chinese side is keen to take measures to promote India greater export to China with a view to reduce India’s increasing deficit.  There is also economic competitiveness between China and India. Though Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has time and again stated that the world has enough space to accommodate the aspirations of both India and China and that two countries should complement each other rather than looking at each other as competitors.

India and China need each other. China needs to access India’s market as much as India needs to draw Chinese capital to develop infrastructure projects. A warm relationship between the neighbours will help them to rise on the world stage, also ensure stability in the Indian Ocean. Two way trades has been impressive growth and has a potential to grow, but widening deficit is a concern for India. Chinese premier promised to redress the trade imbalance between the two. Improve access for Indian exporters of pharmaceuticals, IT and auto companies will help to narrow the gap. The future of both lies in its partnership not rivalry. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao rejecting the Chinese ‘Dragon’ and Indian ‘Elephant’ theory being often propagated by the West, said on 16 December 2010 during his visit to India,

“China and India are partners for cooperation not rivals in competition. There is enough space in the world for the development of both China and India and there are enough areas for China and India to cooperate” [32]

Following are some suggestions and concluding observations of the study: Suggestions:

• As China has already decided that it will fight aggressively in the Indian Ocean, India needs to build naval capacity and careful strategic thinking.
• India as an emerging power has the responsibility to create confidence with its neighbouring countries so that they can walk with India and not pull India indifferent directions.
• India should engage China particularly in trade and avoid military conflict as long as possible.
• India should work towards engaging a strategic ally (possibly US) having sufficient military and economic muscle to caution China on any adventurism against India.
• Closer economic and military cooperation can bring South Asian nations to closer. India needs to energize trading blocs’ countries such as ASEAN, SAARC, SAPTA and IORARC by giving preferential treatment and help them in their economic development.
• Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan need India’s assistance with development and solving internal problems. Since India borders all of these countries, it is an important security measure that these issues be resolved. Improving relationship with Pakistan and Bangladesh is also very important for improving relationship with other South Asian country.
• India must convince the South Asian states that the regional economy could benefit from the huge Indian market.

Concluding observations:

• In reality, China wants to encircle and contain India. India needs to remain more vigilant. India needs to consolidate its strength and influence in the Indian Ocean.
• Tensions between India and China are unlikely to lesson, unless they somehow find an accommodation on their border dispute. Amicable ties between China and India are essential for stability in the Indian Ocean.
• South Asian countries and littoral states of Indian Ocean can get significant geo-political and economic benefits.
•  A good trade relation exists and has the potential to grow even faster in the coming years, despite economic competitiveness and the sharing of contested border.

In a nutshell, China’s diplomacy is aimed at counterbalancing and checkmating India’s pre-eminent influence in its immediate neighbourhood and in the Indian Ocean. China’s growing naval presence in and around the Indian Ocean region is troubling for India as it restricts India’s freedom to maneuver in the region. India cannot afford to let China dominate the Indian Ocean. Instead of being alarmed at China’s growing influence in the region. India needs to find new ways to win neighbours and increase influence in the Indian Ocean region. India must ramp up its naval capabilities. India’s “Look East” policies are paying well. All regional countries have close cultural, linguistic, historic ties to India. As a result, it should not be possible for China to encircle India. Leaders from both sides will have to find a way to remove new strains and to overcome these concerns. A contest ridden relationship cannot help India and China, which should engage in a transparent dialogue to ensure peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region.

Abstract

India-Sri Lanka relations are based on a deep and abiding friendship on shared historical experience and common civilisation and cultural values sustained by geographical proximity and ethnic affinity. The implication of such a close proximity is that developments in each country have affected the other. The specific geo-strategic location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean and ethnic affinity of the Indian Tamils has been the most important factor in their relations. There have been shifts and changes in the pattern of relationship marked by mutual differences, irritants, co-operation and friendship. Both the countries have developed adequate strength to withstand the stresses and strains; is a notable feature of their bilateral relationship. India-Sri Lanka relations in the post 1990 phase have undergone a contextual change in tandem with changes in India’s foreign policy perceptions. In the post 1990 era, the sharply improving economic co-operation between India and Sri Lanka has its roots in the maturing political relationship. India’s clear, sincere and abiding commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and its supports for a peaceful, negotiated settlement for the Sri Lanka ethnic conflict that put animosity behind and sowed the seeds for eliminating all irritants in the political relations between the two countries. Keeping in view India’s changing foreign policy perceptions and India’s earlier experience from 1987-pre1990 and particularly after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India has changed its policy towards Sri Lanka from intervention to non-intervention. India’s pragmatic policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka’s commitment towards India’s security concern created a credible atmosphere and consequently brought a new era in relations between two countries. India’s new policy has contributed to remove the cultivated fear complex of Sri Lanka. The leadership and the people in Sri Lanka have changed their mindset and thinking about India; for the first time, India is considered as an asset rather than a threat to the Sri Lanka’s security. A significant development in the post 1990 phase is that a large legal frame work is provided by ISFTA and the Institutional framework for the relationship is provided by frequent contacts at the political level.

Introduction

India-Sri Lanka enjoys excellent bilateral relations, sustained by geographical proximity, historical and cultural affinities and frequent high level political interactions.The specific geo-strategic location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean has been the most important factor in India-Sri Lanka relations. India is closest neighbour of Sri Lanka, separated from it at its narrowest point by 22 miles of sea called the Palk-strait.[i] The implication of such a close proximity is that developments in each country have affected the other. Its strategic location caused concern to the India security particularly because of the possibility of the involvement of external powers in the ethnic conflict. The presence of external powers there can possibly pose a serious threat to security and unity and integrity of India as well as to regional stability.

India-Sri Lanka relations are now affected by the regional power dynamic, with external powers seeking to increase their own, and counter the influence of others. India is the most important foreign supporter of Sri Lanka, and remains its largest trading partner. China has intention to play a hegemonistic role in South Asia. China is currently one of Sri Lanka’s major military suppliers, but also has a potential for economic investments and infrastructure projects. Sri Lanka Government under President Mahinda Rajapakse is exploiting the geo-political struggle unfolding in the Indian Ocean between China and India, with the United States having its own agenda for retaining its influence. While Pakistan is playing for stakes in Sri Lanka with Chinese acquiescence to queer the pitch for India, the Russian too are keeping a hawk eye on any activity in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s engagements in Sri Lanka are strategically sensitive to India. Strategically, it is in India interest to keep its rivals out of its sphere of influence. [ii] India sought to eliminate these security threats through various bilateral agreements with Sri Lanka.

The close proximity of Sri Lanka to India, gave a special kind of boundness between the two countries. Sri Lanka has had close relations with India since dawn of history. India and Sri Lanka having historical, cultural and geographical affinity dating back to the Ramayana.[iii] India-Sri Lanka relations are based on a deep and abiding friendship on shared historical experience and common civilisation and cultural values sustained by geographical proximity and ethnic affinity.[iv] The strong ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious links between the two countries have resulted in the development of close relationship at the people to people level.[v] There have been shifts and changes in the pattern of relationship marked by mutual differences, irritants, co-operation and friendship. Both the countries have developed adequate strength to withstand the stresses and strains is a notable feature of their bilateral relationship.[vi]It was only in 1990 after the withdrawals of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka when it paved the way for normalization of relations between India and Sri Lanka.[vii] In the post 1990 phase, the sharply improving economic co-operation between the two countries has its roots in the maturing political relationship. India’s clear, sincere and abiding commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and its supports for a peaceful, negotiated settlement for the Sri Lanka ethnic crisis that put animosity behind and sowed the seeds for eliminating all irritants in the political relations between the two countries.[viii]

Keeping in view India’s changing foreign policy perceptions and India’s earlier experience of Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 29^th July, 1987 and subsequent mission of the IPKF from 1987 to pre1990, and particularly after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), India has resisted the option of mediation or intervention in the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka. India new Sri Lanka policy vis a vis the ethnic conflict combines it old stands with the new realities. At the core of India foreign policy is a reiteration of the Indian government’s commitment to protect Sri Lanka’s unity, sovereignty and Territorial integrity.[ix] In the post 1990 period India has changed its policy towards Sri Lanka from intervention to non-intervention.  India’s pragmatic policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka’s commitment towards India’s security concern created a credible atmosphere and consequently brought a new era in relations between two countries. India’s new policy has contributed to remove the cultivated fear complex of Sri Lanka. The leadership and the people in Sri Lanka have changed their mindset and thinking about India; for the first time, India is considered as an asset rather than a threat to the Sri Lanka’s security.[x]

The relationship can best be described as having matured over to a deep and abiding friendship. In the post 1990 period, significant and definite changes have taken place in India-Sri Lanka political relations. The nature and pattern of relations are completely different. The comprehensive improvement in relations can be assessed both in qualitative and quantitative terms. The ending of mutual misperception between governments of both the countries and the increase in mutual understanding has brought about this desired change.  The regular high level contacts between leaders and senior officials are taking place signifying the importance and seriousness attributed to bilateral relations.[xi] The two Governments are in regular interaction so that actions of others are not misunderstood.[xii] Now the main task of the government of both the countries is to maintain the same pattern of relation by providing a continuity in co-operation and strengthening their mutual understanding in order to take their relations to the level of excellent.   

OVERVIEW OF PRE-1990 RELATIONSHIP

The government of India has often faced a great policy dilemma in responding to the Sri-Lankan Tamil ethnic conflict, which had deep impact on India-Sri Lanka relationship.[xiii] India had in the past been actively engaged in the process of negotiations for citizenship and other rights of Tamil of Indian origin. But its direct involvement in assisting Sri Lanka to work out a political solution to the ethnic conflict, at Sri Lanka’s request, began in the wake of July 1983 riots.[xiv] From 1983 to 1987 the objective of India’s involvement in Sri Lanka was twofold. India wanted to help Sri Lanka Government and the Tamils to evolve a workable solution to the ethnic conflict as it was wary of the emergence of a Tamil ‘Eelam’ nation out of Sri Lanka. At the same time India also wanted to prevent possibility of the involvement of external powers in the ethnic conflict.[xv] India considered the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka as an internal matter of Sri Lanka.[xvi] India believed that solution to this conflict had to be found within the framework of sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka. India did not support the Tamil demand for a separate state, because it would have a negative impact in South India and North-Eastern states. However, the ethnic riots in 1983 and the subsequent civil war between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE lead to an emotional upsurge in Tamil Nadu in favour of Tamils of Sri-Lanka.[xvii] Therefore, the government of India could not remain a passive spectator to mass killing of the Tamils, as Tamils in India were watching government of India’s lack of action with anxiety. The people and political parties in Tamil Nadu exerted pressure to force India to save the lives of “their brethren” in Sri Lanka. The Indian government condemned the killing of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Prime Minister Indra Gandhi was forced to take some steps to placate the opinion of Tamil Nadu. Indra Gandhi stated that the Indian government was dealing with the Tamils question in Sri Lanka as a national issue. She further expressed that, “India could not be regarded as ‘Just another country’ as every development in Sri Lanka affected India also.”[xviii] If Indian government failed to respond to the Tamil sentiments in India, this might lead to the demand for creation of an independent Dravidistan.[xix]

The escalation of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and possibility of involvement of external powers in the ethnic conflict and its perception in India and Sri Lanka compelled India and Sri Lanka to come to an agreement on 29^th July 1987. Subsequently IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka to oversee the implementation of the accord. India proactive politico-military intervention proved ultimately failure. The   lessons that India has learnt from its intervention are very harsh and hard to forget. India has realised its limitations. Many feel that Indian policy was ill conceived, unrealistic and adventurous. However, it can be stated that India’s intervention had certainly saved the Sri Lanka from territorial disintegration and also it had undoubtedly served India’s geo-security interests by preventing the entry of outside powers in the region. The events that unfold between 1983 to pre1990 were the most troubled and by and large conflictual years in the India­-Sri Lanka relationship. India’s intervention had embittered its relationship with both the government and people of Sri Lanka.

INDIA-SRI LANKA RELATIONS POST-1990 PHASE

In the post 1990 period, significant and definite changes have taken place in India-Sri Lanka relations. The nature and pattern of relations were completely different. The comprehensive improvement in relations can be assessed both in qualitative and quantitative terms. The ending of mutual misperception between governments of both the countries and the increase in mutual understanding has brought about this desired change. The main task of the government of both the countries was to maintain the same pattern of relations by providing a continuity in co-operation and strengthening their mutual understanding in order to take their relations to the level of excellence.         

Realising the constraints and cost of its direct intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka, from 1987-1990, India has adopted new policy of non-intervention with active interest in the ethnic conflict and focus on economic co-operation. India-Sri Lanka relations are multifaceted and interconnected; invariably, therefore they have implications for domestic politics and economy in the two countries. Nearly every bilateral issue between them is intertwined with some domestic issues and therefore became a matter of domestic political debate. There is inter-dependence but, at the same time, the smaller partner also complaints of asymmetry in the relationship. In post 1990 phase India and Sri Lanka have established, a dense bilateral network of institutions and mechanisms so as to ensure sustained cooperation irrespective of domestic politics and changes in the external environment of the two countries. [xx]

A significant development in the post 1990 phase was that a large legal frame work was provided by Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) which was signed at the highest political level on December 28, 1998, with an overall objective to promote trade and economic relations between the two countries and promote Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). It entered into force from March1st, 2000.[xxi] Following the Success of FTA both the governments are ready to sign Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Aside from the legal framework, during this period, the Institutional framework for the relationship is provided by frequent contacts at the political level, including at the highest levels, President, Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers of both the countries are engaged in bilateral discussion covering the entire gamut of the bilateral relationship. In this new phase, both the nations realise that restrictions on trade between the two are detrimental to their economic growth and prosperity.

India-Sri Lanka relations in the post 1990 period have undergone a contextual change in tandem with changes in India’s foreign policy perceptions. After the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the U.S. as the sole super power, India’s foreign policy perceptions have also changed. In keeping with the changing global economic and trade scenario, India’s strategic priorities in Indian Ocean Region have also undergone a change during the last two decades. India’s national security perceptions have now been enlarged to include economic security, free trade and commerce, energy security, and social security of the population in addition to territorial integrity. U.S. relations have become an important component of India’s strategic linkages to globally safeguard its interests.[xxii]

In the post-LTTE era, Sri Lanka has become closer to China, Pakistan and Israel because of their political and military support to Colombo during the War. China has partly filled the vacuum created by India’s reluctance to actively participate in Sri Lanka’s war effort. While Indian Government declined to provide military equipment, citing political compulsions and concern over the use of force against the LTTE. China filled in the gap with liberal supply of a wide variety of armaments.[xxiii] Timely help rendered during the war has enabled China to gain a lot of strategic space and credibility in Sri Lanka.[xxiv] China building the Hambantota port cannot be ignored by India. Hence it is important that India looks at these developments with great caution and ensure a proper policy towards Sri Lanka. India needs to invest in Sri Lanka to keep the later in its zone of influence. India’s timely help during the Tsunami has proved to the world that India is capable of handling challenges facing the region.

The United States of America has also been an active player in Sri Lanka both in promoting the peace process 2002 and later in supporting Sri Lanka’s war effort. However, on issues relating to Sri Lanka, the U.S. had been maintaining close contact with India. It is evident that the U.S. values India has unique geographic and strategic advantage in Sri Lanka; this relationship is likely to be strengthened to balance the increasing Chinese profile in the   South Asia region.[xxv]

The end of Eelam war has opened a new chapter in India-Sri Lanka relations. India need not worried about the presence of the third navy (Sea Tigers), Air Force (Air Tigers) and suicide cadres in the Indian Ocean, rather the close relations of Sri Lanka with China and Pakistan has increased strategic concern for India.[xxvi] India will have to safeguard its interests particularly in the Indian Ocean region.[xxvii] The sea-lanes of Indian Ocean have become vital for India’s expanding global trade. They carry fossil fuels so vital for India’s ever increasing energy needs.

India’s Sri Lanka relations are now broad based with economic agenda as a priority followed by strategic considerations. India strategic interest in Sri Lanka has been enlarged to protect and project India’s strategic and economic interests by building strong bonds with Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was the first country with which India signed a Free Trade Agreement; the trade between the two countries is expected to grow to $ 4 billion by the year 2010. [xxviii] There is greater appreciation between the two countries of the other’s problems and perceptions.

Inevitably the changes in India’s strategic perception were reflected in its present approach to Sri Lanka’s wars against the LTTE, particularly after the failure of the peace process 2002.[xxix] Its role had been limited as an advisor and counselor not only to Sri Lanka but to the four co-chairs-the European Union, Japan, Norway and the U.S. who promoted the peace process. India scrupulously kept out of Sri Lanka’s war with the LTTE despite strong internal political pressure from coalition partners in Tamil Nadu. India’s agenda for Sri Lanka had mainly focused on strategic security cooperation and building of trade linkages.[xxx]

India new Sri Lanka policy vis a vis the ethnic conflict combines it old stands with the new realities. At the core of it is a reiteration of the Indian government’s commitment to protect Sri Lanka’s unity, sovereignty and Territorial integrity. Permanent peace in Sri Lanka require institutional restructuring aimed at creating ethnic equality; a power sharing arrangement to satisfy the ‘aspirations of all the Sri Lankan communities, especially those of Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sri Lankan Muslims’, is considered as the most desirable democratic option.[xxxi] This prominority position under lining the need for devolution of powers to counter the majority community’s entrenched position on ethnic democratic centralism.[xxxii]

CHANGING ROLE OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS

A key reason for India-Sri Lanka relations to improve dramatically since the mid 1990’s was the change of governments in both the countries (as power moves from the hand of the United National Party to the Sri Lanka Freedom Party after 17 years).Following the General Election in India the Congress party led by Rajiv Gandhi was replaced in New Delhi by the National Front Government headed by Vishwanath Pratap Singh. V.P. Singh declared his Sri Lankan policy by saying,

“In the first place, it was mistake to have sent our troops there. The whole affair had started on a wrong note. Our position was clear: we favour a phased withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka.” [xxxiii]

The phased withdrawal of the IPKF was completed by 24^th March 1990.

The Sri Lanka policy of V.P. Singh Government became clear when the External Affairs Minister I.K. Gujral gave the statement that, India no longer wanted to intervene in Sri Lanka militarily. The Sri Lankan Government should deal with its Tamil problem as an internal affair in which India would not take any interest. He also said that the Indian Territory would not be allowed for subversive activities against Lanka under any circumstances. I. K. Gujral also said,

“India had always favoured a negotiated political solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. An adequate package of devolution had to be vigorously implemented and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 provided a good basis.”[xxxiv]

The V. P. Singh Government was succeeded by the Chandrashekhar Government. Its tenure was short lived and by February-March 1991 it was clear that India would be going in for another general election. During the rule of V.P. Singh and later that of Chandraskehkar, India-Sri Lanka relations had been of low key nature.[xxxv] After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991 entire Indian perspective on the LTTE changed. On May14, 1992 the LTTE was formally banned in India.[xxxvi]

In the General election of 1991, the Congress Party came back in power and P. V. Narasimha Rao became the Prime Minister of India. After assuming power Rao declared his Sri Lankan policy. He said that, India would not desire to take any active part in resolving the problems of Sri Lanka. These problems would have to be solved by Sri Lankans themselves, regardless of whether they are Sinhalese or Tamils, “At the bilateral level, India showed more interest in developing of framework for a working relationship with Sri Lanka, rather than identifying itself with Sri Lankan Tamil cause.” [xxxvii]

The Government of India and the Government of Tamil Nadu would ensure to the extent possible, that the LTTE did not have base or sanctuaries in India. India remained opposed to any secessionist or terrorist group operating from its territory against any of its neighbours.[xxxviii] An Agreement was signed between India and Sri Lanka in July 1991 to establish an Indo-Sri Lanka Joint Commission. Its sub commissions included those on trade, investment and finance, science and technology.[xxxix] President Premasdasa visited India in October 1992 and discussed the bilateral relations of two countries.[xl]

Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga became the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. She headed a coalition of political parties, People’s Alliance. She attempted to resolve the ethnic conflict through peaceful means and involved in direct talks with LTTE. After being elected, President Chandrika Kumaratunga paid a significant visi to India in March 1995 and laid the base for close relation with India. President Chandrika Kumaratunga again visited in May 1995 for the SAARC Summit.[xli]

The Narasimha Rao Government lost power in 1996 and H.D. Deve Gowda became the new Prime Minister of India. I. K. Gujral once again assumed the office of External Affairs Minister. President Kumaratunga sent her Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar to India on a goodwill visit in 1996. India and Sri Lanka focused their attention on economic cooperation. Later on I. K. Gujral became the Prime Minister in late 1997. He clearly understood the importance of maintaining friendly relations with the neighbours. He introduced ‘Gujral Doctrine’.[xlii]

After the midterm elections in 1998, Bhartiya Janta Party along with its alliance (National Democratic Alliance) came in to power at the Centre. As soon as Atal Bihari Vajpayee became the new Prime Minister of India, the Sri Lanka representative was among the first to reach India. India reassured Sri Lanka that it respected the sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka and it had no intention to intervene in its internal affairs.[xliii]

The fourth session of the India-Sri Lanka Joint Commission took place in New Delhi on December 18, 1998. The Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Sri Lanka to attend the 10th SAARC Summit. He said that India would be willing to conclude bilateral Free Trade Agreements with the member countries. By the end of December 1998, President Kumaratunga’s visit to India resulted in the conclusion of the historic Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement. The Sri Lankan President said,

“The agreement would not only cement close relations between India and Sri Lanka but also serve as a pacemaker for regional cooperation in South Asia.” [xliv]

In May 2000, when the conflict intensified between the LTTE and the security forces over Elephant Pass and refugees started streaming to India, the Indian government approached the issue cautiously. When Sri Lanka requested for troops or arms also after the Elephant Pass fell to the LTTE on April 2000 and the security forces were trapped in Jaffna, India declined to oblige.[xlv]

In 2001 Parliamentary election, Sri Lanka’s main Opposition Party UNP won the majority and Ranil Wickremesinghe became the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. He visited India in December 24, 2001. He not only obtained New Delhi’s blessings to any peace initiative launched through the good offices of Norway but also asked Norway to make sure that New Delhi kept in picture.[xlvi] The warm relations between the two countries continued ever since, and determined to forge closer ties with India. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s concept of ties between the two countries extends to the extent of wanting both countries to partner each other in building a bridge, utterly, across, the Palk-Strait.[xlvii] In February 2002, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesignhe and the LTTE cheif, Velupillai Prabhakaran signed a Ceasefire Agreement and an MoU to take the peace process forwards, India welcomed this Agreement.

Norway broke ceasefire agreement between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government, which went into effect from 23^rd February, 2002. After six rounds of talks negotiation were suspended in April 2003.India has supported the Norwegian facilitation of the peace process in Sri Lanka since 2002, departing from its traditional and antagonist policy against the involvement of external powers in south Asia. The assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadigamar, reignited the conflict.[xlviii] Ultimately peace talks broke down and the Sri Lanka Government withdrew from the truce, prompting Norway monitor to pull out from the country.

In November, 2005 national elections Mahinda Rajapakse of SLFP was elected president.[xlix] Like previous governments, the administration of President Mahinda Rajapaksa devotes the highest priority to India-Sri Lanka relationship and president has visited India on five occasions, since assuming the office in November 2005.[l] President was of the view that the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of 29^th July1987 provided the best prospects for a solution. While there were those who were critical at the time of signing of the Agreement, over the years people have come to appreciate the fact that the 13^th Amendment to the constitution, which enacts the provisions of the Accord, provide space for a meeting of minds of those from all sides holding moderate opinion. There is also an appreciation of the role   played by the IPKF and the fact that 1200 killed and about 2500 injured. IPKF soldiers killed by the LTTE were fighting for the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.[li]

When the war began In January 2006 and the Sri Lankan Government began to resort to savage bombing of the Tamil areas in the northern part of Sri Lanka, the political parties in Tamil Nadu began to express deep concern. In August 2006 when news about the air attack on Sencholai orphanage and also a school meant for the internally displaced children reached Tamil Nadu there was righteous indignation. Almost all political parties came together and the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed a unanimous resolution. The resolution characterized the air attack as “barbaric, uncivilized and inhuman” The resolution also requested New Delhi to step up pressure on Colombo to cease fire immediately and try to arrive at a negotiated settlement.

In 2006, the government launched military campaign to root out the LTTE. The Sri Lanka army and paramilitary forces have driven the LTTE out of the East by exploiting the defection of Karuna. The governing coalition formed a partnership with the Pro-government splinter of the LTTE, Tamil Makkal Vidutnalai Pulikoel(TMVP), and installed the leader of that party as Chief Minister of the newly created eastern provincial council after May 2008 elections.[lii]

After capturing the East, the government security forces and the LTTE take on each other with renewed determination. The Sri Lanka Army has made deep in roads into LTTE strongholds in Mannar and Wanni in the North and captured Killinochi. The sea and Air Tigers too have suffered setbacks. After a 30 month long military campaign,Sri Lankan armed forces have ultimately military defeated the LTTE and freed the nation from three decades of terror in May 2009.[liii] 80,000 people officially listed were killed during the war.[liv] The end of military conflict with the LTTE has brought Sri Lanka to a major turning point in its history with the death of LTTE Chief Velupillai Prabakaran, the militant campaign for a Tamil State in Sri Lanka seems to have come to an end.

POST-LTTE ERA RELATIONSHIP        

In the post-war period, a frictional chapter in India-Sri Lankan history has come to an end. It is time for India and Sri Lanka to start a new chapter with renewed vigour and vitality by rigorous co-operation in various fields.[lv] It is likely that this period would not see the policy of involvement but rather of mutual trust and harmony. In this period both countries agreed that with the end of military operation in the island country, the time is opportune to focus attention on issues of relief, rehabilitation, resettlement and reconciliation, including a permanent political solution.[lvi] First and foremost, the government has the huge responsibility of providing basic needs and proper relief close to 3 lakh persons who were recently displaced due to war and are currently housed in temporary shelters spread across the district of Vavuniya, Mannar and Jaffna. The imperative need is to resettle all these IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) in their original dwelling place as early as possible. It is not just a question of political will but of resources and expertise. [lvii] A special financial package is necessary to help the people of the North and East for re-construction and develop their battered economy and shattered lives.[lviii] The international attention on the humanitarian crisis that devolved in aftermath the war resulted in the government making certain guarantees towards the return and resettlement of the recently displaced.[lix]

India is providing humanitarian relief and assistance to internally displaced persons in Sri Lanka. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted on June 9, in his reply to the debate on the motion of thanks to the President’s address to the joint session of Parliament, that the Tamils’ problem was much larger than the LTTE and hoped the Sri Lanka government would show imagination and courage in meeting the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Tamil people.[lx] Prime Minister told parliament that India has made it known that it has no intention of instructing Colombo on the political front but is ready to play an active part in the relief   and rehabilitation of the IDPs and has earmarked Rs. 500 crore for the purpose. “We are willing to do more to restore normality and to help such people return to their rightful home and occupations.” [lxi]

C. Romesh Jayasinghe, Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner to India speaking at a seminar on “Post Conflict Sri Lanka and India’s Role, “organized by the Observer Research Foundation on July 7,2009 at Chennai, “Sri Lanka deeply  value the Rs.500 crore pledged by India and Rs.25 crore granted by Tamil Nadu for the rehabilitation of the IDPs in government transit facilities. Jayasinghe further said India’s bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka could be strengthened even further with the end to the military conflict.[lxii]

There is consensus within an outside Sri Lanka that with the LTTE out of the way, a golden opportunity has presented itself before the government to work towards a just, honourable and durable political settlement of the ethnic conflict. [lxiii] The government has promised a political package to address the grievances of the Tamil community and resettle the displaced persons in the north.[lxiv] President Mahinda Rajapakse also noted at victory rally in Colombo on June 3, “The war is over. Now is the time to win the hearts and minds of Tamils”. India’s constant refrain, over the years has been that Sri Lanka to come up with a political solution, including devolution of powers to the minorities to solve the ethnic conflict. India can now play a positive and meaningful role in Sri Lanka and ensure that ethnic minorities have a say in the Sri Lanka’s political future.

Speaking in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi, who is also the President of the DMK, pointed out that in the post-LTTE era, attaining the goal of Tamil Eelam was not a realistic goal. He advocated the pursuance of a “flexible policy”, where the Tamils should avoid critical comments about the Sinhalese “out of anger and hatred”, because it may have “adverse effect” on their well being. The need of the hour, Karunanidhi underlined, is for the Tamils to carry on their struggle “for equal rights, equal status for their language and devolution of power at the regional level”. This statement shows that transformation has taken place in the DMK perception on Sri Lanka. It may be recalled that in July 1983, on 27 August 1983, the DMK passed a resolution, which stated that a separate Tamil Eelam shall be the only remedy and permanent solution.[lxv]

In the post-LTTE era without devolution the internal situation in Sri Lanka would continued to be restive. This could have fall on the Tamil Nadu situation.[lxvi]In the Post civil war period if the relationship between Tamils of the Tamil Nadu and Tamil of Sri Lanka’s channel into a positive and vibrant force, a previously constraining force on India-Sri Lanka relations could transform into a promising connection that draw the India and Sri Lanka close together.[lxvii]

Jayanthi Natarajan of the Congress also its spokesperson in the Raja Sabha during motion of thanks to President said, “We demand that President Mahinda Rajapakse ensure proper devolution of authority to Tamils and discrimination must end. Nothing short of this will satisfy us.” [lxviii]

It is imperative that India adopts a pro active policy towards Sri Lanka, in order to not only save the people but also for its own security reasons. Economy aid could be a big trump card in India’s policy. India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has congratulated the President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa on his re-election of president in January 26, 2010. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated,

“We have time tested ties of friendship and co-operation. I look forward to working closely with you to further strength our close and multidimensional bilateral relations in the coming years.”    

Affirming a strong relationship with India, Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated,

“All countries are friends of Sri Lanka but India is Sri Lanka’s

relation (relative).” [lxix]

Indian Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao after inaugurating the Sri Lanka-India Centre for English Language Training in Peradeniya on 7th March, 2010 stated, India and Sri Lanka are “sister countries,” which shared a model, unique, and time-tested relationship.[lxx]

In the post-LTTE era, India is worried over the increasing Chinese influence and its implication for India’s security.[lxxi] The Chinese presence in Sri Lanka has increased so much that there is no major infrastructure project in which the Chinese have not invested. There is a perception that Hambantota may be detrimental to India’s strategic and security interests. Though China and Sri Lanka claim that this is merely a commercial venture, its future utility as a strategic asset for China cannot be ruled out. Though at present, there is no talk of a naval base, it could emerge ultimately to cater to the requirements of Chinese oil and gas tankers and anti-piracy patrols.[lxxii]

Sri Lankan President, Mahinda Rajapakasa, has sought to allay Indian Concerns about the growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka, saying India’s role in the Sri Lanka was a permanent feature. Unlike other players whose engagement was limited to commercial project they execute.

“The Chinese will Come to Sri Lanka, build some project and go, but the Indians will come here, they will build and they will stay. This is the difference in our relation with China and India.” [lxxiii]

Sri Lankan President told K. Venkataramanan of The Times of India in an interview at his ‘Temple Tree’ residence in Colombo on 28thJune, 2010.

Sri Lankan President while pointing out that China was only one of the countries which were involved in post-war development, Mahinda Rajapaksa further said that the China factor was a bogey raised to upset the Indian public and undermine his regime’s deepening ties with India.[lxxiv]

Affirming India’s interests, Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated earlier also during an interview to The Hindu, chief editor N. Ram at ‘Temple Tree’ in Colombo on 30th June, 2009,

“Sri Lanka will not initiate any action with any other country against India as it would be self defeating act. Sri Lanka does not see India’s prosperity and power detrimental to them. In fact, Sri Lanka stands to benefit from India’s prosperity.”[lxxv]

Colombo envoy Prasad Kariyawasam told IANS in an interview amidst concern about China growing influence in Sri Lanka,

“China is an old friend, but India is an older friend. Our political and economic friendship with China will not be at the expense of India. Sri Lanka will not be a party to any mechanism or effort to harm India’s strategic interests. Harming India interests will be like harming our interests.”[lxxvi]

In the post LTTE-era, India wants close relations with Sri Lanka to counter the growing influence of China and open up opportunities for Indian business.

To conclude, in the post 1990 phase, leadership in both the countries gave a new life and showed interest in India-Sri Lanka relations. V.P. Singh and I.K. Gujral decided on the withdrawls of the IPKF. P.V. Narasima Rao reoriented India’s Sri Lanka policy from an active involvement to non-intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka with a deep sense of practicality, taking into account the ground realities of the political situation in Sri Lanka. Chadrika Kumaratunge perceived India as an ally rather than an enemy. Leadership in both the countries concentrated on reviving areas of common interest, which has been ignored so far due to ethnic conflict. ‘Gujral Doctrine of India Foreign Policy’, which aimed at strengthening relations with neighbouring countries played a significant role in improving the relations between two countries. Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Chandrika Kumaratunge signed the historic ISLFTA. Ranil Wickremesinghe which was known for its west-oriented policy, supported close relations with India was an example of mature relations between India and Sri Lanka. The relations have become stronger during the tenure of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Mahinda Rajapakse. The maturity of relations between both the countries is evident from Sri Lanka’s strong support to India for permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

Notes and References:

Abstract

In the post LTTE-era the fishing rights of Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen have become a major issue between India and Sri Lanka. Despite the existence of various agreements and elaborate understanding, the fishermen issue has trigged unexpected worry in the excellent relations between the two countries. The main problem in the fishing rights in the Palk Bay is that of the conflict between the laws of the sea and traditional fishing rights. The Tamil Nadu fishermen even today invoke the historical rights and routinely stray into the IMBL for prawn fishing. Sometimes, the killing and detention of the Tamil Nadu fishermen, allegedly by the Sri Lankan Navy, becomes an emotive human rights issue (right to Life and Livelihood) in the domestic politics of Tamil Nadu. Despite various outcries the humanitarian aspect of the problem was overlooked by both the countries. Still, differences persist on the fishing rights of Indians and it has been decided by both the countries to address the issue amicably.

Despite the existence of two bilateral agreements of June 1974, and March 1976, the Joint Working Group and elaborate understanding, the fishermen issue has caused unexpected concern in the all-time high diplomatic relations between India and Sri Lanka. Indian fishermen being allegedly attacked and killed by the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) and subsequent protest by the Tamil Nadu fishermen community would have to be given priority as the State Assembly elections are approaching in the politically sensitive State. There is immense pressure from Tamil Nadu Government on the Indian Government to act decisively. Reflecting the political sensitivities in Tamil Nadu, the Indian Government has reacted strongly to the January 2011 incidents in which two Indian fishermen were killed in the span of ten days.

The fishermen issue has deeply affected the history, economy and culture of the coastal regions of both Tamil Nadu and northeast Sri Lanka. Since the fishermen of both the countries are living below the poverty line, so they go in search of fish wherever those are available. In their pursuit, they hardly respect the maritime boundaries. Despite the historical linkages between the fishermen of both Tamil Nadu

and northeastern Sri Lanka, they still see their comrades as martyrs and those on the other side of the international boundary line as aggressors.

The Sri Lankan fishermen poaching in other countries, waters are more widespread than Indian fishermen doing the same. But the Tamil Nadu fishermen even today invoke the historical rights and routinely stray into the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) for fishing. This has led to apprehension by the Sri Lankan Navy and in some cases even to shooting. Another factor that makes the Indian fishermen cross to Sri Lankan waters is availability of good quality fish and brown prawns beyond the IMBL. N.J. Pose, an Indian fisherman, said: “We take huge risks and cross and the border only for prawn.” On the other hand, the Sri Lankan fishermen also cross over to Indian waters near the Lakshadweep islands for Tuna fish.1 The other reasons are the lack of Global Positioning System (GPS) in mechanised boats and a chain of Automatic Identification System (AIS) stations along the Tamil Nadu coast.2

The main problem in the fishing rights in the Palk Bay is that of the conflict between the laws of the sea and traditional fishing rights. Historically the Indian fishermen and Sri Lankan fishermen have been fishing in the Palk Bay with occasional fights between the two groups; however with the ceding of Kachchativu to Sri Lanka in 1974, fishing has become an issue of contention between India and Sri Lanka. Until the civil war, which broke out in Sri Lanka in 1983, the Indian fishermen did not find it difficult to operate near Kachchativu for fishing. In due course of time, however, the Sri Lanka Navy has become unfriendly to the Indian fishermen owing to their inability to distinguish between genuine fishing vessels and boats used for smuggling goods for the Sri Lankan Tamil militants. Consequently, indiscriminate firing and killing of Indian fishermen became common. Entering into others’ waters and carrying out fishing activity is illegal. However, under Article 146 of the UN Law of Sea, “Measures will be taken to ensure effective protection of human life.”3 Despite outcries, the humanitarian aspect of the problem was overlooked by both the countries. In the post-war period, relaxations of fishing restrictions along the Sri Lanka coast have led the Sri Lankan fishermen to venture into the sea. Indian fishermen, who enjoyed a monopoly of resource rich waters, have now got competitors in the form of their Sri Lankan counterparts.4 During the ethnic conflict, the straining of Indian fishermen was overlooked. In the post-conflict period, the Sri Lankan Navy is patrolling the island’s maritime borders. In the post-LTTE era the fishing rights of the Indian fishermen and Sri Lankan fishermen have become a major issue. Both nations would need to sort out this issue at the earliest possible time. A solution to this issue is only possible if there is a proper agreement on fishing around the Kachchativu island.

Historical Background

PROJECTION of similar interest by India and Sri Lanka as regards the Indian Ocean is further reflected in the definitive agreement reached between the two countries on the question of demarcation of their maritime boundaries. The necessity for demarcation of these boundaries had been emphasised by the extension, by both states, of their territorial waters and contiguous areas, and by the disputed possession of the island of Kachchativu in the Palk Strait.5

Maritime Agreement of 1974 AFTER protracted talks and negotiations an agreement was signed, demarcating their maritime boundary in the Palk Strait on June 26, 1974 and it became effective from July 9, 1974. Though Kachchathivu was not mentioned but it fell on the Sri Lanka side of the boundary agreed upon by the two countries.6 The agreement demarcated a boundary in the sea from a point about 18 nautical miles northwest of point Pedra in the Palk Strait to Adams Bridge, a distance of approximately 86 nautical miles.7

According to the Tamil Nadu Government, its fishermen were the most affected party under the Maritime Agreement of 1974. Article 5 of this Agreement safegaurds the rights of the Indian fishermen and pilgrims: “Subject to the foregoing, Indian fishermen and pilgrims will enjoy access to visit Kachchathivu as hitherto, and will not be required by Sri Lanka to obtain travel documents or visas for these purposes.” The article, however, was vague enough for the Sri Lankan Government to argue: “The agreement did not give any fishing rights, but only gave permission of drying fishing nets, to rest and allowed the pilgrims to visit Kachchathivu for religious purposes.” This play of words later on became a source of tension between the Tamil Nadu Government and Sri Lanka.

Maritime Agreement of 1976

ANOTHER Maritime Boundary Agreement of 1976 affecting the boundary in the Gulf of Mannar and Bay of Bengal was signed between India and Sri Lanka, which gave each party sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones, as well as over their resources, whether living or non-living, falling on its side of boundary.

An important aspect of this agreement was regarding the fishing rights. According to this agreement:

“The fishing vessels and fishermen of India shall not engage in fishing in the historic waters, the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone of Sri Lanka, nor shall the fishing vessels and fishermen of Sri Lanka engage in fishing in the historic waters, territorials sea and the exclusive economic zone of India, without the express permission of Sri Lanka or India as the case may be.”8

The Maritime Agreement of 1976 clearly bans poaching. It created domestic problems for India with the Tamil Nadu Government. The Indian fishermen from Tamil Nadu who traditionally fished in and around the Kachchativu island for a rich catch felt cheated.9 The area round the island and beyond, nearer the Sri Lankan coast, is rich in prawns, and prawns are the main source of income for these fishermen since 1969. Fishermen used to go fishing wherever they wanted, and respected no maritime boundaries. Despite the maritime boundary, Sri Lanka’s naval surveillance and the LTTE’s resistance, Indian fishermen have been poaching in the waters around Kachchativu.

After 1980, in order to put brakes on the increasing activities of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Navy intensified its surveillance in this area. According to them, they have to be strict because of security reasons and due to this the Indian fishermen have to be the sufferers. These types of incidents instigated Statewide reactions. Former Chief Minister J. Jayalalitha of Tamil Nadu demanded the retrieval of Kachchativu.10

Later on, the Indian fishermen started having clashes with not just the Sri Lankan Navy but also with the Sri Lankan fishermen. Although Article 73 of the United Nations Law of the Sea prohibits shooting of straying fishermen, the Sri Lankan Navy had been quite trigger happy. The Government of India could do little to stop it given the security concerns of Sri Lanka in the light of the LTTE-led insurgency in northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka from 1983 onwards.

The Tamil Nadu fishermen say that fishing is their livelihood and the Indian Government should either arrange some other provision for their living or solve this problem with the Sri Lankan Government. Various proposals have been made from time to time to obtain fishing licence for the fishermen of the area. A proposal for lease in perpetuity or reciprocal licensing has also been mooted. All this requires concerted action by the governments. India has taken up on a priority basis with the Government of Sri Lanka the question of the safety of the Indian fishermen straying across the International Maritime Boundary Line. Keeping in mind the humanitarian issue, the countries agreed to put in place practical arrangements to deal with bonafide Indian and Sri Lankan

fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL). As part of these practical arrangements, it was decided that there will be no firing on Indian fishing vessels and Indian fishing vessels will not enter into sensitive areas designated by the Government of Sri Lanka along its coastline.

Joint Working Group AN institutional mechanism in the form of a Joint Working Group (JWG) has been constituted between India and Sri Lanka to deal with the issues related to fisheries.

The JWG last met in Colombo in January 2006 where it was agreed to: (i) Examine the possibility of not arresting straying fishermen within five nautical miles of the IMBL on either side,

(ii) Consider releasing the small fishing boats along with the fishermen on humanitarian grounds; and

(iii) Enhance coordination between the two Navies to curb illegal activities. However, whether this agreement is being followed in letter and spirit is a big question. As of now, there are no straying (bonafide) Indian fishermen in custody in Sri Lanka. The Indo-Sri Lankan International Maritime Boundary Line and the issue of fishing rights had been settled through bilateral agreements in 1976. The Indian fishermen, however, cross the maritime boundary in search of better ‘catch’ of high-valued prawns. Sometimes the treatment and detention of fishermen becomes an emotive human rights issue in the domestic politics of Tamil Nadu.11

On October 26, 2008 the two sides reached an elaborate understanding to put in place “practical arrangements to deal with bona fide Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line”. For the first time, both sides acknowledged and accepted that fishermen crossed the international boundary, and had to be dealt with in non-lethal ways. The steps included designation by Sri Lankan of sensitive areas along its coastline that Indian fishing vessels could not venture into even if they crossed the IMBL. The governments also agreed that there would be no firing on trespassing vessels, which would have a valid registration or permit; the fishermen were to carry government-issued identity cards. These measures led to a remarkable drop in the number or arrests of Indian fishermen by the Sri Lankan authorities, from nearly 1500 in 2008 to just 34 in 2010.12 According to official data, more than 400 Tamil Nadu fishermen have been killed after 1983, including as many as 118 between1991 to 2008.13 There were no incidents of killing in 2009 and 2010.

However, in the January 2011 incident two fishermen were killed allegedly by the Sri Lankan Navy in a span of 10 days following which India lodged a strong protest with the island nation and sought strong action to end such incidents.14 Jayalalitha of the AIADMK of Tamil Nadu said: “The retrieval of Kachchathivu was the only solution to end the suffering of the Tamil Nadu fishermen.”

Significantly, President Mahinda Rajapaksa has hinted at a rethink on the two-year-old understanding, remarking to the press that the end of the war against the LTTE and the peaceful situation in northern Sri Lankan necessitated a revision in the existing arrangements. Clearly, there is an apprehension in Sri Lanka that Indian fishermen are now taking advantage of these arrangements to cross the IMBL regularly and in greater numbers, threatening the livelihood of fishermen on the other side.15 While these concerns are real, it is extraordinarily difficult to physically prevent fishermen from crossing the international maritime boundary. External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, in response to a Call Attention Motion in the Rajya Sabha, said:

“The Government of India provides protective cover to fishermen as long as they do not stray into the Sri Lankan water. We are bound by a bilateral treaty and we to act according to rules.” 16

Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi of the DMK expressed reservations over the draft Marine Fisheries (Regulation and Management) Act, 2009, by the Indian Government, saying that the conditions stipulated for fishing beyond 12 nautical were “too severe and impracticable”. Referring to the clause that makes a special permit mandatory for fishing to go beyond 12 nautical miles would pave the way for duplication of the licence system and create confusion. In the absence of clear-cut geographical zoning, it would not be possible to prevent the fishermen from crossing 22 nautical miles.17 Jayalalitha of the AIADMK in a statement alleged that the Bill had been drafted for the benefit of multinational fishing companies and the AIADMK would oppose the Bill in Parliament at the introduction stage itself. Jayalalitha asked the DMK to withdraw support to the Centre, if it really had concern for the fishermen.18

On March 2, 2009 the Sri Lankan Government declared a ‘Fishing Ban’ on Indian fishing boats operating around the northern and eastern coasts, authorising the Navy to fire on any of them seen in these waters without express permission.19 However, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa, during his visit to India from June 7, to June 11, 2010, and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to explore ways to strengthen the safety and security of fishermen and in this context directed their officials to revive the

meetings of the bilateral Joint Working Group on fishing. It was also decided to enhance and promote contacts between the fishermen’s associations on both sides.20

Following the killing of two Indian fishermen, the Foreign Secretary of India, Nirupama Rao, along with senior officials of the Ministry of External Affairs visited Sri Lanka on January 30-31, 2011. During the visit she called on President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Minister for External Affair, G.L. Peiris. Rao expressed deep concern over the killing of two Indian fishermen allegedly by the Sri Lankan Navy and said it expected the island nation to put in place “effective measures” to avoid recurrence of such incidents. In a joint statement issued at the end of the visit both India and Sri Lanka agreed that use of force cannot be justified under any circumstances and both countries desired to find an amicable solution to the issue.21 Nirupama Rao’s visit to Sri Lanka has contributed to easing of tensions in bilateral relations between the two countries. Following heavy diplomatic pressure from India, Sri Lanka released 136 Indian fishermen on February 18, 2011.

To conclude, in order to resolve the fishermen issue between India and Sri Lanka, maritime agreements were signed in 1974 and 1976 and a boundary line was demarcated. In the post-LTTE era, fishing communities in Tamil Nadu need to be sensitised to the imperative of respecting the sanctity of the IMBL but the penalty for trespass cannot be death. Despite outcries, the humanitarian aspect of the issue was overlooked by both the countries. As India and Sri Lanka have excellent political and economic relations, it has been decided by both the countries to address the fishermen issue amicably. Joint measures to solve this problem, such as joint naval patrolling, controlling of smuggling and piratical activities, developing fish farming extensively in the Indian waters and strengthening of communication network, have been suggested.

REFERENCES

1. A. Subramayam Raju (2008), “Maritime Issue between India and Sri Lanka”, in A. Subramayam Raju, India-Sri Lanka Partnership in the 21st Century, Kalpaz Publications, New Delhi, pp. 157-161.

2. Mahalingam Ponnusswamy (2011), “Lure to Catch leads Tamil Nadu Fishermen to Cross Line”, The Times of India, January 27.

3. A. Subramayam Raju, op. cit., p. 159.

4. N. Manoharan, “Fishing in Troubled Waters: Indian Fishermen and India Sri Lanka Relations,” http://www. eurasiareview.com, accessed on February 20, 2011.

5. S.U. Kodikara (1982), Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka: A Third World Perspective, Chanakya Publications, New Delhi, p. 30.

6. P. Sahadevan (2004), “India-Sri Lanka: A Changing Relationship”, Dialogue, New Delhi, Vol. 5, No. 3, January-March, p. 154.

7. Ravikant Dubey (1995), Indo-Sri Lanka Relations: With Special Reference to the Tamil Problem, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, p. 101.

8. Ibid.

9. Avtar Singh Bhasin, India in Sri Lanka between Lion and the Tigers, Manas Publications, New Delhi, p. 18.

10. V. Suryanarayan and P. B. Venkatasubramanian, “Sri Lanka-Focus on Kachchativu”, http://www.southasian analysis.org1%5cpapers29%5cpaper2837html., accessed on September 28, 2009.

11. Ministry of External Affairs (BSM Division: India) “Brief on India Sri Lanka Relations”, http://meaindia.nic.in/foreign relations/Sri lanka.pdf., accessed on November 11, 2009.

12. The Hindu, “Fishermen Again,” http://www.thehindu.com/, accessed on January 28, 2011.

13. Mahalingam Ponnusswamy (2011), “Lure to Catch leads Tamil Nadu Fishermen to Cross Line,” The Times of India, January 27.

14. The Times of India (2011), January 28.

15. Ibid.

16. Vibha Sharma (2010), “Fishermen told not to Stray into Sri Lanka Waters,” The Tribune, August 12.

17. N. Ravi Kumar (2009), “DMK opposes Bill on marine Fisheries,” The Tribune, Chandigarh, November 24. 18. Ibid.

19. Edgar O’ Balance (1989), The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-88, Brassy’s (UK), p. 59.

20. The Hindu (2010), June10, http://thehindu.com/, accessed on September 25, 2010

21. The Tribune (2011), March 1.

The author is an Associate Professor and the Head of the Department of Political Science, M.R. Government College, Fazilka.